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LITERATURE, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY,
AND THE CONSTITUTION
WILLIAm B. LOCKHART* AND ROBERT C. MCCLURE**
Early in 1946 when Doubleday & Company, Inc., an old and
very large and reputable publishing house,1 published Edmund
Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County, book reviewers and critics
had a field day; for Edmund Wilson was then as now the nation's
most distinguished literary critic, and this was his first book of
fiction since I Was a Daisy, published in 1929.2 To Virgilia Peter-
son in Commonweal the Memoirs was "a pathological joke," "a
string of satiric stories which, in their aimlessly offensive vulgarity
(aimless, unless the aim was in fact to offend) defy description." 3
Others went to the opposite extreme: Ralph Bates in the New York
Times called it "a good, a distinguished book,"'4 and Time magazine
said that "it was the first event of the year which can be described
as 'literary,' " and that it was "pretty certainly the best contempor-
ary chronicle, so far, of its place and period." 5 Most reviewers,
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
**Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
The authors have under way a more extensive study of obscenity censor-
ship of literature, which will be published by the University of Minnesota
Press.
1. The Doubleday firm was incorporated in 1897. By 1946 it was publish-
ing more than 300 separate titles and between 24,000,000 and 36,000,000 books
per year. See Transcript of Record, pp. 17-18, Doubleday & Co. v. New York,
335 U. S. 848 (1948).
2. "When the man who is the sharpest and most readable literary critic
of our time produces a long work of fiction he is laying himself wide open
to attack. He who has assaulted so many fly-blown reputations and flattened
so many writers who were hailed as budding geniuses may expect to find
himself in the direful position of the armed knight of old who was pushed off
his horse and lay helpless on his back where the common soldier might have
a go at him." Smith, Book Review, 29 Saturday Review of Literature 22
(Mar. 23, 1946).
3. 43 Commonweal 660 (Apr. 12, 1946).
4. N. Y. Times Book Review, Mar. 31, 1946, pp. 7, 16.
5. 17 Time 102 (Mar. 25, 1946). At least two other reviewers also gave
the Memoirs extravagant praise. They were Dola De Jong, 6 Knickerbocker
Weekly 23 (July 22, 1946) and John Richmond, 5 Tomorrow 72 (June, 1946).
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however, simply took advantage of the opportunity to discuss the
book from a literary viewpoint.,
The Memoirs is made up of six related stories about the lives
of upper-crust residents of a suburban community not far from
New York City. The longest of these, and the story that provoked
the greatest controversy because of its detailed description of sexual
intercourse,7 is The Princess With the Golden Hair. One reviewer
described the story as "adulterous dabbling ... revealing the inti-
macies of these experiences with unpardonable pleasure." Most
of the other reviewers also noticed the sexual episode but found
nothing pleasurable in it, from either the reader's or the author's
viewpoint. 0 For they had discovered that The Princess and the
other stories of the Memoirs were rigidly moralistic studies of
evil;- one was even tempted to "accuse him [the author] of the
6. See Match, N. Y. Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review, Mar. 10,
1946, p. 3; Smith, 29 Saturday Review of Literature 22 (Mfar. 23, 1946) ;
Cowley, 114 New Republic 418 (Mar. 25, 1946) ; Kazin, 13 Partisan Review
375 (1946) ; Trott, 26 Canadian Forum 163 (Oct., 1946) ; Chamberlain, 192
Harpers Magazine (June, 1946); and Trilling, 162 Nation 379 (Mar. 30,
1946).
Charles Poore of the New York Times, Mar. 7, 1946, p. 23, col. 3, was
Wilson's most caustic critic: "The clarity and force of Mr. Wilson's criticism
seem to vaporize when he starts to tell a story; ... It is hard to understand
why Mr. Wilson the critic allows Mr. Wilson the story-teller to clutter up his
tales with so much irrelevant or disparate material; ... It is when he starts
collaborating with Proust, Joyce, Freud, Marx, Henry James, Scott Fitz-
gerald and the historians of the Greek and Roman mythologies, all at the
same time, that we want to ask Edmund Wilson the critic to step in and
straighten out Edmund Wilson the story-teller."
7. P. 190.
8. Peterson, 43 Commonweal 660 (Apr. 12, 1946).
9. "The descriptions of love are so zoological, the narrator is so intent
on making a safari through the bedroom with gun and microscope, that we
find he is preserving only the stuffed and mounted hides of his love affairs;
what has disappeared is simply their passion, the breath of their life. And the
reader feels like those children in a very progressive school who went to their
teacher with a question. 'We know all about how babies come to be born,' they
said, 'but what we can't understand is why people like to do it.'" Cowley, 114
New Republic 418 (Mar. 25, 1946). See also Kazin, 13 Partisan Review 375(Summer, 1946) ; Trilling, 162 Nation 379 (Mar. 30, 1946) ; 27 Newsweek 96
(Mar. 11, 1946).
10. "The intent is serious, even in the sections that might seem to be
sheer pornography, and at moments Mr. Wilson achieves passages of real
insight. But there is a blindness in the book that robs it of any ultimate
effectiveness; and for a man who spends so much time cultivating the sensuous
aspects of life Mr. Wilson exhibits an astounding lack of joy .. . [T]he
Casanova in Wilson seems always ready to ask permission of a psychiatrist
to enjoy himself. He is the Puritan inalgr lid." Chamberlain, 192 Harpers
Magazine (June, 1946). See also Poore, New York Times, Mfar. 7, 1946,
p. 23, cal. 3; Trott, 26 Canadian Forum 163 (Oct., 1946) ; Richmond, 5
Tomorrow 72 (June, 1946) ; De Jong, 6 Knickerbocker Weekly 23 (July 22,
1946) ; Smith, 29 Saturday Review of Literature 22 (far. 23, 1946) ; 17 Time
102 (Mar. 25, 1946) ; 2 U. S. Quarterly Book List 183 (Sept., 1946).
11. "Critic Wilson's purpose is to develop a subtle and ambitious theme
of Evil in our times." 17 Time 102 (far. 25, 1946). "forally it (Hecate
County) is the scene of a conflict between good and evil, in which evil
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very Manichean heresy-the belief that 'the devil is contending on
equal terms with God and that the fate of the world is in doubt'-
which he himself protests in one of the stories." 12
Despite the author's moral purpose and the intelligent readers'
understanding of it, the sexual episode in The Princess did create
the risk, as Harrison Smith in the Saturday Review of Literature
put it, that
"a great deal of what is fine and accurate writing and observa-
tion in 'Memoirs of Hecate County' may be swept away in the
mind of future readers by the notoriety that these scenes will
evoke. We have managed to keep at bay the literary censors
and the keyhole peepers who insist that books shall not be
printed that their little Lucy should not read. It would be un-
fortunate and ironic if our foremost literary critic should rouse
those dogs to bay at literature again."' 3
Mr. Smith's guess proved to be right; for that old dog, the New
York Society for the Suppression of Vice (since renamed the New
York Society for the Improvement of Morals), soon began to bay
again.
1 4
Within a few months, Memoirs of Hecate County was under
attack for obscenity on three fronts. A jury conviction in Los
Angeles and a hung jury in San Francisco were minor skirmishes.1
The major battle had to be fought at the seat of publication in
New York, where Doubleday itself was charged with publishing
and selling an obscene book. Here the issue of constitutional pro-
tection for those charged with publishing or selling obscene litera-
ture was squarely raised in such a way as to reach the Supreme
Court of the United States for the first time. The Supreme Court
divided equally with no opinions' 6 -a fitting culmination for this
is stronger and more personalized--one of the characters is or appears to be
Satan himself-and wins minor victories one after another, but never achieves
a complete triumph." Cowley, 114 New Republic 418 (Mfar. 25, 1946). For
others who made the same point, see: Poore, New York Times, Mar. 7, 1946,
p. 23, col. 3; Smith, 29 Saturday Review of Literature 22 (Mar. 23, 1946) ;
Kazin, 13 Partisan Review 375 (Summer, 1946) ; Chamberlain, 192 Harpers
Magazine (June, 1946); Trott, 26 Canadian Forum 163 (Oct., 1946).
See also Transcript of Record, pp. 29-31, 38, Doubleday & Co. v. New York,
335 U. S. 848 (1948).
12. Trilling, 162 Nation 379, 380 (Mfar. 30, 1946).
13. 29 Saturday Review of Literature 22 (Mar. 23, 1946).
14. 150 Publ. Wk. 287 (1946).
15. See 150 Publ. Wk. 1603, 1983 (1946). In Los Angeles no expert
witnesses were permitted; in San Francisco, where expert witnesses testified
regarding the literary merit of the book, 8 of the jurymen were reported to
have held out for acquittal. The Los Angeles conviction was later upset upon
appeal. People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P. 2d 853 (1947).
As the attacks got under way, the initial printing of 70,000 was sold out,
and no new printing was planned. 150 Publ. Wk. 1506 (1946).
16. Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U. S. 848 (1948). Mr. Justice
Frankfurter did not participate.
1954]
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strange litigation in which Doubleday was convicted, and the con-
viction affirmed by three courts, without a single opinion except the
lone unpublished dissent of one of the trial judges.17 Despite this
judicial silence, it is significant that four of the Supreme Court
justices must have voted for constitutional protection for the out-
spoken treatment of sexual intercourse found in the Memoirs.
In the trial before three judges in the Court of Special Ses-
sions of The City of New York, the entire case for the prosecution
consisted of a stipulation that Doubleday had published and sold
Memoirs of Hecate County and the introduction of an unmarked
copy of the book. One of the justices would have preferred a
marked copy indicating the objectionable passages, 8 but his interest
was probably satisfied when the prosecution singled out and read
into the record two sexual passages 9 during the cross examination
of Professor Lionell Trilling of Columbia University, a distin-
guished author and literary critic.
Professor Trilling testified for the defense that the author,
Edmund Wilson, is the best known American literary critic in this
country 2 0 and that Memoirs of Hecate County is largely a satirical
work, which "makes a rather stern and severe judgment of what is
happening in our modern culture," with "the intention of inducing
in the reader a sense of disgust with all he is likely to find around
him in life."12' On cross examination, counsel for the State read to
Professor Trilling two passages apparently considered the most
objectionable-each a description of sexual intercourse written in
the first person. Professor Trilling pointed out how these descrip-
tions, including "a rather precise and literal account of a woman's
sexual parts in the sexual act," fulfilled the author's aim in a story
about sexuality, in which he sought to contrast the vulgar and out-
spoken with "tender and charming gallantry. ' 22 Professor Trilling's
conclusion was that there is a close relationship between these pas-
sages and the theme of the book which is "very moral" in its em-
phasis upon the defeat of what is good and the corruption of what
is pure.23
In its motion to dismiss, the defense raised the constitutional
issue of liberty of the press under the New York Constitution, and
17. Transcript of Record, p. 47, Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335
U. S. 848 (1948).
18. Id. at 11-14. All of the justices recognized, however, that the book
must be judged as a whole.
19. Id. at 34-35.
20. Id. at 27.
21. Id. at 29-30.
22. Id. at 35-36.
23. Id. at 38.
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the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.24 One month
later a majority of the trial court found Doubleday guilty on both
charges, but wrote no opinion and gave no reasons.25 In a short
dissenting opinion finding the book not obscene, Justice Perlman
stressed the author's honest concern with "the complex influences
of sex and of class consciousness on man's relentless search for
happiness.""- He pointed out that this is a problem of deep concern
to the mature reading public, who ought not to be deprived of the
writer's insight because of the possible harmful effects upon the
young and immature. He did not consider the constitutional issues.
The conviction of Doubleday was affirmed without opinion,
first in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
"York, U7 and then in the Court of Appeals where Doubleday had
contended that the conviction violated the right to "freedom of
speech" guaranteed by the due process clause of the 14th Amend-
ment.'-s Evidently the Court of Appeals considered the constitutional
issue too trivial for comment-a viewpoint apparently shared by
counsel for the state, who chose to minimize the issue by limiting
his brief on the constitutional point in the United States Supreme
Court to six sentences contending that a conviction for obscenity
raises no constitutional problem . 2  In contrast, the Supreme Court
not only considered this freedom of expression issue substantial,30
but divided equally in affirming the conviction when the sole issue
before it was freedom of expression under the 14th Amendment.31
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id. at 42. In commenting on this conviction, Time magazine stated
that Memoirs of Hecate County
"... was what the non-literary citizen would call a raw book and decidedly
not for high school youngsters. One of its 6 short stories had 20 more or
less detailed descriptions of sexual intercourse. But Memoirs was no
flippant bedroom farce. Fat, fiftyish Author Wilson, book critic for the
New Yorker had written it as a critique of modem manners and morals.
... The decision made thousands of citizens more impatient than ever to
get their morals ruined. It also proved again that finding a yardstick for
proving a serious work indecent is as difficult as weighing a pound of
waltzing mice." 48 Time 23-25 (Dec. 9, 1946).
26. Transcript of Record, p. 48.
27. People v. Doubleday & Co., 272 App. Div. 799, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 736
(1st Dep't 1947).
28. 297 N. Y. 687, 77 N. E. 2d 6 (1947).
29. Brief for Appellees, pp. 8, 11. The State's oral argument was even
briefer-three short sentences. See 17 U. S. L. Week 3119 (1948).
30. In response to the State's motion to dismiss or affirm on the ground
that the appeal presented no substantial federal question, the Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction. Doubleday v. New York, 68 Sup. Ct. 732 (1948) ;
see Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, Doubleday v. New York, 335
U. S. 848 (1948).
31. It may be noted that in the trial court the motion to dismiss spoke
in terms of "freedom of the press" while the formal order in the Court of
Appeals used the term "freedom of speech." Technically, censorship of litera-
ture relates directly to freedom of the press, but no issues in this article
1954]
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In presenting this constitutional issue, counsel for Doubleday
did not scatter their shots. Their brief relied exclusively on the
First Amendment, as read into the 14th. It centered on the single
contention that works of literature, both fiction and nonfiction, deal-
ing with sex problems are entitled to the same constitutional pro-
tection as any other literature, and can only be suppressed when
their publication creates a "clear and present danger" to some
substantial interest of the state. Memoirs of Hecate County, it
urged, gave rise to no danger, either clear or present, that it would
subvert order or morality.3 2 Similarly, the amicus brief of the
American Civil Liberties Union relied exclusively on the First
Amendment argument, urging the clear and present danger test as
the appropriate criterion.3 3 While some point was made of the
lack of definiteness in the state obscenity statute and its interpreta-
tions, this argument was directed to the necessity for an ascertain-
able standard of conduct through use of the First Amendment clear
and present danger test.34 Neither brief made any claim of in-
validity based on the 14th Amendment due process requirement of
definiteness in a criminal statute.8
The oral arguments in the Supreme Court, insofar as report-
ed,3 6 were also concerned exclusively with the freedom of expression
issue and the applicability of the clear and present danger test to
literature attacked as obscene. Various members of the Court ex-
pressed interest in and raised questions about this issue. Mr. Jus-
tice Rutledge volunteered:
"It is up to the State to demonstrate that there was a danger,
and until they demonstrate that, plus the clarity and imminence
of the danger, the constitutional prohibition would seem to
apply. '37
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Jackson suggested that if the Court
decided "constitutional issues on the merits of literary works" in
obscenity cases it "would become the High Court of Obscenity."':"
Since the sole issue presented to the Court was freedom of ex-
pression in literature attacked as obscene, and the members of the
turn on a distinction between freedom of the press and freedom of speech. In
general, we use the broader term encompassing both-freedom of expression.
Cf. 1 Chafee, Government and Mass Communication 34-35 (1947) ; Richard-
son, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
2 n. 1 (1951).
32. Brief for Appellant, pp. 13-37.
33. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Ainicus Curiae, pp. 5-15.
34. Brief for Appellant, pp. 37-52; Brief for American Civil Liberties as
Amicus Curiae, pp. 16-40.
35. Cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948); see Note, Due
Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1948).
36. See 17 U. S. L. Week 3117-3119 (1948).
37. Id. at 3118.
38. Id. at 3119.
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Court themselves showed much interest in this issue at the oral
argument, there can be little doubt that the equally divided vote
in the Doubleday case reflects a Court closely divided on this con-
stitutional issue. This four to four vote in 1949 indicates that the
issue is still an open one. Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not partici-
pate in the decision, and three of those who did participate have
been replaced.: 9 Even assuming that two of these, Justices Rut-
ledge and Murphy, probably voted for reversal of the Doubleday
conviction, the present Court may still be very closely divided. It
cannot be assumed that the four justices who voted for affirmance,
if still on the Court, would refuse constitutional protection to all
literary treatment of sexual issues when attacked as obscene. It
must be remembered that Memoirs of Hecate County, despite its
literary merit, contained one extremely frank passage that may
have shocked one or more justices into voting for affirmance when
they might have been inclined to give First Amendment protection
to literature treating sex problems with a little more restraint.
At the very least the Doubleday case demonstrates that consti-
tutional protection for literature attacked as obscene is an open
and live issue today, despite the scattered dicta in a number of
Supreme Court opinions suggesting that obscenity is not entitled to
constitutional protection.40 Certainly, after the Doubleday case these
dicta impose no serious barrier to raising the constitutional issue
in an appropriate case. This Article is written in the belief that it
is essential for this issue to be raised and carried to the Supreme
Court in a strong case in order to establish that literature dealing
with sex is entitled to the same freedom of expression as literature
dealing with any other significant social problem. Supreme Court
recognition that such literature is entitled to the constitutional pro-
tection given freedom of expression generally, and is entitled to be
tested by the same constitutional standards, 41 would provide a
powerful means for inducing local authorities to pay less attention
to pressure groups and to adopt a rational and realistic approach
in appraising charges of obscenity in literature. Such a ruling would
go far toward bringing about a quick restoration of sanity when
periodic orgies of censorship break out, as in the most recent wide-
spread outbreak of censorship aimed at paper-bound books.
39. Chief Justice Vinson, and justices Rutledge and Murphy. It seems
likely that Chief Justice Vinson was among the four who voted to uphold
the Doubleday conviction, judging from his attitude toward obscenity prob-
lems reflected in his dissent as a Court of Appeals judge, protesting a decision
holding "Nudism in Modern Life" (by a well qualified writer on sociology)
not obscene under the Tariff Act. See Parmalee v. United States, 113 F. 2d
729, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
40. These dicta are considered in the text to notes 377-401 infra.
41. See text at note 402 ff. infra.
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I. CENSORSHIP TODAY
A. FORCES AND METHODS
There are many reasons for the current nation-wide efforts to
censor paper-bound books. The volume of their sales, the manner
of their distribution, their modest price and ready accessibility to
the public, the provocative nature of some of their jackets and
blurbs, and the existence of a national organization that had al-
ready sharpened its teeth on comic books and magazines-all these
contributed to the outbreak of censorship aimed at literature in
this form.
Though paper-bound books are not new in the United States,42
their sale in the present format began in 1939, when Pocket Books
published 34 titles which sold 1,508,000 copies from June through
December of that year.4 3 Other publishers soon entered the field,
until at one time there were more than 30 companies engaged in the
publication of inexpensive paper-bound books.4 4 Now there are
only ten major publishers still in business, 45 but their sales and the
number of published titles have soared. In 1953 alone between 250
and 300 million copies 46 of some 1,200 titles47 were sold.
This torrent of books is distributed through magazine whole-
salers to some 100,000 retail outlets, where they are placed upon
display racks for public sale.4 S Most of the titles sell at retail for a
quarter, though a few may run as high as 75 cents.4" Paper-bound
books are thus placed within easy reach-both physical and finan-
cial-of the public at large.
Books marketed in this way have to be sold promptly. The re-
tailer-usually a newsstand or a drugstore-has little space for their
display,5° and his margin of profit is necessarily low ;51 he can't
afford to carry a large stock, and what stock he does carry he wants
to turn over rapidly. 2 But to be sold promptly the books displayed
must catch the eye and interest of what is sometimes called the
42. Lewis, Paper-Bound Books in America 2-6 (1952).
43. Id. at 7.
44. Ibid.
45. 48 Fortune 123, 144 (Sept., 1953); cf. H. R. Rep. No. 2510, 82d
Cong. 2d Sess. 18-19 (1952).
46. Waller, Paper-Bound Books and Censorship, 47 A. L. A. Bull. 474
(Nov., 1953) ; 48 Fortune 123 (Sept., 1953).
47. 48 Fortune 123, 125 (Sept., 1953).
48. Lewis, op. cit. supra note 42, at 9-13; Waller, op. cit. supra note 46;
H. R. Rep. 2510, supra note 45, at 19-21.
49. Waller, op. cit. supra note 46.
50. 48 Fortune 123, 148 (Sept., 1953) ; Lewis, op. cit. upra note 42,
at 11.
51. 48 Fortune 123, 148 (Sept., 1953). The estimate here is 5/¢ a book.
52. Lewis, op. cit. supra note 42, at 11-12; 48 Fortune 123, 147-148
(Sept., 1953).
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"impulse buyer '53 and must do so not only in competition with
each other but also in competition with magazine covers.5 4 For
these reasons, publishers often employ provocative jackets and
blurbs to attract the attention of prospective buyers and readers."
Once in a while even the title of a book is changed to make it more
attractive to the general public."
As the sales of paper-bound books mounted, so too did the at-
tention of the sensitive and censorious.5 7 Many were offended by
the jackets and blurbs,"s and many were doubtless shocked to dis-
cover what had been going on between the covers of books all these
years. For between 80 and 90 per cent of the paper-bound books
are reprints of books previously published in hard covers,5 9 which
during their sale in that format encountered little opposition. Ap-
parently those who were disturbed by paper-bound books either
didn't know or care very much about the books that were bought
by those intellectuals who could afford it from the book clubs and
the relatively few general bookstores that are so lightly scattered
across the country."1 But they did know and care about books that
were so readily accessible to the public at large, because of their
53. Waller, op. cit. supra note 46; 48 Fortune 123, 124 (Sept., 1953).
54. Lewis, op. cit. supra note 42, at 15.
55. Lewis, op. cit. supra note 42, at 15-16; Waller, op. cit. supra note 46,
at 474-475; 48 Fortune 123, 124-125 (Sept, 1953) ; Dempsey, The Revolution
in Books, 191 Atlantic Monthly 75 (Jan., 1953) ; 56 Commonweal 286 (June
27, 1952).
56. 48 Fortune 123, 124 (Sept, 1953).
57. Cf. Bok, Censorship and the Arts, in Civil Liberties Under Attack
117-120. (1951).
58. Lewis, op. cit. supra note 42, at 15; Dempsey, supra note 55. Com-
,noizweal, referring to the jackets on Koestler's Darkness at Noon and
Orwell's 1985, commented: "These are books in which the erotic element is
either practically non-existent or so submerged in a much greater context
that it has justification and meaning. But they are among hundreds of other
serious literary works prostituted to the lowest kind of commercial exploita-
tion by publishers over-anxious to sell their wares at any price." 56 Com-
monweal 286 (1952).
59. Waller, op. cit. supra note 46; 48 Fortune 123, 125 (Sept., 1953).
60. Only a few of the hard-cover books since reprinted in paper-back
format ran into censorship trouble. Some were old-timers like Boccaccio's
Decaincron and Apuleius' Golden Ass, which were excluded by the customs
before 1930. Ernst & Lindey, The Censor Marches On 14-16 (1940). Others
included such books as Smith's Strange Fruit and Caldwell's God's Little
Acre, both of which were held to be obscene in Massachusetts. Commonwealth
v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945) ; Attorney General v.
Book Named "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 93 N. E. 2d 819 (1950). But
in both New York and Pennsylvania, God's Little Acre was cleared of
obscenity charges. People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 264 N. Y. Supp. 534(1933); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 D. & C. 101, aff'd sub non. Common-
wealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1950).
61. One estimate is that as late as 1937 there were only 500 good book-
stores in the United States and possibly 500 department stores that sold books.
Ernst, The First Freedom 123 (1946). The estimate seems reasonably accu-
rate, for an advertisement for the February, 1953, Bowker Mailing Lists shows
only 908 selected general bookstores, including major department stores.
1954]
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fear that the widespread reading of current literature would lower
the moral standards of the nation.6 2 Some even found in the paper-
bound book industry a communist plot so to deprave the public
that the communists would find it easy to take over.03
Meanwhile, the National Organization for Decent Literature
had been busying itself with magazines and comic books, seeking
to suppress those it believed to be objectionable; and as the sale
of paper-bound books increased, these too were brought within the
scope of the organization's activities. 64 These activities include:
1) the arousal of public opinion against "objectionable" magazines,
comics, and paper-bound books;65 2) more rigorous enforcement
of existing laws governing obscene literature ;6 3) promotion of new
and more strict legislation to suppress such literature ;O7 4) prepara-
tion of monthly lists of magazines, comics, and paper-bound books
disapproved by the organization ;6s and 5) visitation of newsstands
62. H. R. Rep. No. 2510, supra note 45, at 116; Investigation of Litera-
ture Allegedly Containing Objectionable Material, Hearings before House
Select Committee on Current Pornographic Materials on H. R. 596 and 597,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77, 340, 341 (1952) ; cf. Drive for Decency in Print,
Report of the Bishops' Committee Sponsoring the National Organization for
Decent Literature 7-8 (1939) ; Noll, Manual of the N. 0. D. L. 17 (n.d.).
63. 23 The Wanderer 4 (Nov. 26, 1953); Falque, What is Coinnon
Decency, 29 St. Cloud Register 1, 3 (1953) ; Hearings, supra note 62, at 317;
cf. Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 192; Noll, op. cit.
supra note 62, at 50, 161-162, 165-168.
64. The National Organization for Decent Literature was formed in
1938 by an Episcopal Committee appointed by the Roman Catholic Hierarchy
"to devise a plan for organizing a systematic campaign in all dioceses of the
United States against the publication and sale of lewd magazine and brochure
literature." Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 5. Informa-
tion about its activities is also available in Noll, op. cit. supra note 62; NODL
Code and Its Interpretation (n.d.) and in the testimony of Rev. Thomas J. Fitz-
gerald, executive director of the Chicago Archdiocesan Council of Catholic
Women, before the Gathings Committee. Hearings, supra note 62, at 75. For a
detailed critical analysis of the origin and operations of the NODL, see Vol-
kart, Censorship of the Press in the United States 437-494 (unpublished thesis
in Yale Law School Library, 1947).
65. E.g., 29 St. Cloud Register 1 (Mar. 13, 1953). See also Drive for
Decency in Print, op. cit. supra hote 62, at 15, 23-24, 39, 131-156; Hearings,
supra note 62, at 77.
66. Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 14, 20, 186-187;
Noll, op. cit. supra note 62, at 100-112, 211.
67. Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 19, 43, 177-185;
Noll, op. cit. supra note 62, at 57-97; NODL Code and Its Interpretation
17-19 (n.d.) ; Hearings, supra note 62 ,at 77-78.
68. The lists are prepared monthly by the Chicago Archdiocesan Coun-
cil of Catholic Women and are printed and distributed by Our Sunday
Visitor Press, Huntington, Indiana. Sometimes local organizations reprint
the lists for local distribution as in St. Paul, Minnesota, by the Organization
for Decent Literature and in Detroit, Michigan, jointly by the Detroit
Archdiocesan Council of Catholic Women, Detroit Council of Church
Women, and Detroit Council of Churches.
Two codes or sets of standards are used in preparing the lists; one applies
to comic books, the other to magazines and paper-bound books, NODL Code
and Its Interpretation 3, 6-7 (n.d.), though the distinction between the two
isn't always maintained. Hearings, supra note 62, at 76. There is some devia-
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and drug stores to secure the removal of blacklisted literature.69
Because of its extensive local organization in Roman Catholic
dioceses, 70 the NODL soon became a powerful and effective in-
strument for the accomplishment of its goal.
7 1
As a result of all of these circumstances and the activities of
the NODL, civic and religious groups from one end of the coun-
try to the other organized to combat literature that offended their
sensibilities; they held meetings, passed resolutions, and started
campaigns to eliminate such literature from newsstands in their
tion in the wording of the code originally applicable to magazines and later
to both magazines and paper-bound books. The original draft set up the
following standards "by which in the opinion of the Committee publications
may be judged objectionable:
(a) Those which glorify crime and the criminal;
Sb) Those whose contents are largely 'sexy';
c) Those whose illustrations and pictures border on the indecent;
(d) Those which make a habit of carrying articles on 'illicit love';(e) Those which carry disreputable advertising."
Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 13.
Standard (a) was later changed to "glorify or condone reprehensible
characters or reprehensible acts," NODL Code and Is Interpretation 3 (n.d.) ;
the local Detroit list for April-May, 1953, however, used only the words
"featuring crime." Standard (b) was changed to "predominantly 'sexy,'" Noll,
op. cit. supra note 62, at 42, and later to "contain material offensively 'sexy,'"
NODL Code and Its Interpretation 3 (n.d.) ; on the local Detroit list it was
rephrased to read "objectionable and offensive presentation of sex facts."
Standard (c) became "carries illustrations indecent or suggestive," Noll,
op. cit. supra note 62, at 42; NODL Code and Its Interpretation 3 (n.d.),
though the local Detroit list recast the phrase and substituted "and" for "or"
so as to read "indecent and suggestive illustrations." Standard (d) was
changed to "feature illicit love," Noll, op. cit. supra note 62, at 42; NODL
Code and Its Interpretation 3 (n.d.) ; the local Detroit list substituted "por-
trayal of illicit love." Standard (e) became "advertise wares for the prurient-
minded," NODL Code and Its Interpretation 3 (n.d.), and in Detroit,
"vulgar and lewd advertising." Detroit added a new standard of its own:
"blasphemous, profane, and obscene speech."
Rev. Thomas J. Fitzgerald, executive director of the Chicago Arch-
diocesan Council of Catholic Women, is "in charge of reviewing publications,judging as to their conformity to the National Organization for Decent
Literature code." Hearings, supra note 62, at 76.
69. Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 15-17, 20-21, 23,
25-26; Noll, op. cit. supra note 62, at 211-213; NODL Code and Its Inter-
pretation 21-22 (n.d.) ; Hearings, supra note 62, at 83-84.
70. The organization plan is outlined in Drive for Decency in Print,
op. cit. supra note 62, at 10-17, and in NODL Code and Its Interpretation
21-23 (n.d.).
71. Within less than a year after its organization, when about half
the Roman Catholic dioceses of the country had been covered by organized
campaigns, the magazine publishers "one by one, began to ask for interviews
with the National Committee and offered to agree to almost anything which
might lead to the elimination of their particular periodicals from the N.O.D.L.
black list." Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 24. And "as
the campaign extended from one diocese to another until it covered nearly
the entire United States, it became increasingly easier to secure cooperation
of fully nine-tenths of all sellers of magazine literature in every community."
Id. at 18-19. For a revealing account of the interviews and correspondence
between Bishop John F. Noll, chairman of the NODL, and magazine pub-
lishers, see Id. at 40-79.
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communities.72 Proposals for new legislation to broaden existing
laws against obscene literature cropped up almost everywhere 73 and
many were adopted. 74 In May, 1952 the House of Representatives
72. Available space permits only a few illustrations; they are, however,
typical of many others throughout the nation. In Modesto, California, a group
of citizens adopted a resolution "to curb publication and sale of immoral and
profane books . . . by alerting the public conscience to the evil influence of
such publications." In New Hampshire, the Catholic War Veterans resolved
to support and participate "in the drive to rid our newsstands of literature
threatening our way of life, the sanctity of the home, and the sense of morality
and justice on which our country was founded." In Chattanooga, Tennessee, a
local schoolmasters' club issued a report opposing "the peddling of smut" and
the circulation of "demoralizing material." Other instances are recounted
in the working paper for the American Library Association-American Book
Publishers Council Conference on the Freedom to Read, April 23, 1953
(mimeographed). See also Hearings, op. cit. supra note 62, at 153-154; H. R.
Rep. 2510, op. cit. supra note 45, at 29.
73. One of the most extreme legislative proposals was introduced in the
Minnesota state legislature in February, 1953. One section made it a criminal
offense to sell, give away, possess, or import any book "containing obscene,
immoral, lewd or lascivious language, or detailed descriptions, figures, or
symbols of [sic] scenes, or dialogue of a sexual nature or language immoral
and depraving in its nature or tending toward the corruption of the morals of
youth, offensive against common decency." Another section dealt with selling
or giving such literature to minors and with its introduction "into any family,
school, place of education, or other center frequented by minors." Still an-
other prohibited the exhibition of such literature in a public place or any
other place within the view of minors, apparently making it an offense
to display a book containing any of the prohibited language even though the
covers of the book are closed. The bill was tabled in committee.
In Massachusetts two bills were introduced in the 1954 legislative session.
One authorized the Attorney General to appoint a citizens' committee to re-
port to him on books they considered obscene, lurid, depraved, and harmful
to the public. The other created a decency review board to review books and
report violations of obscenity statutes. One of the bills was withdrawn; the
other was defeated in the house.
In New York the state legislature passed the Carlino bill, which em-
powered police chiefs and sheriffs, without notice to the defendant, to apply
for an injunction restraining the sale, distribution, acquisition, or possession
of obscene literature. Governor Dewey, however, vetoed the bill.
Other legislative proposals are discussed in American Book Publishers
Council, Bulletin No. 377 (mimeographed 1954); Drive for Decency in
Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 177-185; Noll, op. cit. supra note 62, at 67-95.
74. In Georgia a statute passed early in 1953 created a State Literature
Commission empowered "to prohibit the distribution of any literature they
find to be obscene" and to recommend prosecutions for violation of Ga. Code
Ann. § 26-6301 (1953). The new statute defines "obscene literature" as
"any literature offensive to chastity or modesty, expressing or presenting
to the mind or view something that purity and decency forbids to be exposed."
Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6301a (1953).
In 1950 the St. Cloud, Minnesota, city council passed an ordinance creat-
ing a board of review to screen literature sold in the city and to order
distributors and newsdealers to cease the sale of books "condemned" by the
board. The ordinance prohibits the sale of any book that "prominently fea-
tures an account of horrors, robberies, murders, arson, assault with caustic
chemicals, assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, kidnapping, mayhem, rape,
theft, voluntary manslaughter, ridicule of law enforcement or parental
authority; or are obscene, immoral, lewd, or are suggestively obscene, im-
moral or lewd; or ridicules any person or persons by reason of race, creed or
color; or advocates Unamerican or subversive activities." Similar ordi-
nances were also passed in Eveleth, Faribault, Foley, Hibbing, Northfield,
and Virginia, Minnesota. Morris, Minnesota, introduced some innovations;
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created a "Select Committee on Current Pornographic Materials"
to determine "the extent to which current literature-books, maga-
zines, and comic books-containing immoral, obscene, or otherwise
offensive matter, are being made available to the people of the
United States" and also to determine "the adequacy of existing law
to prevent the publication and distribution of books containing im-
moral, offensive, and other undesirable matter."75 The committee's
hearings were marked by ignorance and prejudice,7 6 inept essays
its ordinance gave the city commission power to declare what publications
were harmful and to approve publications as harmless. It defined "harmful
publication" as any book that "contains any writing, view, or other matter
which suggests, describes in any degree or to any extent, or mentions, any
sexual act of a person, or which is actively or suggestively lewd, immoral
or obscene, or which is contemptive of any person or persons by reason of
race, color or creed, or which advocates or encourages practices which are
un-American or subversive to lawful government or governmental activities
within the United States of America, or which ridicules law or parental
authority, or which contains any other matter which is or may be deleterious
to moral or social welfare." Brainerd, Minnesota, didn't go so far; it passed
an ordinance applicable only to "any obscene, lewd, suggestive, or indecent
book." The St. Cloud ordinance is recommended by the NODL, but apparently
without the board of review. NODL and Its Interpretation, 17-19 (n.d.).
In Lansing, Michigan, the licensing power is used to control books sold
in that city. Its ordinance requires a license for each newsstand, magazine
stand, and rental or lending library in the city. The license may be revoked by
the city council for "good cause" which is defined as including the sale, dis-
tribution, loan or rental of any book "containing obscene language or obscene
prints, pictures, figures or descriptions, manifestly tending to currupt the
morals of youth." Drive for Decency in Print. op cit. supra note 62, at
180-182.
In Lynchburg, Virginia, the city ordinance lists 43 publications by title,
declaring them to be obscene. It also defines "obscene publication" as any
book "containing obscene or indecent language, or language calculated to
convey licentious, indecent or sensual impressions, or containing any
drawing, print, picture, figure or description of any obscene or indecent
character."
The New Hampshire legislature at its 1953 session added a new defini-
tion of "obscene" to its existing obscene literature statutes; it defined an
"obscene" book as one "whose main theme or a notable part of which tends
to impair, or to corrupt, or to deprave the moral behavior of anyone viewing
or reading it." N. H. Laws 1953, c. 233.
75. H. R. Rep. No. 2510, supra note 45, at 1.
76. De Voto, The Case of the Censorious Congressmen, 206 Harper's
Magazine 42 (April 1953). The minority report observed: "The Committee,
however, has seen fit not only to criticize the content by which obscenity may
be judged, but has also directed unfavorable comment toward ideas contained
in cited publications. This comes dangerously close to book burning. For
example, The Haters, by Theodore Strauss, a Bantam book, was entered
into the record with the objection that 'Author obviously trying to cash
in on the Scottsboro pro-Negro agitation which was Communist-inspired.'
Cage of Darkness, by Rene Masson, was criticized by counsel because, among
other things, the 'Author does not seem to like the "upper classes" or law-
enforcement officers.' Another book, The Harem, by Louis Royer, is con-
demned by the committee because the author personally advocates polygamy."
H. R. Rep. No. 2510, supra note 45, at 122. The counsel's criticisms of The
Haters and Cage of Darkness apparently were not included in the printed
transcript of the hearings; the printed transcript, however, does show three
instances in which counsel objected to a book because its author in a post-
scriptum advocated polygamy. Hearings, supra note 62, at 31, 69, 208. The
majority report itself vigorously objects to the book for this reason. H. R.
Rep. No. 2510, supra note 45, at 14-15.
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into literary criticism,77 use of marked passages to condemn whole
books 78 and rejection of the prevailing legal standard for determin-
ing when a book is obscene. 9 Though the committee blamed the
prevailing legal standard, at least in part, for the failure to enforce
existing laws against obscene literature,80 it did not recommend
amendment of the federal obscenity statutes to restore the Victorian
standard that once was generally accepted by federal courts."' In-
stead, the committee called upon publishers to eliminate on their
own initiative "border line" and "objectionable" literature8 -' and
recommended the enactment of federal legislation to prohibit inter-
state transportation of obscene literature by private carriers.8 3 It
also recommended "the enactment of legislation authorizing the
Postmaster General to impound mail addressed to a concern which
he has reason to believe is disseminating obscene materials ... and
the exemption of the Post Office Department from the requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act.' 8 4 Presumably, since John
Steinbeck's The Wayward Bus offended the committee's sensibili-
77. H. R. Rep. No. 2510, stpra note 45, at 13-14; Hearings, supra note
62, at 12-14, 227, 260.
78. Id. at 24-25, 227. One of the committee members, in response to a
witness' question whether there was an evaluation of the books in the record
remarked, "Yes, there is and if you had read some of the excerpts, you could
evaluate them in a hurry." Id. at 262. The committee sought to excuse this
practice with the following argument: "It is quite impossible to reach a
decision on obscenity without considering the questioned parts as such and as
related to the text as an entirety; and in so doing the questioned parts must be
taken out of context to evaluate them and that the committee has done.
"Quotations from numerous books which were among hundreds of
volumes read in the course of committee research have been selected on the
basis of obscenity, violence, lust, use of narcotics, blasphemy, vulgarity,
pornography, juvenile delinquency, sadism, masochism, perversion, homo-
sexuality, lesbianism, murder, rape and nymphomania, or other objectionable
features, and were entered in the record at the same time that the volume
from which those quotations were taken was itself submitted as an exhibit.
"Quotations so selected are those considered to be unnecessarily objec-
tionable and of the character to cause the book in which they were found
to be obscene within the meaning of numerous judicial decisions." H. R.
Rep. No. 2510, supra note 45, at 12.
79. "It is as elastic as rubber in its interpretive susceptibility and sup-
plies the purveyors of obscenity with an excuse regardless of what is the
degree of obscenity involved and requires each and every book to be judgcd
separately, an almost impossible task.... The judicial viewpoint on the sub-ject of obscene literature today, establishing a new legal philosophy in that
field but one so elastic that it serves as the basis for excuse to print and
circulate the filthiest most obscene literature without concurrent literary
value to support it, ever known in history." [italics added] H. R. Rep. No.
2510. supra note 45, at 6. See also Hearings, supra note 62, at 23, 298-301.
80. H. R. Rep. No. 2510, supra note 45, at 5-6.
81. The committee, however, did express a devout wish for return to the
pious reserve of Puritan England and the literary restraint of the Victorian
era. H. R. Rep. No. 2510, supra note 45 at 5.
82. Id. at 120.
83. Id. at 116-117.
84. Id. at 119.
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ties,- the committee would give the Postmaster General power to
impound all mail addressed to the Viking Press, which originally
published the book in 1947, and to Bantam Books, Inc., which re-
printed it in paper-bound format in 1950,6 and would give him this
sweeping power without the procedural safeguards of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.
But despite the agitation against paper-bound books, there have
been very few criminal prosecutions attacking them under obscene
literature ordinances and statutes. So far as we have been able to
determine, prosecutions have been initiated in only four cities; in
three of the four cities the cases were resolved favorably for the
books concerned, and in the fourth the case is still pending.8 7
Apparently, those anxious to suppress paper-bound books that
offend them are reluctant to use the normal and traditional legal
procedure for the handling of obscene literature cases. A judicial
proceeding is a public affair in which the merits as well as the de-
merits of a questioned book may be considered, in which those in-
terested in the preservation of a free literature as well as the censor-
ious may be heard. And publicity, as every censor knows, often
increases the demand for the very book he seeks to suppress. More-
over, a judicial proceeding is not suitable for the mass suppression
of large numbers of books. The censor prefers a procedure that
permits the secret suppression of books en masse. And this is the
course that has been most often followed in the current efforts to
censor paper-bound books.
The National Organization for Decent Literature uses the de-
85. Id. at 16; Hearings, supra note 62, at 295, 312.
86. Hearings, supra note 62, at 301. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. and Curtis
Publishing Co. are the majority stockholders in Bantam Books Inc.; each
holds 42V per cent. Id. at 290, 315.
87. In St. Paul, Minnesota, Judge James C. Otis found a local news-
dealer not guilty of selling an indecent or lewd book in violation of a city
ordinance. The book involved in the case was Women's Barracks, by Tereska
Torres, St. Paul v. Fredkove, 38 finn. Munic. 362 (Mun. Ct. 1953).
In Springfield, fissouri, a municipal court dismissed charges against
local news agency operators.
In Detroit, Mfichigan, a federal court dismissed an indictment against
several publishers and distributors when, upon inspection of the grand jury
minutes, it appeared that the jury had no evidence of interstate shipment in
violation of the federal statute. The paper-bound books involved were: Awake
to Darkness, by Richard McMullen; Sinful Life, by Glen Watkins; Find Me
in Fire, by Robert Lowry; Prettiest Girl in Town, by Thomas Fall; and
Private Life of a Street Girl, author unnamed.
In Youngstown, Ohio, the prosecution of a local distributor is still
pending. 165 Pub. Wk. 36 (Jan. 2, 1954). The criminal charge was filed shortly
after a federal court enjoined the city's police chief from ordering the dis-
tributor to withdraw from sale certain books published by the plaintiff. New
American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D.
Ohio 1953). The criminal charge of course involved a book published by the
plaintiff: Down All Your Streets, by Leonard Bishop. 164 Pub. Wk. 845
(Sept 5, 1953).
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vice of organized persuasion, and sometimes of open general boycott,
in its efforts to suppress literature that violates its codes of decency.88
Through its detailed organization in many Roman Catholic dioceses
and parishes,8 9 canvassing teams are appointed to call upon the
dealers in each community; they explain the NODL's crusade and
request each dealer's cooperation and his promise to withdraw from
sale all publications appearing on the NODL lists.9° Vigilance com-
mittees may follow the canvassing teams to determine whether the
dealers are continuing their cooperation.9 1 Parishioners sometimes
assist in the campaign; when patronizing a dealer for other mer-
chandise, they ask him whether he cooperates with the NODL and,
upon observing any blacklisted publications on display, object to
them.92 In some communities, the local organization issues certifi-
cates to cooperating dealers for display in their places of business."i
In all of this, there frequently is at least an implied threat of a gen-
eral boycott against the dealer who refuses to cooperate.9 4 Since
the dealer's gross profit on the sale of paper-bound books is very
small, 5 many dealers succumb to the pressure, sacrificing the rela-
tively small profit from sale of books blacklisted by the NODL for
the sake of the larger profit derived from general trade with cus-
tomers.96 As a result, approximately 300 to 750 titles of paper-bound
88. See text to notes 64-71 supra.
89. See note 70 siupra.
90. Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 14-15, 23; Noll,
sop. cit. pra note 62, at 211. Such a campaign was initiated in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, early in 1953, using the St. Paul, Minnesota, NODL list. Minne-
apolis Star, Mar. 21, 1953, p. 10, col. 7; 70 Christian Century 404 (Apr. 8,
1953).
91. Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 15-16, 25-26,
191 ; Noll, op. cit. supra note 62, at 49.
92. Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. sutpra note 62, at 25; Noll,
op. cit. supra note 62, at 212; NODL Code and Its Interpretation, 2-21 (n.d.).
93. Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62, at 197; Noll,
op. cit. supra note 62, at 55. The monthly certificate of cooperation used by
a Decent Literature Committee in Brooklyn, N. Y., reads: "This store has
satisfactorily compiled with the request of the Committee to remove all pub-
lications listed as 'OBJECTIONABLE' by the National Organization of
Decent Literature, from its racks during the above month."
94. "It is necessary, therefore, for Catholics to do something about the
situation.... They should serve notice on publishers of such printed filth that
they will boycott every place where it is sold in their respective communities;
and on those who advertise in such filthy periodicals that they will not pur-
chase any of their wares." Drive for Decency in Print, op. cit. supra note 62,
at 39. See also id. at 26, and Noll, op. cit. supra note 62, at 40, 212-213. But
see Father Fitzgerald's disclaimer of the use of the boycott. Hearings, supra
note 62, at 83-84.
95. The retailer's margin on a 25-cent book is 5/2. 48 Fortune 148
(Sept. 1953).
96. Early last year, in the Flatbush area of Brooklyn, New York, the
campaign organized by the Decent Literature Committee of Our Lady Help of
Christians Roman Catholic Church became so effective that Bantam Books,
Inc., one of the largest publishers of paper-bound books, found it necessary to
counterattack with half-page advertisements in the Brooklyn Eagle for Feb-
ruary 25, 1953.
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books may be withdrawn from sale in those communities in which
the NODL is successful in its campaign. 5 Most people of course
are unaware of what titles have been suppressed by this device, since
the NODL blacklists are not made public.98
In some communities, private groups have made use of the
police or prosecuting attorney in censoring literature that offends
them. In these communities, voluntary citizens' committees pre-
pare blacklists of publications they believe to be objectionable and
deliver their lists to the police or prosecuting attorneys, who then
give notice to distributors and dealers to withdraw the blacklisted
publications from sale. The notice of course is accompanied by at
least an implied threat of criminal prosecution under obscene liter-
ature laws if the dealer or distributor fails to comply.9 This censor-
ship device was extensively used in New Jersey until Bantam Books,
early in 1953, secured an injunction in superior court against the
Middlesex county prosecutor.10° The decision of the superior court
has just been affirmed, limited however to the single book in issue.' 0 '
The unofficial status of such private censorship groups is of
course a weakness from the point of view of the censorious. Volun-
tary citizens' committees notoriously blow hot and cold, and it's
hard to keep them operating at a high level of activity over a long
period of time. Members excited at first lose their enthusiasm when
faced with the arduous task of reading even a portion of the litera-
ture offered for sale in almost any community. But whatever the
reason, one state' 2 and a number of cities 0 3 have established offi-
97. The April, 1953 list of publications disapproved by the NODL con-
tains approximately 300 titles of paper-bound books; the St. Paul, Minnesota,
list of the "Organization for Decent Literature" for the same month has 744
titles.
98. Noll, op. cit. supra note 62, at 214.
99. For a more detailed description of the use of this device, see:
Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N. J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47 (1953) ; h1earngs,
supra note 62, at 317. This device is also used in Denver, Colorado, where
early in 1953 a private group gave the local district attorney a list of paper-
bound books which the district attorney promptly forwarded to local distribu-
tors and dealers. 48 Fortune 123, 148 (Sept. 1953).
100. Bantam Books v. Melko, supra note 99.
101. The New Jersey Supreme Court apparently confined its affirmance
to the single book in litigation- Vivian Connell's The Chinese Room. It re-jected as moot the superior court's ruling that the county prosecutor lacked
authority to promulgate lists of objectionable books. 165 Pub. Wk. 1340 (Mar.
13, 1954). The county prosecutor took this as a blanket endorsement of his
censorship activities and threatened a new drive to halt distribution of objec-
tionable literature in Middlesex County. New York Times, Mar. 9, 1954,
p. 34, col. 4.
102. Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6301a (1953).
103. In addition to the cities in notes 72-74, supra, official censor-
ship boards have been created or authorized in Canton, Ohio; Hartford, Con-
necticut; Kenosha, Wisconsin; Miami, Florida; New Britain, Connecticut;
Pawtucket, Rhode Island; and Wheeling, West Virginia. filwaukee County,
Wisconsin, has an official literary commission.
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cial censorship boards to review literature offered for sale in the
state or city.
The operations of the official censorship boards vary widely from
place to place. The range of variation is illustrated by an examina-
tion of the operations of two such boards-the Board of Review
of St. Cloud, Minnesota, and the Georgia Literature Commission.
In St. Cloud, Minnesota, the board of review, before its operations
were suspended early in 1953,04 used the NODL blacklist as a buy-
ing guide. 05 Some paper-bound books were read by the board mem-
bers; others were farmed out to volunteer reviewers with instruc-
tions to note objectionable passages and to designate whether each
book was (1) suitable reading for youth, (2) borderline, or (3)
condemned. 00 In condemning a book, reviewers were told to state
their reasons and also that "probably in most cases it will not be
necessary to read the whole book to reach a judgment of this
kind.' 0 7 The code employed in determining what books were to
be condemned consisted of the following items: (1) objectionable
and offensive presentation of sex facts, (2) glorification of crime,
(3) portrayal of illicit love, (4) blasphemous, profane and obscene
speech, (5) indecent and suggestive illustrations, (6) vulgar and
lewd advertising, (7) trashy romance, and (8) disrespect for au-
thority. 0 8 Board meetings of course were secret,10 9 and its lists of
condemned books and even the code it used as a standard for
judging books were not made public.1 0 Of course the lists were
made available to the dealers, most of whom promptly withdrew
the condemned books from sale."' During the period of its opera-
tions, the board condemned more than 300 paper-bound books." -
In Georgia, on the other hand, the State Literature Commission
104. Minneapolis Star, Feb. 3, 1953, p. 1, col. 3.
105. Sonderegger, St. Cloud Book Censors Act on Own Judgment, Min-
neapolis Star, Dec. 25, 1952, p. 20, col. 3; cf. Davidson, St. Cloud- How the
Flames Spread, 128 New Republic 13 (June 29, 1953)
106. Sonderegger, supra note 105, at p. 20, col. 1, 3; Schoelkopf and
Wilson, City Censors Ban Classics, Nation, Jan. 24, 1953, p. i.
107. The full directions given to reviewers were: "If in your opinion
this book should be condemned, state your reasons on the reverse side of this
page. Probably in most cases it will not be necessary to read the whole book
in order to reach a judgment of this kind."
108. Sonderegger, supra note 105. The code was obviously taken from
the NODL. Schoelkopf and Wilson, supra note 106. See note 68 for the
NODL code.
109. Sonderegger, Reading Matter is Censored in St. Cloud, Minneapolis
Star, Dec. 23, 1952, p. 1, col. 1; Davidson, supra note 105. But cf. Schoelkopf
and Wilson, supra note 106.
110. Sonderegger, Censors Brand Prize-winning Novels 'Unfit', Minne-
apolis Star, Dec. 24, 1952, p. 1, col. 1; Sonderegger, supra note 105, at p. 20,
col. 2-3; Davidson, supra note 105; Schoelkopf and Wilson, supra note 106.
111. Sonderegger, supra note 109, at p. 4, col. 4.
112. Minneapolis Star, Dec. 24, 1952, p. 1. col. 1.
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has proceeded much more carefully, despite the contrary inference
that might have been drawn from its chairman's early statement,
"I don't discriminate between nude women, whether or not they are
art. It's all lustful to me."" 3 The commission soon adopted a set
of criteria for determining whether a particular book is "above sus-
picion." The criteria apparently took the form of questions: (1)
What is the general and dominant theme? (2) What degree of
sincerity of purpose is evident? (3) What is the literary or scientific
worth? (4) What channels of distribution are employed? (5) What
are the contemporary attitudes of reasonable men toward such mat-
ters? (6) What types of readers may reasonably be expected to
peruse the publication? (7) Is there evidence of pornographic in-
tent? (8) What impression will be created in the mind of the reader
upon reading the work as a whole ?"1 If all of these questions are
answered favorably, the commission finds the book to be "above
suspicion"; if not, the book is classed as a "possibly obscene" publi-
cation. 1 In determining whether a "possibly obscene" book is
actually obscene, the commission follows the statutory standard,","
which defines "obscene literature" as "any literature offensive to
the chastity or modesty, expressing or presenting to the mind or
view something that purity and decency forbids to be exposed.""117
In making this determination, the commission does not "condemn
that which, though it might be 'erotic to the neurotic,' would give
'no offense to persons of balanced mentality.' ""s The commission
gives to any distributor who complains of its rulings an opportunity
for a hearing, and it has invited the press to each of its meetings."19
It has not, however, made public its decisions on individual books,
though one local distributor served notice on the commission that
he would no longer withdraw books from circulation upon the com-
mission's informal notices and that he intended to insist upon a
public hearing and a specific finding against each book before he
would withdraw any book from distribution.120 By the end of its
first year, the commission had taken action against only four paper-
bound books .' 2 '
113. American Library Association, op. cit. supra note 72.
114. Wesberry, Georgia Scrubs Its Newsstands, 70 Christian Century
1498 (Dec. 23, 1953)
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6301a (1953).
118. Wesberry, supra note 114.
119. Id. at 1499.
120. 164 Publ. Wk. 765 (Aug. 29, 1953); American Civil Liberties
Union, Feature Press Service, Weekly Bulletin No. 1608 (mimeographed
1953)
121. Wesberry, supra note 114, at 1499.
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In other communities, the police do their own censoring with-
out the aid of official censorship boards. The Detroit, Michigan,
police department, for instance, has a "license and censor bureau"
which censors literature offered for sale in that city. 22 Local dis-
tributors, in advance of distribution, submit copies of paper-bound
books for review by policemen assigned to the bureau.12 3 In the
reviewing process, the police officer notes objectionable passages
in a book and, if the police inspector in charge of the bureau
agrees that they are sufficiently naughty or numerous, the offend-
ing passages are submitted to the county prosecuting attorney for
an opinion on whether the particular book violates Michigan law . 2 4
If the county prosecutor, after reviewing the excerpts, concludes
that the book in his opinion violates the Michigan statutes, he
prepares a letter to that effect for the censor bureau, which in turn
transmits a copy of the letter to the distributor of the book.' 2' The
censor bureau also prepares and sends to the local distributors a
monthly list of books found to be in violation of the law. 20 So far,
the local distributors in Detroit have withheld from circulation every
book banned by the censor bureau and the county prosecutor.
2 7
From 1950 to 1952 more than 100 titles of paper-bound books were
withheld from circulation in this way.1 28 The public of course is kept
in ignorance, for the censor bureau does not make its lists public
and the Detroit newspapers cooperate in keeping them under
cover.
2 9
But the Detroit police censor bureau, like the Gathings Com-
mittee, discovered that there were many "objectionable" or "border-
line" books not clearly in violation of the obscene literature statutes.
So the censor bureau has a second list of "partially objectionable"
122. There are two good sources of information about the censorship
activities of the license and censor bureau. One is the testimony of Inspector
Herbert W. Case before the Gathings committee. Hearings, supra note 62, at
132-142. The other is a series of articles by Leo Sonderegger in the Minne-
apolis Star, Feb. 9-11, 1953.
123. "We called them in, and we threatened prosecution.... We had
them in a conference with the Wayne County prosecuting attorney's office,
and there they voluntarily agreed to submit to us for inspection the pocket-
size magazines before distribution." Hearings, supra note 62, at 116 (testi-
mony of Inspector Case).
124. Hearings, vrupra note 62, at 120-121; Sonderegger, Censors Guard
Young Morals in Detroit, Minneapolis Star, Feb. 9 1953, p. 18, col. 1.
125. Hearings, supra note 62, at 116.
126. Sonderegger, supra note 124.
127. Hearings, supra note 62, at 116.
128. Hearings, supra note 62, at 136-139. Sonderegger estimates 150
titles. Sonderegger, supra note 124, at p. 17, col. 7.
129. Sonderegger, Detroit Public Not Told What Is Censored, Minne-
apolis Star, Feb. 10, 1953, p. 15, col. 1 ; Hearings, supra note 62, at 127. After
the Sonderegger articles appeared in the Minneapolis Star, the Detroit Frce
Press ran a series of three articles, concluding Mar. 17, 1953.
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books which may contain passages technically in violation of the
Michigan statutes but which are not suitable for criminal prosecu-
tion.3 0 These lists are sent to local dealers who are told that, if a
complaint is received on a listed book, they will "have to take it off
the stands."' 31 Since the NODL is active in Detroit and has been
joined by local Protestant groups,132 most dealers are afraid to
handle books that appear on the censor bureau's "partially objec-
tionable" lists.133
Detroit's censorship influence is not confined to the city limits.
Since the prosecuting attorney is a county official and the Detroit
censor bureau distributes its lists of banned books to all police chiefs
in the county, the Detroit censorship is effective throughout Wayne
county. 3 4 The censor bureau also distributes its lists to the police
departments of seventeen or eighteen other cities in Michigan' 35
and also to any prosecuting attorney or chief law enforcement officer
who requests them."36
One of the chief law enforcement officers who requested and
received the Detroit censor bureau's lists was the chief of police
of Youngstown, Ohio. He had earlier, with the assistance of the
Youngstown police department's vice squad, prepared a list of his
own, containing 108 paper-bound books, most of which had been
placed on the list solely because of their jackets and blurbs and
without reading even a part of their contents.137 To these, he
added in a separate list all the books appearing on both Detroit
lists-140 books on the "illegal" list and 195 books on the "partially
objectionable" list-apparently without recognition of their dif-
ferent nature."3" Still discontented with the progress of his campaign
to rid the city of "almost all" the paper-bound books offered for
sale there,"" the police chief joined forces with the Federated
Women's Clubs of Youngstown in the organization of a comriittee
130. Hearings, supra note 62, at 116.
131. Sonderegger, supra note 129, at p. 18, col. 3.
132. The NODL list issued in Detroit bears the endorsement of the
Detroit Archdiocesan Council of Catholic Women, the Detroit Council of
Church Women, and the Detroit Council of Churches.
133. Sonderegger, supra note 129, at p. 18, col. 3.
134. Hearings, supra note 62, at 116; Sonderegger, supra note 129,
at p. 18, col. 1.
135. Hearings, supra note 62, at 131.
136. Id. at 134.
137. See New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F.
Supp. 823, 826 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
138. Id. at 827.
139. "These books include almost all of the so-called paper backed
'pocket books' .. . , which as a matter of policy, glorify and dwell upon im-
morality. Admittedly, there are some few which are not in this category, yet
so few are they in number that their publication would seem to be a subterfuge
designed to whitewash the great bulk of these publications." Id. at 826, quoting
the chief of police.
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to assist him in the screening of books.140 Armed with his lists and
heartened by the prospect of the assistance of women club-members
of the city, he requested the local distributors and dealers to re-
move from the newsstands of the city all books appearing on the
combined lists and threatened criminal prosecution if they failed
to comply.' 4' When the distributors and dealers complied in part
with the police chief's demands by removing the books on his own
list,142 The New American Library of World Literature, publisher
of some of the books on that list, sought an injunction in federal
court, and got it.14 3 Shortly afterwards, criminal proceedings were
instituted against a local distributor for distributing an obscene
book; the book, of course, was one of those published by The New
American Library.
1 44
Detroit's enormous influence in the current battle between the
forces of censorship and those of intellectual freedom is thus readily
apparent. Its influence is not limited to the city of Detroit alone;
it blankets Wayne county and extends to many other cities both in
Michigan and in other states. The measure of its influence is indi-
cated by the fact that one publisher of paper-bound books submits
manuscripts to the censor bureau for approval before their publica-
tion.:" 5 Since it is obviously impossible for a publisher to print two
editions-one for Detroit and Wayne county and other cities using
the Detroit lists, and the other for the rest of the country-the De-
troit censor bureau and an assistant prosecuting attorney for Wayne
county are able to this extent to censor literature for the entire
country.'"
B. Booics UNDER ATTACK
With all of the public agitation and concern over paper-bound
books and the very great efforts that have been made in many parts of
140. Id. at 828.
141. Id. at 826-828.
142. Id. at 827.
143. New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp.
823 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
144. 164 Publ. Wk. 845 (Sept. 5, 1953).
145. Sonderegger, What Detroit Censors May Affect All U. S., Minne-
apolis Star, Feb. 11, 1953, p. 46, col. 1 ; Hearings, supra note 62, at 128, 130-131.
This practice once caused embarrassment to the censor bureau; they forgot
to remove the book from the illegal list after the publisher had made the
required deletions. Inspector Case testified: "In one instance ... there were
deletions made in our manuscript form, and it happened that we slipped up.
We had withheld the book, and they had made the deletions; and as the book
came out-in fact, it happened a n'onth ago-we still had this on our banned
list, and up in the prosecutor's office, and we couldn't find out the things
that we had banned. They were not there; they had taken them out. We were
-quite red-faced about it, and we sent a letter to all the police chiefs in the
county, and the book is circulated." Id. at 131.
146. Sonderegger, supra note 145, p. 33, col. 1.
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the country to censor them, what kinds of books have offended those
who have been active in the current censorship campaigns against
such books? Are they books that clearly fall within the ambit of
statutes prohibiting obscene literature? Or are they books that in
hard covers were considered to be legitimate and in some instances
even great literature? To put the question another way, are the
censors of today any more discriminating than their predecessors?
The question of course almost answers itself.
The NODL blacklists are the most elaborate of all of the
lists currently in use. They contain a larger number of titles of
books than any of the other lists we have been able to obtain. But
the number of titles changes from month to month, and the lists
issued by local branches of the NODL are not always identical.
In April, 1953, for instance, the national NODL list contained
the titles of some 300 paper-bound books, while the Detroit
NODL list for April-May, 1953 had more than 350 titles and
the St. Paul NODL list for April, 1953 had almost 750. Apparent-
ly the St. Paul list was a cumulative one, which had not dropped
titles as they were dropped from the national list. At any rate, all
of the titles on the national list also appeared on the St. Paul list.
But the Detroit list contained titles that did not show up on either
the St. Paul or the national lists for April 1953, though many of
them did turn up later on the national lists for subsequent months.
The titles of the books on the NODL lists make a strange
collection. They range all the way from something called Hot Dames
on Cold Slabs to William Faulkner's Pylon, Sanctuary, and Soldier's
Pay, with Mickey Spillane's tours in sadism and voyeurism 147
sandwiched somewhere in between. Among the authors who had at
least three books on one or more of these lists were James M.
Cain," Erskine Caldwell, 9 James T. Farrell, 150 Pierre Louys,'5 '
W. Somerset Maugham, 5 2 John O'Hara,5 3 and Emile Zola. 154
147. The Spillane titles that appeared on the lists were: The Big Kill,
I. the Jury, One Lonely Night, and Vengeance Is Mine.
148. Love's Lovely Counterfeit; Mildred Pierce; Past All Dishonor;
and The Postman Always Rings Twice.
149. Episode in Palmnetto; God's Little Acre; A House in the Uplands;
Journeyman; A Place Called Estherville; A Swell Looking Girl; This Very
Earth; Tobacco Road; Tragic Ground; Trouble in July; and A Woman in
the House.
150. Bernard Carr; Ellet Rogers; Gas House McGinty; A Hell of a
Good Time; Judgment Day; Meet the Girls; When Boyhood Dreams Come
True; A World I Never M$ade; and Young Lonigan.
151. Aphrodite; Collected Works; Psyche.
152. Fools and Their Folly; The Painted Veil; Up at the Villa.
153. Appointment in Samarra; Butterfield 8; Hope of Heaven; A Rage
to Live.
154. Nana; Piping Hot; Theresa.
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Here too were Nelson Algren's The Man With the Golden Arm
and Never Come Morning, Niven Busch's Duel in the Sun, C. S.
Forester's The African Queen, Ernest Hemingway's A Farewell to
Arms, D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover and Love Among
the Haystacks, James A. Michener's Tales of the South Pacific,
Christopher Morley's Kitty Foyle, Irwin Shaw's The Young Lions,
Natalie Anderson Scott's The Story of Mrs. Murphy, and Ben
Ames Williams' The Strange Woman. Boccaccio's Decameron,
Flaubert's Madam Bovary, and a collection of stories by De Mau-
passant also appeared on one of the lists. The Detroit NODL list
also designated some books as "particularly objectionable." Among
these were Walter Karig's Caroline Hicks, Francois Mauriac's
The Desert of Love, John Dos Passos' The Forty-Second Parallel,
John Masters' Nightrunners of Bengal, Vardis Fisher's Passions
Spin the Plot, Edgar Mittelholzer's Shadows Move Among Them
and F. Van Wyck Mason's Three Harbours. The NODL lists,
however, are not restricted to works of fiction; they also include
such books as The Sexual Side of Marriage by M. J. Exner, M.D.,
How Shall I Tell My Child by Belle S. Mooney, M.D., and The
Story of My Psychoanalysis by John Knight.
The lists prepared by the private citizens' committees that work
through police departments and prosecuting attorneys in suppress-
ing paper-bound books are no more discriminating than those of
the NODL; they're only shorter. In Denver, Colorado, the list
of 55 titles prepared for the district attorney contained such books
as Emile Zola's Nana as well as others on the NODL lists.," In
Middlesex County, New Jersey, most of the 36 books on the list pre-
pared for the county prosecutor by a Committee on Objectionable
Literature also appeared on the NODL lists. 5 6 The New Jersey
committee withdrew four books from its list when the publisher
protested their inclusion, 57 but it refused to withdraw Vivian
Connell's The Chinese Room, even though the half-price and the
paper-bound editions had been bowdlerized at the instance of the
New York Society for the Suppression of Vice. 58 This was the
book on which the prosecutor and the committee took their stand,
155. 48 Fortune 123, 148 (Sept., 1953).
156. Some of them were: Vivian Connell's The Chinese Room, Erskine
Caldwell's God's Little Acre, Journeyman, and Tragic Ground. James T.
Farrell's Meet the Girls, Caroline Slade's Margaret, John O'Hara's Butter-field 8 and Susan Morley's Mistress Glory.
157. The four books were: The Heller by William E. Henning, The
Bride Saw Red by Robert Carson, Come Clean, My Love by Rosemary
Taylor, and No Marriage in Paradise by Myron Brinig. Of these, The Heller
is the only one to appear on the NODL lists; it was also condemned by the
St Cloud Board of Review.
158. Legman, Love & Death: A Study in Censorship 68 (1949).
[Vol. 38:295
THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
and lost in a suit by the publisher to enjoin the prosecutor's ac-
tivities. 150
In Detroit, where the police do their own censoring, the censor
bureau's lists show the same obtuseness to literary values. It is
quite apparent that the censor bureau has never accepted the Detroit
public library's offer to advise it on literary values,18 0 for its list of
some 150 books declared to be in violation of Michigan law includes
such books as James T. Farrell's A World I Never Made, Ernest
Hemingway's Across the River and Into the Trees, John O'Hara's
The Farmers Hotel, Jan Valtin's Wintertime, James Warner Bel-
lah's Ward 20, and Lillian Smith's Strange Fruit.'1' And its list
of partially objectionable books includes Sherwood Anderson's Dark
Laughter, John Dos Passos' The Forty-Second Parallel, James T.
Farrell's No Star Is Lost, Mackinlay Kantor's Signal Thirty-Two,
and Ethel Waters' His Eye Is on the Sparrow.'62 In Youngstown,
Ohio, of course, the situation was equally as bad. For there, the
chief of police not only prepared his own list from the appearance
of the jackets and blurbs on paper-bound books but also took both
the "illegal" and the "partially objectionable" lists of the Detroit
censor bureau and combined them in a single list?63 Among the
books he succeeded in suppressing, until a publisher obtained an
injunction in federal court against him,8 4 were John Steinbeck's
Cannery Row, Christopher Isherwood's The Last of Mr. Norris,
and Pierre Lamure's Moulin Rouge.
Some of the official censorship boards were equally as obtuse.
Perhaps the worst was the St. Cloud Board of Review. Most of the
books it condemned were books blacklisted by the NODL, for
its standards of judgment were about the same as those used by
the NODL and it used the NODL lists as buying guides. Among
the books it condemned were W. Somerset Maugham's Cakes and
Ale and The Painted Veil, William Faulkner's The Wild Palms
and Sanctuary, Herbert Ernest Bates' The Purple Plain, Evelyn
Eaton's Quictl, My Captain Waits, Richard Wright's Native Son,
and Thomas Heggen's Mister Roberts.'6 ' In Georgia, however,
the State Literature Commission proceeded much more carefully.
159. Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N. J. Super. 292, 96 A. 2d 47 (1953).
See note 101 supra.
160. Minneapolis Star, Feb. 10, 1953, p. 18, col. 5.
161. Sonderegger, Detroit Public Not Told What Is Censored, Minne-
apolis Star, Feb. 10, 1953, p. 15, col. 1.
162. Minneapolis Star, Feb. 10, 1953, p. 18, col. 3.
163. See text to note 137 supra.
164. New American Library of World Literature v. Allen 114 F. Supp.
823 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
165. Sonderegger, Censors Brand Prize-winting Novels "Unfit," Minne-
apolis Star, Dec. 24, 1952, p. 1, col. 1.
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In nearly a year of its operation it has ruled against only four paper-
bound books. Three of the four are reported to be Spring Fire,
by Vin Packer, and Women's Barracks, by Tereska Torres, both
Fawcett publications, and Erskine Caldwell's A Place Called Esther-
%ilie.116 What it will do in the future remains to be seen.
Surely, in the face of this record, it could not seriously be con-
tended that today's censors are any more discriminating than their
predecessors. The same ignorance or disregard of the literary and
other values of a book marks the censor's activities today as it has in
the past,167 and the reasons for this are not hard to find. For the
censor is seldom a person who appreciates esthetic values or under-
stands the nature and function of imaginative literature.' His
interests lie elsewhere. Often an emotionally disturbed person,169
he sets out to look for smut and consequently finds it almost every-
where, oblivious of the context and the values of the book in which
he finds what he seeksY.7 0 His one-track interest often is reinforced
when his smut-snuffling becomes a professional occupation. 7
Surely, Heywood Broun was far from wrong in observing that
"[o]nce censorship is let loose, nothing is safe from the smirch of its
exceeding dirtiness."'1 72
II. LAW OF OBSCENITY
A. CONCEPTS OF OBSCENITY
No one seems to know what obscenity is. Many writers have
discussed the obscene, but few can agree upon even its essential
nature. Some find the key to it in the sense of shame; whatever
violates the community's sense of shame is obscene. 7 3 The obscene
166. American Civil Liberties Union, Feature Press Service, Weekly
Bulletin No. 1608 (Aug. 24, 1953).
167. See Haight, Banned Books (1935), for an itemized account of
books censored for various reasons, including obscenity. Ernst and Seagle, To
the Pure . .. (1928) ; Ernst and Lindey, The Censor Marches On (1940) ;
Craig, The Banned Books of England (1937) ; and Scott, Into Whose Hands
(1945) deal specifically with books banned for obscenity.
168. Speaking of Anthony Comstock, Heywood Broun observed: "Since
death and damnation might be, according to his belief, the portion of the
girl or boy who read a ribald story, it is easy to understand why he was so
impatient with those who advanced the claims of art. Even those who love
beauty would hardly be prepared to burn in hell forever in its service. Corn-
stock's decision was even easier, for he did not know, understand or care any-
thing about beauty. [Italics added]." Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock
266 (1927).
169. See note 462 infra.
170. See note 463 infra.
171. See note 464 infra.
172. Broun and Leech, op. cit. supra note 168, at 275. See also Watson,
Some Effects of Censorship Upon Society in Social Meaning of Legal Con-
cepts No. 5, Protection of Public Morals Through Censorship 81-83 (1953).
173. Kallen, Indecency and the Seven Arts 11, 35-36 (1930) ; Kallen,
The Ethical Aspects of Censorship in Social Meaning of Legal Concepts
No. 5, Protection of Public Morals Through Censorship 34, 41-44 (1953);
Seagle, Cato, or the Future of Censorship 26 (1930).
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in this sense usually lies in the exposure of sexual matters, 7 4 though
it may also lie in the exposure of the excremental as well. 7 5 Simi-
larly, Havelock Ellis found the obscene in whatever is "off the
scene" and not openly shown on the stage of life.'70 The obscene
in this sense also lies in the public exposure of the naturalistic as-
pects of sexual and excremental processes. 177 Some have found a
quite different kind of obscenity that lacks sexual and excremental
exhibitionism. Termed critical obscenity, it attacks accepted moral
standards and for this reason is held to be obscene. 7 8 Others, how-
ever, have taken an entirely different approach; to them the obscene
is that which arouses the "lower passions or indulgence in sen-
suality."' 17 But most writers have found the term hopelessly sub-
jective and lacking in any definite or acceptable meaning.8 0
Sometimes the inability to find a satisfactory meaning of ob-
scenity has led writers to turn to the word "pornography" in the
hope of finding something more tangible. One of them found a dis-
tinction between the two words; "obscene," he wrote, is a broader
word than "pornography," since it includes profanity and exple-
tives, whereas "pornography" is limited to books that are or were
intended to be aphrodisiacs. 181 Others have found in pornography
the essential quality of fantasy deliberately designed to stimulate or
pander to the sexual perversion of auto-eroticism.' s2 D. H. Law-
174. Kallen, Indecency and the Seven Arts 35-36 (1930) ; Seagle, op. cit.
supra note 173, at 22, 26.
175. Kallen, The Ethical Aspects of Censorship, op. cit. supra note 173,
at 41-42.
176. Ellis, The Revaluation of Obscenity in More Essays in Love and
Virtue 100 (1931).
177. Id. at 100-101. Ellis' interpretation of the obscene seems to be the
one followed by the United States Customs. See Chafee, Government and
Mass Communications 209, 258-259 (1947) ; cf. Cairns, Freedom of Expres-
sion in Literature, 200 Annals 76, 78 (1938).
178. Seagle, op. cit. supra note 173, at 26-27; cf. Housman, Sex and the
Censorship in International Congress for Sexual Reform 311 (3d Cong. 1929);
Van Druten, Sex and Censorship in the Theatre, id. at 317.
179. Burke, What Is the Index 23, 37 (1952).
180. Jackson, The Fear of Books 69-75 (1932); Scott, Into Whose
Hands 24-27 (1945) ; Lawrence, Pornography and Obscenity 5-9 (1929) ;
Hallis, The Law and Obscenity 20-21 (1932) ; Russell, The Recrudescence of
Puritanism, in Sceptical Essays 124 (1952).
181. Scott, Into Whose Hands 38 (1945); cf. Craig, Above All Liberties
168-170 (1942). But see notes 193 and 274 infra and text thereto.
182. "We may define pornography, cross-culturally, as words or acts or
representations that are calculated to stimulate sex feelings independent of
the presence of another loved and chosen human being." Mead, Sex and
Censorship in Contemporary Society, in New World Writing, Third Mentor
Selection 18 (1953). "The character of the daydream as distinct from reality
is an essential element in pornography. True, the adolescent may take a
description of a real event and turn it into a daydream, the vendor of
pornography may represent a medical book as full of daydream material, but
the material of true pornography is compounded of daydreams themselves,
composed without regard for any given reader or looker, to stimulate and
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rence defined "genuine pornography" as that which insults sex and
the human spirit. 83 Havelock Ellis in a somewhat similar vein
wrote of "the vulgar, disgusting, and stupid form of obscenity called
pornography-the literature and art that is a substitute for the
brothel and of the same coarse texture."'' 1 4 To Huntington Cairns,
however, pornography is "that class of material which is put for-
ward with no other purpose in view than the stimulation of the
sexual impulse" whose effect "except on the prurient and the imma-
ture is one of repugnance."'' s5 Heywood Broun, too, noted the dull-
ness of "sheer nastiness."' 6 Pornography as a concept seems almost
as hard to handle as obscenity.8 7
Faced with the impossibility of framing a satisfactory definition
of either term, a few writers have endeavored to classify the kinds
of books regarded as obscene or pornographic. Alec Craig set up
seven categories and described with examples the kinds of books in
each category."' Holbrook Jackson, on the other hand, set up only
two general classes, the facetiae and the literary aphrodisiacs.'8 0 But
these classifications of books do no more than acquaint us with the
varieties of books likely to be charged as obscene; they're of no
value at all in helping to frame a satisfactory definition of the ob-
scene or the pornographic.
titillate. It bears the signature of nonparticipation-of the dreaming adolescent,
the frightened, the impotent, the bored and sated, the senile, desperately con-
centrating on unusualness, on drawing that which is not usually drawn,
writing words on a plaster wall, shifting scenes and actors about, to feed
an impulse that has no object: no object either because the adolescent is not
yet old enough to seek sexual partners, or because the recipient of the
pornography has lost the precious power of spontaneous sexual feeling." Id.
at 19; cf. London and Caprio, Sexual Deviations 626-627 (1950).
183. Lawrence, op. cit. supra note 180, at 13; see also id. at 16.
184. Ellis, op. cit. vipra note 176, at 130.
185. Cairns, op. cit. supra note 177, at 85.
186. Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock 268-269 (1927).
187. Craig, op. cit. supra note 181, at 168-170.
188. Id. at 170-188. His categories are: (1) Books like The Auto-
biography of a Flea, Flossie and The Way of a Man With a Maid, which are
designed to extract money from people with an unhealthy curiosity and
a hunger for sexual experience of any sort. (2) Books, termed "gallant
pornography," that concern themselves with the physical side of sex and
nothing else. (3) Books, like those of the Marquis de Sade, that associate
the sexual impulse with cruel, hard, and destructive emotions; sadistic
literature. (4) Works of historical interest or by reputable se-xologists re-
printed in tawdry, meretricious, journalistic fashion with sensational and
inflammatory headlines and illustrations that have little or no relevance to
the text. Examples are The 120 Days of Sodom and Carrington's Satyricon of
Petronius. (5) Books, like the unbowdlerized edition of D. H. Lawrence's
Lacy Chatterley's Lover, that use plain, homely words for the natural func-
tions and anatomy of the body instead of latinized words or circumlocutions.
(6) Books that are humorous about sexual subjects. The Frogs in the
original Greek is an example. (7) Well-written books designed to instruct
in and stimulate sexual activity. These were common in classical times and
are prominent in oriental literature.
189. Jackson, op. cit. supra note 180, at 112-135.
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It is not surprising therefore that the delegates to the Geneva
Conference on the Suppression of the Circulation and Traffic in
Obscene Publications discovered that they could not define ob-
scenity;10° "After which, having triumphantly asserted that they
did not know what they were talking about, the members of the
Congress settled down to their discussion."'191 Nor is it surprising
that American legislatures have sought to give sensible meaning to
their statutes prohibiting obscene literature by adding one or more
of the following words: disgusting, filthy, indecent, immoral, im-
proper, impure, lascivious, lewd, licentious, and vulgar.192 These
added words, however, have made little or no difference in judicial
interpretations of the statutes. 93 And though New Hampshire and
Georgia have recently enacted statutory definitions of obscenity,'9 4
these definitions will probably have no more effect than the addi-
tion of a long string of synonyms.
Zechariah Chafee gives a number of excellent reasons for the
extreme difficulty of framing a satisfactory definition of the ob-
scene.' 05 The law, he writes, likes to be logical, but sex is seldom
wholly that, since by its very nature it includes a large element of
irrationality. The law of obscenity also undertakes to protect a
common standard in an area in which there is no such thing; for
each community is divided into groups that have different standards
of decency. The complexity of the idea of obscenity is another cause
of difficulty; for obscenity includes three different factors: 1) of-
190. Causton and Young, Keeping It Dark 55 (n.d.).
191. Huxley, Vulgarity in Literature 1 (1930).
192. Utah has seven words in its statute; it applies to any "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, disgusting or impure" book. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-39-1 (1953). New York and Pennsylvania each have five; their statutes
apply to any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or disgusting" book. N. Y. Penal
Law § 1141 (1944) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. § 18.4524 (Purdon 1939). Only Florida,
Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have been content with the single
word "obscene." Fla. Stat. § 847.01 (1931) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 1190 (1934);
IV. Va. Code § 6066 (1949) ; Wis. Stat. § 351.38 (1951).
193. "The effect of this plethora of epithets is to merge them into one
prevailing meaning-that of sexual impurity alone. . . ." Commonwealth v.
Gordon, 66 Pa. D & C 101, 112 (1949), aff'd stb nor. Commonwealth v. Fei-
genbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120,70 A. 2d 389 (1950). See also People v. Eastman,
188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E. 459 (1907) ; People v. Wendling, 258 N. Y. 451, 180
N. E. 169 (1932). Only a few courts have given the words filthy, indecent or
disgusting a separate meaning. United States v. Limehouse, 285 U. S. 424(1932) ; Commonwealth v. Donaducy, 33 Erie 330 (Pa. 1949).
194. New Hampshire now defines an "obscene" book as one "whose
main theme or a notable part of which tends to impair, or to corrupt, or to
deprave the moral behavior of anyone reading or viewing it." N. H. Laws
1953, c. 233.
The Georgia definition of "obscene literature" is "any literature offensive
to chastity or modesty, expressing or presenting to the mind or view some-
thing that purity and decency forbids to be exposed." Ga. Code Ann. §
26-6301a (1953).
195. Chafee, op. cit. supra note 177, at 210-212.
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fensiveness, 2) an ideological element that seeks to protect moral
standards from criticism, and 3) stimulation of sexual impulses and
impure thoughts that may lead to immoral conduct. This last factor
is the most troublesome of all because of the lack of reliable evidence
of the actual consequences of reading any kind of literature. The
situation is further complicated by the fact that the reading of litera-
ture is not confined to normal adults. Abnormal persons and young
people read too, and the effect of literature upon them plays an im-
portant part in the determination of what is obscene. Professor
Chafee may well despair of framing a definition of the obscene that
will work in all situations.196
But courts cannot await the formulation of a perfect definition
of obscenity. Every state, save one, 1 7 the United States, and many
municipalities have laws aimed at obscene literature. Courts have
no choice but to do the best they can with an extremely difficult and
complex concept. 19 What they have done and how well they have
done it merits careful study. 99
B. OBSCENITY IN THE COURTS
In the United States before the Civil War there were few re-
ported decisions involving obscene literature. -09 This of course is
no indication that such literature was not in circulation at that time;
the persistence of pornography is entirely too strong to warrant
196. Id. at 210.
197. New Mexico.
198. Unless of course they invalidate the obscenity laws for vagueness,
which seems unlikely. See text to notes 369-373 infra.
199. In the United States many such studies have been made. Perhaps
the best are: Ernst and Seagle, To the Pure (1928); Ernst and Lindey,
The Censor Marches On (1940); Chafee, Government and Mass Communi-
cation 196-366 (1947) ; Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52
Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1938) ; Grant & Angoff, Massachusetts and Censorship,
10 Boston U. L. Rev. 36, 146 (1930); Grant & Angoff, Recent Develop-
ments in Censorship, 10 Boston U. L. Rev. 488 (1930) ; Jenkins, The Legal
Basis of Literary Censorship, 31 Va. L. Rev. 83 (1944). For consideration
of special problems, see Balter, Some Observations Concerning the Federal
Obscenity Statutes, 8 So. Calif. L. Rev. 267 (1935) ; Chafee, Censorship of
Plays and Books, 1 Bill of Rights Rev. 16 (1940) ; Nutting, Definitive Stand-
ards in Federal Legislation, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 24 (1937) ; Rogers, Copyright
and Morals, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 390 (1920).
In England, too, there are many valuable studies of the obscenity laws:
Armitage, Banned in England (1932) ; Causton and Young, Keeping It Dark(n.d.) ; Craig, Above All Liberties (1942) ; Craig, The Banned Books of Eng-
land (1937); Hallis, The Law and Obscenity (1932) ; Scott, Into Whose
Hands (1945) ; Seagle, Cato, or The Future of Censorship (1930).
200. The first reported case is Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336(1821), which turned on procedural matters and the jurisdiction of the court.
The court did, however, hold that an "obscene libel" was a common-law
offense. The book involved in the case was entitled Menziors of a Woman of
Pleasure. Could this have been John Cleland's notorious Memoirs of the
Life of Fanny Hill or, The Career of a Woman of Pleasure (1748-1749) or
one of its many pirated or expurgated versions? For an account of the book,
see Scott, Into Whose Hands 143-145 (1945).
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such an inference.2 1 Nor is it an indication that the people of the
time were totally indifferent to the proprieties of the literature they
read. In 1851 Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter was bit-
terly attacked as an immoral book that degraded literature and
encouraged social licentiousness.2 0 2 The lack of cases merely means
that the problem of obscene literature was not thought to be of
sufficient importance to justify arousing the forces of the state to
censorship.
Following the Civil War, however, there was a sharp change in
attitude. The financial scandals, the vulgar and lax social behavior,
and the flagrant immorality of the years immediately after the war
led to a powerful social reaction. "The voice of the reformer was
heard in the land. The stage was set for a stern and rigorous re-
vival of the spirit of the Puritan forefathers. ' 20 3 This was the stage
on which Anthony Comstock stepped to begin his 40-year campaign
to purify the reading matter of the American public under the ban-
ner "MORALS, Not Art or Literature. 2 0 4 It was on this stage
too that a new legal definition of obscenity, imported from Eng-
land, first appeared.
In England at about this time the Protestant Electoral Union
published a pamphlet entitled "The Confessional Unmasked ' 2,5 to
further its program for advancing Protestantism and opposing
Catholicism, particularly in the election of Protestants to Parlia-
ment. The pamphlets were seized under Lord Campbell's Act 206
and in the case that arose out of the seizure--Queen v. Hicklin -2 0 7
a new legal definition of obscenity was framed for both England
and the United States. In the course of his opinion, the Lord Chief
Justice Cockburn said:
"I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and
into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. '12 0 8
201. In 1815 several persons were convicted of exhibiting for a price
an obscene painting "representing a man in an obscene, impudent and indecent
posture with a woman." Commonwealth v. Sharpless 2 S. & R. 91 (Pa. 1815).
202. A. C. Coxe in the Church Review for January, 1851, reprinted in
Mordell, Notorious Literary Attacks 122 (1926).
203. Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock 76 (1927). See also Mencken,
Puritanism as a Literary Force in A Book of Prefaces 197 (1917).
204. See Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock (1927); Mencken,
Puritanism as a Literary Force in A Book of Prefaces 197, 253-260 (1917)
Trumbull, Anthony Comstock, Fighter (1913).
205. See Scott, Into Whose Hands 89-91 (1945).
206. 20-21 Vict. c. 83 (1857). For discussions of the developments lead-
ing to enactment of this statute, see Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene
Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 50-52 (1938).
207. L. R. 3 Q. B. 360 (1868).
208. Id. at 371.
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This test was soon adopted by American courts.20 9 By 1913 it had
become so well established that Judge Learned Hand, though he
personally rejected the test, felt constrained to follow it. In United
States v. Kennerley210 Judge Hand overruled a demurrer to an
indictment for mailing Daniel Carson Goodman's Hagar Revelly
but added his now-famous protest against the Hicklin rule:
"... I hope it is not improper for me to say that the rule as
laid down, however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian
morals, does not seem to me to answer to the understanding
and morality of the present time .... I question whether in the
end men will regard that as obscene which is honestly relevant
to the adequate expression of innocent ideas, and whether they
will not believe that truth and beauty are too precious to society
at large to be mutilated in the interests of those most likely to
pervert them to base uses. Indeed, it seems hardly likely that
we are even to-day so lukewarm in our interest in letters or
serious discussion as to be content to reduce our treatment of
sex to the standard of a child's library in the supposed interest
of a salacious few, or that shame will for long prevent us from
adequate portrayal of some of the most serious and beautiful
sides of human nature....
"Yet, if the time is not yet when men think innocent all that
which is honestly germane to a pure subject, however little it
may mince its words, still I scarcely think that they would for-
bid all which might corrupt the most corruptible, or that society
is prepared to accept for its own limitations those which may
perhaps be necessary to the weakest of its members. If there be
no abstract definition, such as I have suggested, should not the
word "obscene" be allowed to indicate the present critical point
in the compromise between candor and shame at which the
community may have arrived here and now?... To put thought
in leash to the average conscience of the time is perhaps toler-
able, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least
capable seems a fatal policy." '211
This protest, however, was not the only indication of judicial
dissatisfaction with the harsh rule of the Hicklin case. In New York,
long before Judge Hand's protest was written, the courts had been
quietly ignoring the rule, despite its early adoption by the Court
of Appeals in 1884.212 In two cases Supreme Court judges held that
standard works of high literary quality were not obscene ;213 and
209. United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14,571 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1879) ; People v. Muller, 96 N. Y. 408 (1884) ; see United States v.
Rosen, 161 U. S. 29,.43 (1896).
210. 209 Fed. 119 (S.D. N.Y. 1913).
211. Id. at 120-121.
212. People v. Muller, 96 N. Y. 408 (1884).
213. In re Worthington, 30 N. Y. Supp. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1894) ; St. Hubert
Guild v. Quinn, 64 Misc. 336, 118 N. Y. Supp. (Sup. Ct. 1909).
Among the books involved in the Worthington case were: Payne's edition
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in one case the Court of Appeals held that a violent newspaper
attack on the confessional was not "indecent" under the statute.214
But it was not until the early 1930's that American courts gen-
erally began to reject the Hicklin rule. 215 In 1930 the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Mary Ware Dennett's
The Sex Side of Life, a pamphlet on sex instruction written for
adolescents, was not obscene and reversed a judgment of convic-
tion.21 Massachusetts in the same year amended its obscene litera-
ture statute to remove at least some of the harshness and inflexibili-
ty of the Hicklin rule.217 The following year Judge Woolsey held
two of Dr. Marie C. Stopes' works not to be obscene, and dismissed
libels against them under the customs law.218 These, however, were
mere skirmishes; the major attack on the Hicklin rule came with
the celebrated Ulysses cases of 1933 and 1934.219 In the Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Augustus N. Hand explicitly and force-
fully repudiated the Hicklin rule and in its place substituted a new
standard for the determination of what is obscene:
"While any construction of the statute that will fit all cases
is difficult, we believe that the proper test of whether a given
book is obscene is its dominant effect. 220 In applying this test,
relevancy of the objectionable parts to the theme, the established
of The Arabian Nights, Fielding's Tom Jones, Ovid's Art of Love, Boccaccio's
Decameron, and Queen Margaret of Navarre's Heptameron.
The St. Hubert Guild case involved a 42 volume set of Voltaire's works.
214. People v. Eastman, 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E. 459 (1907).
215. In New York most judges, particularly on the lower courts, con-
tinued to ignore the Hicklin rule. See Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene
Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 56-65 (1938) ; Grant and Angoff, Massachu-
setts and Censorship, 10 Boston U. L. Rev. 147, 173-176 (1930).
216. United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930). Although
the court (Augustus Hand, J.) did not openly reject the Hicklin rule, it did
modify the rule by holding that what night stimulate sexual impulses is not
barred and by emphasizing the inain effect of the pamphlet.
Mrs. Dennett gives her own account of the case in Dennett, Who's
Obscene (1930).
217. Before 1930 the Massachusetts statute applied to a book "contain-
ing obscene, indecent or impure language, or manifestly tending to corrupt
the morals of youth." Mass. Gen. Laws 1921, c. 272, § 28. In 1930 it was
amended so as to apply to a book "which is obscene, indecent or impure, or
manifestly tends to corrupt the morals of youth." Mass. Acts 1930, c. 162.
The change was doubtless made to correct such cases as Common-
wealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N. E. 472 (1930), in which Theodore
Dreiser's An American Tragedy was held to violate the statute upon the basis
of selected passages alone.
For an account of the enactment of the new amendment, see Grant and
Angoff, Recent Developments in Censorship, 10 Boston U. L. Rev. 487, 487-
491 (1930).
218. United State v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," 48
F. 2d 821 (S.D. N.Y. 1931) ; United States v. One Book Entitled "Contracep-
tion," 51 F. 2d 525 (S.D. N.Y. 1931).
219. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.
N.Y. 1933), aff'd, United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934).
220. The effect Judge Hand refers to is "libidinous." Id. at 707.
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reputation of the work in the estimation of approved critics, if
the book is modern, and the verdict of the past, if it is ancient,
are persuasive pieces of evidence; for works of art are not likely
to sustain a high position with no better warrant for their exist-
ence than their obscene content. 221
Thus, Ulysses effectively routed the old rule-which ignored
literary and other social values, judged a whole book by passages
taken out of context, and tested for obscenity by the tendency of
the passages alone to deprave the minds of those open to such in-
fluence and into whose hands the book might come.222 In cases aris-
ing after Ulysses, most courts continued to reject the Hicklin rule
and to apply the new standard of the Ulysses case. 22 3 In Massachu-
setts, although the court refused to accept all of the implications of
the Ulysses standard, the interpretation it placed upon the 1930
obscene literature law224 was not very different. In Commonwealth
v. Isenstadt22 the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the Hicklin
rule2 6 and approved the Ulysses case, apart from its implication
that a book is not obscene if sincerity and artistry are more promi-
nent features of the book than obscenity 22 7 and its approval of tak-
ing judicial notice of book reviews and literary criticism.228 On the
latter point, the court expressed no opinion, though at the time of
this decision a statute had already been enacted which would
authorize courts to receive evidence of the literary, cultural, and
educational qualities of a book.
2 29
Though routed, the Hicklin rule was not finally defeated. A
battle against it had been won, not the whole war. For Hicklin
from time to time continued to appear in various guises in the
221. Id. at 708.
222. This is Judge Hand's interpretation of the Hicklin rule as laiddown in United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14,571 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1879).
223. United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Parmelee v.
United States, 113 F. 2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d
511 (D.C. Cir. 1945); New American Lib. of World Lit. v. Allen, 114 F.
Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1953) ; Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N. J. Super. 292, 96
A. 2d 47 (1953) ; People v. Gotham Book Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 285 N. Y.
Supp. 563 (Mag. Ct 1936) ; People v. Miller, 155 Misc. 446, 279 N. Y. Supp.
583 (Mag. Ct 1935) ; State v. Lerner, 51 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 81 N. E. 2d 282(C.P. 1948) ; Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D & C 101 (1949), aff'd sub
nor. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1950);
St. Paul v. Fredkove, 38 Minn. Munic. 362 (Mun. Ct. 1953).
224. See note 217 supra.
225. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945).
226. Id. at 549 n. 2.
227. Id. at 552-554.
228. Id. at 560.
229. Mass Acts 1945, c. 278, § 28F. The court did not overlook the
statute; it merely refused to apply the statute since it did not take effect until
a later date. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, supra note 225, at 561.
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decisions of some courts. 230 The Gathings committee, too, sought
to revive the old rule. 3' But even if the war against Hicklin had
been won, the problems inherent in any concept of obscenity would
still remain.
1. Effects of Reading
Perhaps the most difficult of the problems that inhere in any
concept of obscenity concerns the effect of reading an obscene book.
In the Hicklin case Lord Chief Justice Cockburn spoke of the ten-
dency to "deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences." 232 He also spoke of "depraving and debauch-
ing" their minds233 and of corrupting their "minds and morals.1234
But he did not explain what he meant by depraving, debauching, or
corrupting the minds and morals of the book's readers. The only
clue that he gave to the meaning of these words was his firm con-
viction that the book in question-The Confessional Unmasked-
"would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to
persons of more advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and
libidinous character. ' 235 The suggestion of impure and libidinous
thoughts, then, is the key to what depraves, debauches, and cor-
rupts the minds and morals of readers, and so makes a book obscene.
a. Effect on Thoughts
This is the attitude of most courts. But it is an attitude hard to
describe with any precision. For the courts have used such a variety
of terminology in expressing it that even some of the outlines of
the attitude remain blurred. The federal courts, for instance, have
used such phrases as "tendency to suggest impure and libidinous
thoughts,' 2 36 "suggesting lewd thoughts and exciting sensual de-
sires, ' 237 "stir the sex impulses, '238 "lead to sexually impure and
230. Burstein v. United States, 178 F. 2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949) ; UnitedStates v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Calif. 1951), aff'd sub
non. Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Hadley v. State,205 Ark. 1027, 172 S. W. 2d 237 (1943) ; King v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky.
741, 233 S. W. 2d 522 (1950); Commonwealth v. Donaducy, 167 Pa. Super.611, 76 A. 2d 440 (1950); Commonwealth v. New, 142 Pa. Super. 358, 16 A.
2d 437 (1940).
231. See notes 79-80 supra.
232. Queen v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, 371 (1868).
233. Id. at 370.
234. Id. at 373.
235. Id. at 371.
236. United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, 1104, No. 14,571(C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879).
237. United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930).
238. United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love,"48 F. 2d 821, 824 (S.D. N.Y. 1931); United States v. One Book Entitled
"Contraception," 51 F. 2d 525, 528 (S.D. N.Y. 1931) ; United States v, One
Book Called "ilysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
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lustful thoughts," 239 "arouse the salacity of the reader," 240 and
"allowing or implanting ... obscene, lewd, or lascivious thoughts
or desires. ' 2 1 In New York the courts have employed almost as
wide a variety of terminology; they have spoken of the tendency to
"excite lustful and lecherous desires, 2 42 "excite to lustful desire
and what has been rather fancifully called 'impure imagina-
tions,' ",242 and "stir sex impulses or lead to sexually impure
thoughts. '244 In Massachusetts, at least since the adoption of the
1930 statute,245 the courts have been a little more consistent; they
speak of "inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desire."2 10
But what kinds of desires, imaginations, impulses, and thoughts
are impure, lascivious, lecherous, lewd, libidinous, lustful, obscene,
sensual, or sexual? Do these words embrace thoughts of normal
sexual intercourse? If so, within wedlock or only without? Or, on
the other hand, do they embrace only thoughts of sexual perver-
sions, including of course the sexual perversion of auto-eroticism in
which the reader gains sexual gratification solely from reading and
not from a live person of the opposite sex?247 None of the cases gives
a clear answer to any of these questions. We can only infer from
the nature of much of the literature held to be obscene that thoughts
of sex in any form are included within the meaning of the words
used by the courts.
There must of course be some causal relationship between the
literature and the thought. But what degree of causal relationship
is required? Is it enough if reading the book merely allows the
thought to arise, or suggests or leads to it? Or must the book stir,
arouse, implant, excite, or incite the prohibited thought? Only a
239. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184
(S.D. N.Y. 1933).
240. United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Walker
v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
241. Burstein v. United States, 178 F. 2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1949);
Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142, 146 (9th Cir. 1953).
242. People v. Brainard, 192 App. Div. 816, 820, 193 N. Y. Supp. 452,
455-456 (1920) ; People v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 335, 203 N. Y. Supp. 809,
814 (Sup. Ct. 1924); People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 129, 84
N. Y. S. 2d 427, 430 (Mag. Ct 1947).
243. People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 813-814, 264 N. Y. Supp.
534, 536 (Mag. Ct 1933) ; People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 130, 84
N. Y. S. 2d 427, 430 (Mag. Ct. 1947) ; cf. People v. Muller, 96 N. Y. 408,
411 (1884) (photographs of nude paintings).
244. People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 130, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427,
430 (Mag. Ct 1947).
245. See note 217 supra.
246. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 550, 62 N. E. 2d 840,
844 (1945) ; Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber," 323 Mass.
302, 307, 81 N. E. 2d 663, 666 (1948) ; Attorney General v. Book Named
"Serenade," 326 Mass. 324, 326, 94 N. E. 2d 259, 260 (1950). Other courts
have also used this terminology. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa.
D. & C. 101, 131 (1949), aff'd sub no n. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166
Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1950) ; People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959.
961, 178 P. 2d 853, 855 (1947).
247. See note 182 supra.
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few cases have discussed this question. In United States v. Den-
nett248 the court remarked that the statute did not bar "everything
which might stimulate sex impulses"24 9 and went on to hold that a
book on sex instruction for adolescents was not obscene because
"[a]ny incidental tendency to arouse sex impulses which such a
pamphlet may perhaps have is apart from and subordinate to its
main effect." 250 This idea was carried a bit further in United States
v. Levine ;251 there the court suggested that the degree of likelihood
of sexual stimulation as well as the degree of intensity of the re-
sulting sexual thought must outweigh the merits of the book.25 2
But whatever words or scales are used to determine the required
degree of causal relationship between the book and the thought,
there will always be the extremely difficult, almost impossible task
of applying them in particular cases; for who can say with reason-
able certainty when, in what ways, and how much the reading of a
particular book will affect the thoughts and desires of any read-
er?2 Yet on this precise question, courts reject the expert testi-
mony of psychiatrists.25 4
248. 39 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
249. Id. at 568.
250. Id. at 569; cf. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72
F. 2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934) ("dominant effect" of book).
251. 83 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
252. "The standard must be the likelihood that the work will so much
arouse the salacity of the reader to whom it is sent as to outweigh any
literary, scientific or other merits it may have in that reader's hands ..
Id. at 158.
The degree of intensity of the resulting sexual thought is emphasized in
Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The court said: "It
would make nonsense of the statute to hold that it covers works of value
and repute merely because their incidental effects may include some slight
stimulation of the senses of the ordinary reader." Id. at 512.
253. "It is impossible to say just what his (the average modern reader's)
reactions to a book actually are.... If he reads an obscene book when his
sensuality is low, he will yawn over it or find that its suggestibility leads
him off on quite different paths. If he reads the Mechanics' Lien Act while
his sensuality is high, things will stand between him and the page that
have no business there. How can anyone say that he will infallibly be affected
one way or another by one book or another? When, where, how, and why are
questions that cannot be answered clearly in this field. The professional
answer that is suggested is the one general compromise-that the appetite
of sex is old, universal, and unpredictable, and that the best we can do to
keep it within reasonable bounds is to be our brother's keeper and censor, be-
cause we never know when his sensuality may be high. This does not satisfy
me, for in a field where even reasonable precision is utterly impossible, I trust
people more than I do the law." Bok, J., in People v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C.
101, 137-138 (1949), aff'd sub norn. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa.
120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1950). Cf. Gardiner, Tenets for Readers and Reviewers 12-
17 (1944) for a discriminating analysis of the problem from the standpoint of
a reviewer for Roman Catholic readers.
One writer has facetiously suggested an objective test of the causal
relationship between the book and the thought. Legman, Love & Death: A
Study in Censorship 20 (1949).
254. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945);
see Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302,
307, 81 N. E. 2d 663, 666 (1948).
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b. Effect on Conduct
A more fundamental question is whether a book is obscene sole-
ly because it may cause thoughts of sex in the minds of its readers,
without consideration of the relationship between such thoughts and
physical conduct. In other words, is the causal relationship with
which we are concerned an immediate relationship between the
book and the thought? Or is it a relationship between the book
and the conduct of its readers, with the thought of sex only a link
in the chain between the two? The old Hicklin rule is amibiguous
on this point, for it tested obscenity by the tendency of a book to
"deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences" by suggesting impure and libidinous thoughts.25r Here
it is impossible to tell whether the words "deprave and corrupt"
refer to the reader's mind or to his behavior. The same ambiguity
lies in the Massachusetts test of obscenity, which requires the book
to have "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers
by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires. '258 Many
courts, however, speak of depraving and corrupting the morals of
the reader by means of sexual thoughts,217 thus suggesting that the
words "deprave" and "corrupt" refer to the reader's behavior and
not to his thoughts alone. If so, the proposition, however stated, is
fraught with ambiguities and an assumption of doubtful validity.
When is a person depraved and corrupted? And in what ways?
Presumably, since he is to be depraved and corrupted by thoughts
of sex, the depravity and corruption of the reader must be sexual
in nature. Is he depraved and corrupted when he engages in normal
sexual intercourse? Within wedlock, or without? Or is he depraved
and corrupted only when he practices a sexual perversion? More-
over, underlying these ambiguities is the doubtful assumption that
a causal relationship exists between reading a book that suggests
255. See text to notes 232-235 supra.
256. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 550, 62 N. E. 840, 844(1945); Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302,
307, 81 N. E. 2d 663 (1948) ; Attorney General v. Book Named "Serenade,"
326 Mass. 324, 326, 94 N. E. 2d 259, 260 (1950). See also Commonwealth v.
Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 131, aff'd sub noin. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum,
166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1950) ; People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d
959, 961, 178 P. 2d 853, 855 (1947).
257. Commonwealth v. New, 142 Pa. Super. 358, 360, 16 A. 2d 437, 438(1940) ; Commonwealth v. Donaducy, 167 Pa. Super. 611, 613, 76 A. 2d 440,
441 (1950) ; United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, 1103-1104, No. 14,
571 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879); United States v. Journal Co., 197 Fed. 415,
417 (E.D. Va. 1912) ; United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564, 568 (2d Cir.
1930) ; Burstein v. United States, 178 F. 2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1949).
A clearer emphasis upon sexual conduct appears in People v. Creative
Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 190, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 198, 201 (Mag. Ct. 1948), where
the court speaks of "the extent to which the book as a whole would have a
demoralizing effect on its readers, specifically respecting sexual behavior."
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or incites sexual thoughts and the conduct of the reader, a proposi-
tion on which there is little or no reliable information.25
Some courts, however, do not go beyond the thoughts of sex that
may be caused by reading a book to discuss the possible conse-
quences of such thoughts ;259 to them, sexual thoughts alone may be
enough to make a book obscene. But their reasons for disregarding
the consequences of sexual thoughts have never been expressed.
One possible explanation is the ancient theological doctrine that
the contemplation of sex is just as much an evil as its physical ex-
pression ;2cO but this explanation seems quite unlikely in view of the
fact that in all but one of the cases the books involved were held
not to be obscene. 20 1 Another explanation is that these courts have
tacitly assumed that thoughts of sex do in fact lead to undesirable
consequences. Their tacit assumption may be that sexual thoughts
translate themselves into action, an assumption of doubtful validi-
ty.2 G2 Or their assumption may be that sexual thoughts, without
necessarily inducing the reader to engage in sexual acts, somehow
lead to a lowering of the moral standards of the community-a form
of critical or ideological obscenity.263
c. Effect on Community Moral Standards
Ideological obscenity does not often explicitly appear in the
opinions of courts as a basis of their decisions. Perhaps the clearest
example is People v. Dial Press20" in which the court construed the
New York statute to prohibit "publication of a book which con-
travenes the moral law and which tends to subvert respect for
decency and morality."20-5 D. H. Lawrence's The First Lady Chat-
terley, the court held, was clearly obscene because of its central
theme, which the court interpreted to be that "it is dangerous to
the physical and mental health of a young woman to remain con-
tinent and that the most important thing in her life, more important
258. See text to notes 516-531 infra. See also Heywood Broun's obser-
vations on this point in Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock 266-269 (1927).
259. United States v. One Book Entitled "Contraception," 51 F. 2d 525,
528 (S.D. N.Y. 1931); United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F.
Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. N.Y. 1933), aff'd United States v. One Book Entitled
"Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d
156, 158 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir.
1945) ; People v. Brainard, 192 App. Div. 816, 820, 183 N. Y. Supp. 452, 456
(1920) ; People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 816, 264 N. Y. Supp. 534, 536
Mag. Ct. 1933).
260. May, The Social Control of Sex Expression 82 (1931).
261. The one exception is United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156, 158 (2d
Cir. 1936) and in that instance the case was sent back to the district court
for a new trial.
262. See text to notes 516-531 infra.
263. See note 178 supra.
264. 182 Misc. 416, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 480 (1944).
265. Id. at 417, 48 N. Y. S. 2d at 481.
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than any rule of law or morals, is the gratification of her sexual
desires." '2 66 A more common expression in the opinions of New
York courts is whether a book tends to "lower standards of right
and wrong, specifically as to the sexual relation.1261 But even
though courts have not often mentioned ideological obscenity as a
basis of their decisions, there can be no doubt that it has exerted a
powerful influence on the law of obscene literature. 268 Here, too,
the difficulties of framing an acceptable standard and then of ap-
plying it to a particular book are enormous. Perhaps courts could
without excessive difficulty frame a generally acceptable ideological
standard concerning sexual behavior, despite the manifold social
and religious groupings of a nation as large as ours. The chief diffi-
culty lies in its application to literature. When does a book tend to
subvert respect for decency and morality or to lower standards of
right and wrong? If the causal relationship between a book and
sexual thought and between a book and sexual behavior is hard to
determine, what can be said about the causal relationship between
a book and the community's moral standards governing sexual re-
lations? For the factors that influence the growth and formulation
of moral standards and their modification are so numerous and com-
plex that it is impossible to say what effect a book might have.
It is of course possible to formulate a standard of obscenity that
avoids the troublesome questions of causal relationship between the
book and the reader's thoughts or behavior, or between the book
266. Id. at 418, 48 N. Y. S. 2d at 483.
267. People v. Berg, 241 App. Div. 543, 544-545, 272 N. Y. Supp. 586,
588 (1934), affd, 269 N. Y. 514, 199 N. E. 513 (1935); People v. Larsen,
5 N. Y. S. 2d 55, 56 (Sp. Sess. 1938) ; People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc.
127, 130, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427, 430 (Mag. Ct. 1947) ; cf. People v. Fellerman, 243
App. Div. 64, 65, 276 N. Y. Supp. 198, 200 (1934), aff'd, 269 N. Y. 629, 200
N. E. 30 (1936). This expression was taken from People v. Wendling, 258
N. Y. 451, 453, 180 N. E. 169, 169-170 (1932), where with reference to the
play Frankie and Johnnie the court said, "[T]he question is not whether
it would tend to coarsen or vulgarize the youth who might witness it, but
whether it would tend to lower their standards of right and wrong, specifically
as to the sexual relation."
268. E.g., United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14,571(C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879) (Ezra Heywood's Cupid's Yokes); People v. Friede,
133 Misc. 611, 233 N. Y. Supp. 565 (Mag. Ct. 1929) (Radclyffe Hall's
The Well of Loneliness) ; People v. Pesky, 230 App. Div. 200, 243 N. Y. Supp.
193 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 373, 173 N. E. 227 (1930) (Arthur
Schnitzler's Hands Around); Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116
N. E. 265 (1917) (Birth control pamphlets) ; cf. People v. Gotham Book
Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 285 N. Y. Supp. 563 (Mag. Ct. 1936) (Andre Gide's
If It Die). See Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock 170-185 (1927).
Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy was prosecuted in Massachu-
setts because, according to Arthur Garfield Hays, "In the story, Clyde had
killed his lovemate Roberta when her pregnancy threatened his social plans
and an advantageous marriage. 'A story like this is indecent,' declaimed the
district attorney. 'It's an invitation to young people to learn birth control.'"
Hays, City Lawyer 238-239 (1942).
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and its effect upon the moral standards of the community. One such
standard is the religious principle that, if sin is discussed or por-
trayed in a book, it must be recognized for what it is ;289 another, is
Havelock Ellis' definition of the obscene as that which is off the
scene and not openly shown on the stage of life. °70 Although these
standards avoid the problem of casual relationship, they create new
problems of a different kind. The religious principle, for example,
raises such questions as these: What is sin? How and in what way
must it be recognized? Who must recognize it-the author, the
characters in the book, the reader, all readers? *-71 Havelock Ellis'
definition of the obscene is even more troublesome. Both its desira-
bility as a standard and its usefulness in application are doubtful;
for it is a static standard that "might easily fetter American works
of literary and artistic distinction" and it also "pretty much says,
'We will permit what we permit,' which is going around in a
circle. ' ' .27 ' And in addition to the difficulty of ascertaining what is
off the scene and not openly shown on the stage of life, which is no
mean task in itself, it squarely raises issues concerning vulgar and
offensive language and scatological matters not customarily used
or discussed in public.
d. Offensiveness
With rare exceptions, 273 courts agree that the use of vulgar and
offensive language does not in itself make a book obscene.2 7 4 Such
269. Gardiner, op. cit. supra note 253, at 7 (1944).
270. See text to note 176 supra. In State v. Lerner, 81 N. E. 2d 282, 289
(C.P. Ohio 1948) the court said: "The community concept of what is
'obscene' literature is approximately ascertainable. It goes without saying
that public opinion, community concepts condemn sexually nasty, perversive
publications, prints, pictures, drawings or photographs as 'obscene,' not be-
cause they might excite sexually impure ideas in minds susceptible of such
ideas because that is a mere matter of conjecture, but because they offend
the moral concepts of the people as a whole, and the people have the right
to establish codes of right conduct for literature as well as for other forms of
community conduct." See also Judge Learned Hand's suggestion in United
States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed 119, 121 (S.D. N. Y. 1913) that the word
"obscene" should be taken to "indicate the present critical point in the com-
promise between candor and shame at which the community may have
arrived here and now."
271. Gardiner, op. cit. supra note 253, at 7-12.
272. Chafee, Government & Mass Communications 209-210 (1947).
273. Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) ; People v.
Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 203 N. Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1924). See also note
193 supra and cases cited, holding that the word "filthy" in obscene literature
statutes includes vulgar and offensive language.
274. People v. Eastman, 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E. 459 (1907) ; People v.
Wendling, 258 N. Y. 451, 180 N. E. 169 (1932); People v. Viking Press,
147 Misc. 813,264 N. Y. Supp. 534 (Mag. Ct. 1933) ; People v. Vanguard Press,
192 Misc. 127, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427 (Mag. Ct. 1947) ; People v. Creative Age
Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 198 (Mag. Ct. 1948) ; United States v.
One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. N. Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F. 2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, affd sub
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language is not ordinarily sexually stimulating, nor does it tend to
lower moral standards concerning sexual behavior ;275 yet it often
is language not customarily used in public. And it is perfectly clear
that the use of such language in a book has an important bearing
upon judicial decisions in particular cases. In United States v.
Dennett,216 for example, the court emphasized the "decent" lan-
guage of the booklet on sex instruction involved in that case.217
Conversely, in Besig v. United States,278 the court was so shocked
at the language of Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of
Capricorn that it undoubtedly was a very important factor in the
court's decision that these two books were obscene.2 7 1 Yet James
Joyce's Ulysses,280 James T. Farrell's A World I Never Made,2 's t
nor. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1950).
See also People v. Vanguard Press (Mag. Ct 1937) reported in Ernst and
Lindey, The Censor Marches On 33-37 (1940) and Craig, Above All Liberties
127-130 (1942).
275. People v. Wendling, 258 N. Y. 451, 180 N. E. 169 (1932).
276. 39 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
277. "[W]e hold that an accurate exposition of the relevant facts of the
sex side of life in decent language, and in manifestly serious and disinterested
spirit cannot ordinarily be regarded as obscene." Id. at 569. See also United
States v. One Book Entitled "Contraception," 51 F. 2d 525, 527 (S.D. N.Y.
1931) ; United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," 48 F.
2d 821, 823 (S.D. N.Y. 1931); Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511, 512
(D.C. Cir. 1945).
278. 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953).
279. "The vehicle of description is the unprintable word of the debased
and morally bankrupt. Practically everything that the world loosely regards
as sin is detailed in the vivid, lurid, salacious language of smut, prostitution,
and dirt.... [E]ven human excrement is dwelt upon in the dirtiest words
available. The author conducts the reader through sex orgies and perversions
of the sex organs, and always in the debased language of the bawdy house." Id.
at 145. See also Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840(1945) and Morris L. Ernst's comments on the case in Ernst, The Best Is
Yet 114-115 (1945).
280. "The words which are criticized as dirty are old Saxon words
known to almost all men and, I venture, to many women, and are such words
as would be naturally and habitually used, I believe, by the types of folk
whose life, physical and mental, Joyce is seeking to describe." Woolsey, J.,
in United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 183-184(S.D. N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
Morris L. Ernst describes how this matter was handled in the trial of
the Ulysses case. "I told Judge Woolsey about all these words unused by the
polite. I tried ... to trace the convention in words. Tastes change, taboos vary,
but man has always found a new combination of letters to convey a concept
if the old word was deemed disgusting. No better series in our own genera-
tion can be found than in the travelogue of bathroom, toilet, water closet,
W. C., gentleman's room, john, can, and now 'I'm going to telephone.' No
one is ever really deceived." He also explained the derivation of the common
word for sexual intercourse and euphemisms currently used to describe the
same act Ernst, The Best Is Yet 116 (1945).
281. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 105-106, 114 (1949),
aff'd sub norn. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d
389 (1950) ; People v. Vanguard Press (Mag. Ct 1937), reported in Ernst
and Lindey, The Censor Marches On 33-37 (1940) and Craig, Above All
Liberties 127-130 (1942).
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and other books containing similar language 8 2 have been held not
obscene. Perhaps Massachusetts has arrived at as candid and satis-
factory a solution to the problem as possible. In Commonwealth v.
Isenstadt5" the court held that, although realistically coarse scenes
and vulgar words are not in themselves obscene, they may be con-
sidered in determining the effect of a book on its readers. 2 4
Some kinds of literature raise a similar but much more difficult
problem. Such pieces of literature as Benjamin Franklin's Letter
to the Academy of Brussels- 8 5 and Mark Twain's 1601,2s" for ex-
ample, deal with matters not often discussed in polite society, but
they are not sexually stimulating and it's hard to see how either of
them could have any substantial tendency to lower moral standards
concerning sexual behavior. Yet Benjamin Franklin's Letter was
once held to be obscene,28 7 and Mark Twain's 1601 undoubtedly
would be if a censor could ever find a suitable occasion for prosecu-
tion.'" 8 Far below such literature as Franklin's Letter and Twain's
282. Among them are Charles 0. Gorham's The Gilded Hearse, People
v. Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 198 (Mag. Ct. 1948),
and Calder Willingham's End As a Man, People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc.
127, 84 N. Y. Supp. 427 (Mag. Ct 1947) ; Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66
Pa. D. & C. 101, 107-108 (1949), aff'd sb norn. Commonwealth v. Feighen-
baum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1950).
283. 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945).
284. "The prohibitions of the statute are concerned with sex and sexual
desire. The statute does not forbid realistically coarse scenes or vulgar words
merely because they are coarse or vulgar, although such scenes or words
may be considered so far as they bear upon the test already stated of the
effect of the book upon its readers." Id. at 550, 62 N. E. 2d at 833-845.
285. . Franklin's Letter, sometimes entitled A Prize Question or an essay
On Perfumes, is a facetious response to the Royal Academy's request for a
prize scientific question possessing utility. His prize question, bolstered with
elaborate arguments to demonstrate its need and values, was: "To discover
some Drug, wholesome and not disagreeable, to be mixed with our common
Food, or Sauces, that shall render the natural discharges of Wind from our
Bodies not only inoffensive, but agreeable as Perfumes." Franklin, Satires and
Bagatelles 37 (1937).
286. Twain's 1601, or a Fireside Conversation in; ye Time of Queen
Elizabeth was written in 1876 for Clemens' friend, the Reverend Joseph Twit-
chell of Hartford, Connecticut, to reveal to Twitchell "the picturesqueness of
parlor conversation in Elizabeth's time." Somehow in 1880 a copy of the
manuscript came into John Hay's hands. Hay, who was later Secretary of
State, sent it to Alexander Gunn of Cleveland, Ohio, who proposed that he
set it up in type and run off a few copies. Hay protested that he could not
consent to the printing but asked Gunn to "save me one" if it were printed.
Later, in a letter to a Mr. Orr of Cleveland dated July 30, 1906, Clemens de-
scribed how he first came to write the piece and noted that it had been
privately printed in several countries, including Japan, and that a sumptuous
edition made by Lt C. E. S. Wood of West Point, which was distributed
among "popes and kings and such people," was worth 20 guineas a copy in
England in 1900.
287. Scott, Into Whose Hands 157-158 (1945).
288. Twain's 1601 was once published in a magazine called Two Worlds
Ouarterl, sometime in 1926 or 1927. A Clean Books Committee in New
York instituted some kind of action against the magazine, but whether the
particular issues contained Twain's piece is not clear; neither is the outcome
of the proceedings. Ibid.
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1601 are the dirty books that, lacking wit, are dull or even repul-
sive.2 9 They are not sexually stimulating, since they repel rather
than attract the normal reader. At most, they pander to existing
appetites for literature of that kind. Such a book, apparently, is
Waggish Tales From the Czechs which was before the Court of
Appeals in Roth v. Goldman.290 There the court recognized "the
curious dilemma involved in a view that the duller the book, the
more its lewdness is to be excused or at least accepted."29 1 The
majority of the court, to Judge Frank's bewilderment, 29 2 sought to
avoid the dilemma by hiding behind the limited scope of judicial
review and by the argument that "within limits it perhaps is not
unreasonable to stifle compositions that clearly have little excuse for
being beyond their provocative obscenity and to allow those of
literary distinction to survive." 293 A better and more candid solu-
tion to the dilemma was found by the same court a few years earlier
in United States v. Rebhuhn,294 which held that books of this kind
were obscene when sold in such a way as to appeal to the "salacious-
ly disposed" and "to gratify their lewdness," 205 thus returning to
something akin to Margaret Mead's analysis of pornography.""
2. Effect on Whom: The Probable Audience
Inherent in all definitions of obscenity and in the standards for
determining what is obscene is a reference to the effect of a book
upon its readers or the moral standards of the community or to a
community concept of what is not properly exposed to public view.
This reference, particularly to the effect of a book upon its readers,
has caused trouble ever since the decision of Queen v. Hicklin in
289. "Sheer nastiness is feeble stuff. When I was a youngster and care-
fully shielded I, too, had the romantic notion that among the forbidden books
were some powerful enough to steal away the very soul. By now I have read
them and another illusion is gone. There is scarcely a kick in a barrel full.
By what seemed a happy chance there fell into my hands, the other afternoon,
a whole library of paper-backs prepared in Paris for the American trade.
Shock was the whole objective, but it was not there. Indeed, after less than
half an hour of reading my only emotion was one of profound pity for the poor
pornographers." Heywood Broun, in Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock
268-269 (1927). See also text to note 185 supra.
290. 172 F. 2d 789 (2d Cir. 1949). The court described the book as "a
collection of some ninety-six 'waggish tales,' supposed to have been brought
down to us from another era and another clime, and sold through the mails
at the special discount of $10 from the listed $20 per volume. Our task is not
made easier, however, when we discover them to be American-made or
shared smoking room jests and stories, obscene or offensive enough by any
refined standards and only saved, if at all, by reason of being both dull and
well known." Id. at 789.
291. Ibid.
292. Id. at 798.
293. Id. at 789.
294. 109 F. 2d 512 (2d Cir. 1940).
295. Id. at 514-515.
296. See note 182 supra.
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1868.211 In that case the Lord Chief Justice defined obscenity in
terms of the tendency of the book to deprave and corrupt "those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall."29s He also remarked that
"with regard to this work,299 it is quite certain that it would sug-
gest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of
more advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and libidinous
character." 30 The question this definition raised was whether the
effect of a book upon its readers is to be judged by reference to
normal adults, abnormal adults, or children. 301
Many courts, following an unduly restrictive interpretation of
the Hicklin rule, rejected the normal adult as the standard by
which to judge the effect of a book upon its readers; they read into
the obscene literature statutes a desire to protect the young and the
weak. -11 2 In some jurisdictions state legislatures enacted statutes
explicitly aimed at the protection of the young.303 The typical
statute, in addition to the usual terminology, 0 4 speaks of books
that tend or manifestly tend to corrupt the morals of youth. 05 This
297. L. R. 3 Q. B. 360 (1868).
298. Id. at 371.
299. The Confessional Unmasked. See note 205 supra.
300. L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, 371 (1868).
301. See Chafee, Government & Mass Communications 201-202 (1947);
Scott, Into Whose Hands 30-31 (1945) ; Bok, Censorship and the Arts, in
Civil Liberties Under Attack 107, 112 (1951).
302. United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas 1093, No. 14,571 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1879) ; People v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 203 N. Y. Supp. 809 (Sup.
Ct. 1924) ; Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N. E. 472 (1930) ;
People v. Berg, 241 App. Div. 543, 272 N. Y. Supp. 586 (1934), aff'd, 269
N. Y. 514, 199 N. E. 513 (1935) ; Commonwealth v. New, 142 Pa. Super 358,
16 A. 2d 437 (1940).
303. Fla. Stat. § 847.01 (1951); Iowa Code Ann. § 725.4 (1950) ; Me.
Rev. Stat. c. 121, § 24 (1944) ; Mass. Ann. Laws c. 272, § 28 (1933) ; Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 28.575 (1938) ; R. I. Gen. Laws c. 610, § 13 (1938) ; S. C. Code §
16-414 (1952); Tex. Stat, Pen. Code art. 526 (1952); Utah Code Ann. §
76-39-1 (1953); Vt Rev. Stat § 8490 (1947) ; Va. Code § 18-113 (1950) ; cf.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 11190 (Williams 1934); W. Va. Code Ann. § 6066
(1949) ; Wis. Stat § 351.38 (1951).
In this respect, the recent New Hampshire statute seems to be the most
extreme of all obscene literature statutes. It defines an obscene book as one
"whose main theme or a notable part of which tends to impair, or to corrupt,
or to deprave the moral behavior of anyone viewing or reading it [Italics
added]." N. H. Laws 1953 c. 233, p. 326.
304. See note 192 supra.
305. The mutations through which the Massachusetts statute has passed
illustrate most of the various forms of statutes explicitly aimed at the pro-
tection of the young. The 1835 Massachusetts statute applied to any person
who handled "any book ... containing obscene language... manifestly tend-
ing to the corruption of the morals of youth, or shall introduce into any
family, school, or place of education.., any such book.... ." Mass. Rev. Stat
1835 c. 130, § 10. In 1862 the words "manifestly tending to corrupt the morals
of youth" were dropped, Mass. Acts 1862 c. 167, § 1, but were reinstated in
1880. Mass. Acts 1880 c. 97. This is substantially its present form. Mass.
Ann. Laws c. 272, § 28 (Supp. 1953). For a discussion of the statutory his-
tory see Grant and Angoff, Massachusetts and Censorship, 10 B. U. L. Rev.
147, 147-151 (1930).
1954]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
view, in fact, became so well established that Judge Learned Hand
in 1913 felt impelled to follow it, although he personally objected
to it because it would, he said, "reduce our treatment of sex to the
standard of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious
few" and "forbid all which might corrupt the most corruptible." 0
But Judge Hand's objections to this view of the Hicklin rule
had greater influence than his compulsion to follow it. Courts soon
began to look to the normal person as the standard for determining
the effect of a book on its readers, instead of the young or weak.
Now most courts at least start from the premise that the normal
or average person in the community is the proper touchstone,307
though some still speak of the young and weak as part of the read-
ing public.305
The normal person, however, is not always a suitable hypo-
thetical individual for testing the effect of a book on its readers.
Books, like other things, are sometimes distributed in channels that
reach certain kinds or classes of people. A book that is advertised
and more or less surreptitiously distributed as pornography, for
instance, normally reaches those who have an appetite for litera-
ture of that kind. In these circumstances, the normal person is
hardly the proper person to serve as a standard for determining
the effect of the book. Faced with this problem, many courts take
into account what may be called the probable audience of the
306. United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D. N.Y. 1913).
See also text to note 211 .spra.
307. "Whether a particular book would tend to excite such impulses and
thoughts must be tested by the court's opinion as to its effect on a person with
average sex instincts-what the French would call l'homme moyen senstel-
who plays, in this branch of legal inquiry, the same role of hypothetical
reagent as does the 'reasonable man' in the law of torts and 'the man learned
in the art' on questions of invention in patent law." Woolsey, J., in United
States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. N.Y. 1933),
aff'd, 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
See also Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; People
v. Pesky, 230 App. Div. 200, 204, 243 N. Y. Supp. 193, 197 (1930), aff'd, 254
N. Y. 373, 173 N. E. 227 (1930) ; People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 816,
264 N. Y. Supp. 534, 539 (Mag. Ct. 1933) ; People v. Larsen, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 55,
56, (Sp. Sess. 1938); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 136-
138 (1949), affd sub nomn. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super.
120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1950) ; State v. Lerner, 81 N. E. 2d 282, 288-289 (C.P.
Ohio 1948) ; St. Paul v. Fredkove, 38 Minn. Mun. 362 (Mun. Ct. 1953).
308. "The thing to be considered is whether the book will be appreciably
injurious to society ... because of its effects upon those who read it, without
segregating either the most susceptible or the least susceptible, remembering
that many persons who form part of the reading public and who cannot be
called abnormal are highly susceptible to influences of the kind in question
and that most people are susceptible to some degree, and without forgetting
youth as an important part of the mass, if the book is likely to be read by
youth." Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 552, 62 N. E. 2d 840, 845(1945).
See also id. at 557, 62 N. E. 2d at 848; People v. Vanguard Press, 192
Misc. 127, 129, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427, 430 (Mag. Ct. 1947) ; Sunshine Book Co.
v. McCaffrey, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 476, 482 (Sup. Ct 1952).
[Vol. 38:295
THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
book?" If the book is advertised and distributed in such a way as
to reach those upon whom it is not likely to have undesirable effects,
it is not obscene. 310 But if, on the other hand, the book is so adver-
tised and distributed as to reach those upon whom it is likely to
have undesirable effects, it is obscene. 311 And in ascertaining the
probable audience of a book, courts take into account the circum-
stances of its publication.31 2 Among the circumstances sometimes
considered are a) the nature of the advertising and promotional
material, 31 3 b) the reputation of the publisher, 14 c) the channels of
distribution, 1' and d) the price and quality of the edition. 1 6
309. "[A] book must be considered as a whole, in its effect, not upon
any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach." Miller, J.,
in Parmelee v. United States, 113 F. 2d 729, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
See also United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936) ; People
v. Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 190, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 198, 201 (Mag. Ct.
1948) ; Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 552, 62 N. E. 2d 840, 845(1945). But see United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705,
708 (2d Cir. 1934).
310. Consumers Union of United States v. Walker, 145 F. 2d 33 (D.C.
Cir. 1944) (Report on contraceptives distributed to members upon written
certificate stating, "I am married and use prophylactic materials on the advice
of a physician."); United States v. Nicholas, 97 F. 2d 510 (2d Cir. 1938)(Magazine 2Married Hygiene claimed by its American editor) ; United States
v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930) (Booklet on sex instruction for
adolescents).
311. The defendants "indiscriminately flooded the mails with advertise-
ments, plainly designed merely to catch the prurient, though under the guise
of distributing works of scientific or literary merit. We do not mean that the
distributor of such works is charged with a duty to insure that they shall
reach only proper hands, nor need we say what care he must use, for these
defendants exceeded any possible limits; the circulars were no more than
appeals to the salaciously disposed. . . ." L. Hand, J., in United States v.
Rebhuhn, 109 F. 2d 512, 514-515 (2d Cir. 1940).
See also United States v. Burstein, 178 F. 2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Roth
v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 789 (2d Cir. 1949) ; United States v. Nicholas, 97 F. 2d
510 (2d Cir. 1938) ; Lynch v. United States, 285 Fed. 162 (7th Cir. 1922).
312. Even Lord Chief Justice Cockburn recognized this factor. See
Queen v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, 367 (1868).
313. United States v. Rebhuhn, 109 F. 2d 512 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Roth v.
Goldman, 172 F. 2d 789 (2d Cir. 1949); Burstein v. United States, 178 F. 2d
665 (9th Cir. 1949); People v. Pesky, 230 App. Div. 200, 243 N. Y. Supp. 193(1st Dep't 1930), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 373, 173 N. E. 227 (1930) (Nature of
introduction to Arthur Scnitzler's Hands Around). The title of the book or
magazine is sometimes mentioned. Burstein v. United States, pra; Ultem
Publications. Inc. v. Arrow Publications, Inc., 166 Misc. 645, 2 N. Y. S. 2d
933 (Sup. Ct. 1938). But in Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever
Amber," 323 Mass. 302, 81 N. E. 2d 663 (1948), the court disregarded the
advertising for the book.
314. Ibid. But the absence of the publisher's name on the book is some-
times disregarded. Halsey v. New York Society for the Suppression of Vice,
234 N. Y. 1, 136 N. E. 219 (1922).
315. The open sale of a book through reputable bookstores is some-
times considered, although it is not a conclusive factor. People v. London,
63 N. Y. S. 2d 227 (Mag. Ct. 1946). Some courts disregard this factor alto-
gether. People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P. 2d 853 (1947). The use
of an alias by a mail distributor of the book is apparently an important con-
sideration. Burstein v. United States, 178 F. 2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949). So also is
the use of a restricted mailing list, particularly when coupled with a certificate
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Reference to the probable audience of a book to determine its
effect upon readers introduces a new variable into a problem that
is already full of them. In this view, a book is not obscene as such.
A book may be obscene when distributed to one class of persons
but not when distributed to another. Indeed, in two cases there is
even language susceptible of an interpretation that would make
the obscene nature of a book turn upon its effect on a single
individual.3 17
from each purchaser. Consumers Union of United States v. Walker, 145 F.
2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
But evidence of the persons to whom the book has been sold may be
inadmissible, at least when offered by the defendant. See United States v.
Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930) ; United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d
156,158 (2d Cir. 1936).
In the Levine case one of the purchasers, we have been reliably informed,
was a former jurist of high standing. In explanation of its decision on this
point, the court remarked: "The judge refused to allow in evidence a list
of purchasers of the books, among whom were a number of well-known
persons. He was right. Such a list taken alone told nothing of the standing
of the works in the minds of the community; even respectable persons may
have a taste for salacity. Obviously it would be impossible without hopelessly
confusing the issues to undertake any analysis of such a list by finding out
why each buyer bought."
But in the Dennett case the court said, "It was perhaps proper to exclude
the evidence offered by the defendant as to the persons to whom the pamphlet
was sold, for the reason that such evidence, if relevant at all, was part of the
government's proof. In other words, a publication might be distributed among
doctors or nurses or adults in cases where the distribution among small
children could not be justified. The fact that the latter might obtain it
accidentally or surreptitiously, as they might see some medical books which
would not be desirable for them to read, would hardly be sufficient to bar
a publication otherwise proper. Here the pamphlet (Dennett's The Sex Side
of Life) appears to have been mailed to a married woman. The tract may
fairly be said to be calculated to aid parents in the instruction of their chil-
dren in sex matters. As the record stands, it is a reasonable inference that
the pamphlet was to be given to children at the discretion of adults and to be
distributed through agencies that had the real welfare of the adolescent in
view. There is no reason to suppose that it was to be broadcast among children
who would have no capacity to understand its general significance."
316. In re Worthington, 30 N. Y. Supp. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1894) ; People v.
Fellerman, 243 App. Div. 64, 276 N. Y. Supp. 198 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd, 269
N. Y. 629, 200 N. E. 30 (1936) ; cf. St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn, 64 Misc. 336,
118 N. Y. Supp. 582 (Sup. Ct 1909). But in People v. Gotham Book Mart,
158 Misc. 240, 244, 285 N. Y. Supp. 563, 568 (Mag. Ct. 1936), the court
said, "Counsel for the defendant urge as factors to be considered by me that
the book in question sells for $5 and is part of a very limited edition. Such
evidence is immaterial. I cannot say that a 50 cent book is obscene but, that a$5 book or a 'de-luxe' edition is respectable. Such a view gives rise to two
contrary implications- first, that the rich and extravagant have a monopoly
of good manners and morals, which is not true; or, second, that the rich and
extravagant had either already been corrupted or were not worth saving,
which is also not true."
317. In United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936), the de-
fendant was convicted under an indictment containing eight counts for mailing
obscene circulars advertising obscene books. The conviction was reversed
because the trial court instructed the jury that the test of obscenity was the
'effect of a book upon the minds of "the young and immature, the ignorant
and those who are sensually inclined." On appeal, however, the court added,
"Our reversal does not mean that on another trial the proper standard can
under no circumstances refer to the adolescent. It may appear that the pros-
pective buyer in the eighth count was a youth and that the accused had reason
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3. Literary, Scientific and Educational Values:
Partly and Wholly Obscene
The weight to be given to literary, scientific, and educational
values in the determination of what is obscene has engendered
more bitterness and emotional disturbance than any other problem
inherent in the various concepts of obscenity. This is particularly
true of literary values. To those who place a high value upon liter-
ary qualities, the censorious are philistines. To the censorious, on
the other hand, literary qualities are suspect-they serve only to
make the obscene palatable and therefore all the more insidious and
dangerous.318
In the fight between the literati and the philistines, the philis-
tines were at first on top. They got there by means of a rule of law
that called for judging a book by the obscenity of passages taken
out of context-the so-called partly obscene test. Where this rule
came from is not wholly clear. Probably it developed out of an old
rule of pleading that required the indictment to specify the parts
of a book alleged to be obscene.:1 " At any rate, the rule became
to suppose that he was. The evil against which the statute is directed, would
then be the possible injury to such a youthful reader. It is when the crime
consists of importing the work, or offering it for general sale, that the test
cannot be found in the interests of those to whom it is sent, though abnormally
susceptible, lest in their protection the interests may be sacrificed of others
who might profit from the work... But even when the crime consists of
a single sale, and so may be judged by possible injury to the buyer, the book
must be taken as a whole.... The standard must be the likelihood that the
work will so much arouse the salacity of the reader to whom it is sent
as to outweigh any literary, scientific or other merits it may have in that
reader's hands ... [Italics added]." Id. at 158. See also also United States v.
Nicholas, 97 F. 2d 510 (2d Cir. 1938).
In People v. Muller, 96 N. Y. 408, 413 (1884), however, the court said,
"It would we conceive be no answer to an indictment under the statute for the
sale of an obscene picture, that it was sold to a person not liable to be injured
by it...."
318. "If the things said by Gautier in this book of Mlle. De Maupin were
stated openly and frankly in the street, there would be no doubt in the minds
of anybody, I take it, that the work would be lewd, vicious, and indecent.
The fact that the disgusting details are served up in a polished style, with
cxquisite settings and perfumed words, makes it all the more dangerous and
insidious, and none the less obscene and lascivious. Gautier may have a reputa-
tion as a writer, but his reputation does not create a license for the American
market. Oscar Wilde had a great reputation for style, but he went to jail just
the same. Literary ability is no excuse for degeneracy." [Italics added.]
Halsey v. New York Society for Suppresion of Vice, 234 N. Y. 1, 14, 136
N. E. 219, 223 (1922) (Crane, J., dissenting).
See also People v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 334, 203 N. Y. Supp. 809, 813(Sup. Ct. 1924) ; Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1953) ;
ef. People v. Dial Press, 182 Misc. 416, 417, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 480, 482 (Mag.
Ct 1944).
319. The two rules are coupled in United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas.
1093, No. 14,571 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879), but the connection between the
pleading requirement and the partly-obscene rule does not appear here as
clearly as it does in the Massachusetts cases. Compare Commonwealth v.
McCance, 164 Mass. 162, 41 N. E. 133 (1895) and Commonwealth v. Friede,
271 Mass. 318, 171 N. E. 472 (1930).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
firmly imbedded in American law3 20 and was inserted in the ob-
scene literature statutes of a number of states.3 2 1
Yet some courts, even at an early date, refused to apply the
rule to literary classics, to what they called "standard literature," 322
and thus left open a means of escape from a rule that totally ig-
nored literary values. But it was not until Massachusetts in 1930
tripped and fell over Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy
that courts generally began to reject the partly-obscene rule and to
substitute in its place the requirement that a book must be judged
as a whole.
In Commonwealth v. Friede323 the trial court, despite the de-
fendant's repeated efforts, refused to admit in evidence for the
jury's consideration the two volumes which then comprised An
American Tragedy32 4 and permitted the jury to consider only the
allegedly objectionable passages together with some pages and
chapters in which they appeared. Exceptions to the trial court's
rulings were overruled on appeal because, as the Supreme Judicial
Court said, "[E]ven assuming great literary excellence, artistic
worth and an impelling moral lesson in the story, there is nothing
essential to the history of the life of its principal character that
would be lost if these passages were omitted. . . ., -2 The court
added, for good measure, that the "seller of a book which con-
tains passages offensive to the statute has no right to assume that
children to whom the book might come would not read the ob-
320. United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14,571 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1879); United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D. N.Y. 1913);
Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N. E. 472, 69 A. L. R. 640 and
Note (1930) ; cf. United States v. Besig, 208 F. 2d 146 (9th Cir. 1953).
321. Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 8567 (1949) ; Del. Rev. Code c. 70, § 2555
(1935) ; Fla. Stat. § 847.01 (1951) ; Iowa Code § 725.4 (1950) ; lie. Rev. Stat.
c. 121, § 24 (1944) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.575 (1938) ; Ohio Gen. Code §
13035 (1935); R. I. Gen. Laws c. 610, § 13 (1938); S. C. Code § 16-414
(1952); Tenn. Code Ann. § 11190 (Williams 1934); Vt Rev. Stat. § 8490(1947) ; Va. Code § 18-113 (1950) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 6066 (1949) ; Wis.
Stat § 351.38 (1951) ; cf. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2704 (1947) ; Colo. Stat. Ann.
c. 48, § 217 (1935), as amended, Colo. Laws 1937, p. 504, § 2; Md. Code Ann.
art. 27, § 514 (1951). The recent New Hampshire statute defines an obscene
book as one "whose main theme or a notable part of which tends to impair,
or to corrupt, or to deprave the moral behavior of anyone viewing or reading
it" N. H. Laws 1953, c. 233, p. 326.
The "partly obscene" provisions of the Ohio statute have been ruled in-
valid as a violation of the freedom of the press guarantees of the Federal and
Ohio Constitutions. State v. Lerner, 81 N. E. 2d 282 (Ohio C.P. 1948) ; see
New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823, 830-
831 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
322. in re Worthington, 30 N. Y. Supp. 361 (Sup. Ct 1894); St
Hubert Guild v. Quinn, 64 Misc. 336, 118 N. Y. Supp. 582 (Sup. Ct 1909) ;
Halsey v. New York Society for Suppression of Vice, 234 N. Y. 1, 136 N. E.
219 (1922) ; see People v. London, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 227, 230 (Mag. Ct, 1946).
323. 271 Mass. 318, 171 N. E. 472 (1930).
324. Id. at 320, 171 N. E. at 473.
325. Id. at 322, 171 N. E. at 474.
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noxious passages or that if they should read them would continue
to read on until the evil effects of the obscene passages were
weakened or dissipated with the tragic denouement of a tale."326
This was too much, even for Massachusetts. Within the year, it
amended its statute to eliminate the partly-obscene rule.3 27
Since then, the courts of Massachusetts32s and of most other
jurisdictions in which the question has been considered 2 9 have
explicitly adopted the requirement that a book must be judged as
a whole, not by its parts taken out of context. Only the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit retains any vestige
of the old partly-obscene rule.330
But the requirement that a book must be judged as a whole
does not mean that a book is obscene only if it meets Mark Twain's
description of his 1601: "[I]f there is a decent word in it, it is
because I overlooked it." 331 A book is obscene if that is its "domi-
326. Ibid.
327. See note 217 supra.
328. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945);
Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302, 81 N. E.
2d 663 (1948) ; Attorney General v. Book Named "God's Little Acre," 326
Mass. 281, 93 N. E. 2d 819 (1950); Attorney General v. Book Named
"Serenade," 326 Mass. 324, 94 N. E. 2d 259 (1950).
329. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Parmalee v.
United States, 113 F. 2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Walker v. Popenoe, 148 F. 2d511 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 264 N. Y. Supp.
534 (Mag. Ct. 1933) ; People v. Gotham Book Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 285 N. Y.
Supp. 563 (Mag. Ct. 1936) ; People v. Vanguard Press (Mag. Ct. 1937), re-
ported in Ernst and Lindey, The Censor Marches On 33-37 (1940) and Craig,
Above All Liberties 127-130 (1942) ; People v. Dial Press, 182 Misc. 416, 48
N. Y. S. 2d 480 (Mag. Ct. 1944); People v. London, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 227(Mag. Ct. 1947) People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 84 N. Y. S. 2d
427 (Mag. Ct. 1947); People v. Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79
N. Y. S. 2d 198 (Mag. Ct. 1948) ; Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C.
101 (1949), aff'd sub nom. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120,
70 A. 2d 389 (1950) ; State v. Lerner, 81 N. E. 2d 282 (Ohio C. P. 1948) ;
New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823(N. D. Ohio 1953); St. Paul v. Fredkove, 38 Minn. Mun. 362 (Mun. Ct.
1953) ; .ee People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 961, 178 P. 2d 853, 855(1947) ; cf. Burstein v. United States, 178 F. 2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949).
330. "We agree that the book as a whole must be obscene to justify its
libel and destruction, but neither the number of the 'objectionable' passages
nor the proportion they bear to the whole book are controlling. If an incident,
integrated with the theme or story of a book, is word-painted in such lurid
and smutty or pornographic language that dirt appears as the primary pur-
pose rather than the relation of a fact or adequate description of the incident,
the book itself is obscene." Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142, 146 (9th Cir.
1953). The court went on to say, on the same page, that it neither approved
nor disapproved of United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934) and United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936),
and that the point was irrelevant anyway, since "we have adjudged each book
as an integrated whole."
331. Letter of Samuel Clemens to a Mr. Orr of Cleveland, dated July
30, 1906. See note 286 supra.
1954]
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nant effect" 332 or its "main purpose '33 or if it "contains prohibited
matter in such quantity or of such a nature as to flavor the whole
and impart to the whole any of the qualities mentioned in the
statute, so that the book as a whole can fairly be described" as
obscene. 34
And in applying the requirement that a book be judged as a
whole, courts often speak of the relevance of the passages claimed
to be obscene. In the Ulysses case, for instance, the court said that,
in determining the "dominant effect" of a book, "the relevancy of
the objectionable parts to the theme" is a persuasive piece of evi-
dence.33 5 If the objectionable parts are relevant to the theme,
courts tend to find the book not obscene;3388 if, on the other hand,
the parts are irrelevant, the book is usually found to be obscene.33 7
But what is "relevant" in this context? And how is it to be de-
teirnined? In Massachusetts the Supreme Judicial Court tests
relevance by the necessity of the passages to convey the "sincere
message" of the book.338 In New York, however, courts sometimes
determine the relevancy of the passages by the author's sincerity of
purpose3 ---a far more satisfactory standard of relevance than that
employed by the Massachusetts courts. For it recognizes what is
sometimes called "literary necessity"-the author's need to use
332. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705 708(2d Cir. 1934) ; Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 19455.
333. People v. Gotham Book Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 244, 285 N. Y. Supp.
563, 568 (Mag. Ct 1936) ; People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 264 N. Y.
Supp. 534, 536 (Mag. Ct 1933).
334. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 549, 62 N. E. 2d 840,
844 (1945).
335. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705, 708(2d Cir. 1934).
336. E.g., United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705(2d Cir. 1934) ; Parmalee v. United States, 113 F. 2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ;
People v. Gotham Book Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 285 N. Y. Supp. 563 (Mag. Ct.
1936) ; People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427 (Mag.
Ct 1947) ; People v. Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 198(Mag. Ct 1948); Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber," 323
Mass. 302, 81 N. E. 2d 663 (1948).
337. E.g., Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840(1945) ; cf. People v. London, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 227 (Mag. Ct. 1946).
338. In affirming a conviction involving Lillian Smith's Strange Fruit,
the court said, "[T]he matter which could be found objectionable is not
necessary to convey any sincere message the book may contain. . . ." Common-
wealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 557, 62 N. E. 2d 840, 847 (1945) ; cf. Com-
monwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 322, 171 N. E. 472, 474 (1930).
339. In one of the cases the author, Calder Willingham, testified that
he had two purposes in writing his book End As a Man. The court, granting
a motion to dismiss the complaint, said: "But whether or not the author has
proved a case (which he makes no claim to have done), I find nothing in the
book to indicate a lack of sincerity in his purpose. I am satisfied that every
passage in the book was included because the author felt it was an element
necessary to the truth of his literary picture." People v. Vanguard Press, 192
Misc. 127, 128, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427, 429 (Mag. Ct. 1947). See also People v.
Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 198 (Mag. Ct 1948).
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whatever words and passages will produce the effect he intends. 40
It also calls for a livelier appreciation of the nature and function of
literature.
Although the now generally accepted requirement of judging a
book as a whole permits courts to weigh the merits of a book
against its alleged demerits (which the old partly-obscene rule did
not), not all courts have taken advantage of the opportunity.
Despite their acceptance of the whole-book requirement, a few
courts still cling to the notion that literary values are irrelevant.341
Most courts, however, do consider the literary qualities of a book
under attack. In Massachusetts the literary qualities of a book are
not very important but they are no longer totally ignored.342 At
the opposite extreme, New York courts have occasionally held that
the obscene literature law is totally inapplicable to works of genuine
literary value.3 3 To most courts, however, the literary qualities of
a book are important, but not conclusive .3 4 The same observations
apply to educational and scientific works. If a book has literary,
educational, or scientific values, these values are weighed in deter-
mining whether the book is obscene, and their weight is usually
enough to bring about a decision favorable to the book.34  On the
340. Transcript of Record, p. 36, Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335
U. S. 848 (1948) ; Miller, Obscenity and the Law of Reflection 9-10 (1945) ;
cf. Milton, An Englishman, His Defense of Himself, In Answer to Alex-
ander More, & c. (1655), in 9 Works of John Milton 107-113 (Patterson ed.
1933).
341. People v. Dial Press, 182 Misc. 416, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 480 (Mag. Ct.
1944) ; People v. Friede, 133 Misc. 611, 233 N. Y. Supp. 565 (Mag. Ct 1929) ;
People v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 203 N. Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1924) ; see
People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 962, 178 P. 2d 853, 856 (1947).
342. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945);
Attorney General v. Book Named "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 93
N. E. 2d 819 (1950) ; cf. United States v. Besig, 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953).
343. People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 264 N. Y. Supp. 534 (Mag.
Ct. 1933) ; People v. Miller, 155 Misc. 446, 279 N. Y. Supp. 583 (Mag. Ct.
1935).
344. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936) ; People v.
Gotham Book Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 285 N. Y. Supp. 563 (Mag. Ct. 1936);
People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427 (Mag. Ct 1947)
Pcople v. Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 198 (Mag. Ct.
1948) ; St. Paul v. Fredkove, 38 Minn. Mun. 362 (Mun. Ct. 1953).
345. E.g., United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705
(2d Cir. 1934) ; Parmalee v. United States, 113 F. 2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940)
(Parmalee's Nudism in Mfodern Life); Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 33(D.C. Cir. 1945) (Popenoe's Preparing for Marriage) ; People v. Larsen,
5 N. Y. S. 2d 55 (Sp. Sess. 1938) (Life magazine's Birth of a Baby) ; People
v. Gotham Book Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 285 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1936) (Gide's
If It Die) ; People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427
(Mag. Ct. 1947) (Willingham's End As a Man); People v. Creative Age
Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 198 (Mag. Ct. 1948) (Gorham's The
Gildcd Hcarse). Contra: People v. Berg, 241 App. Div. 543, 272 N. Y. Supp.
586 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 269 N. Y. 514, 199 N. E. 513 (1935) (Clarke's
Female) ; Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945)
(Smith's Strange Fruit).
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other hand, if a book with obscene tendencies lacks these values,
courts are likely to condemn it.346
Judges however are seldom equipped by training or experience
to evaluate the literary, educational, and scientific values of a
book. Some of them of course don't recognize their limitations; to
them, the obscene is self-evident, and they neither need nor want
the help of evidence concerning a book's values in these respects .a 7
Fortunately, few judges are afflicted with this form of bigotry and
obtuseness. Today, most courts readily consider some form of evi-
dence of the literary, educational, or scientific values of the book
under attack. But they do not always agree on what kinds of evi-
dence it is proper to consider. Some of them consider the published
book reviews and appraisals of competent critics.3 48 Others admit
the testimony of expert witnesses. 49 And one court has even gone
so far as to receive and consider the solicited letters of persons
qualified to appraise the book.3 50
4. Author's Purpose
The final major problem inherent in the concept of obscenity
concerns the author's purpose and its bearing upon the determina-
tion of what is obscene. Is the author's purpose relevant in any
way? If so, is it relevant to the literary, educational, or scientific
346. E.g., Roth v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 789 (2d Cir. 1949) (Waggish
Tales From the Czechs); People v. London, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 227 (Mag. Ct.
1946) (Wolsey's Call House Madam-defendant held for trial).
347. "It does not require an expert in art or literature to determine
whether a picture is obscene or whether printed words are offensive to
decency and good morals." People v. Muller, 96 N. Y. 409, 410 (1884), quoted
with "hearty" approval in People v. Fellerman, 243 App. Div. 64, 276 N. Y.
Supp. 198, 199 (Sup. Ct 1934), aff'd, 269 N. Y. 629, 200 N. E. 30 (1936).
See also Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945) ;
People v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 203 N. Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1924); People
v. Friede, 133 Misc. 611, 233 N. Y. Supp. 565 (Mag. Ct. 1929); United
States v. Two Obscene Books, 92 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Calif. 1950), 35 Minn.
L. Rev. 326 (1951) ; cf. United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp.
760 (1950), aff'd sub noin. Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir.
1953) ; see People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 963, 178 P. 2d 853, 856
(1947).
348. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1934) ; People v. Gotham Book Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 285 N. Y. Supp.
563 (Mag. Ct. 1936) ; see United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156, 158 (2d Cir.
1936) ; United States v. Rebhuhn, 109 F. 2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1940).
349. United States v. Besig, 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Attorney
General v. Book Named "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302, 81 N. E. 2d 663
(1948); Attorney General v. Book Named "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass.
281, 93 N. E. 2d 819 (1950) ; Attorney General v. Book Named "Serenade,"
326 Mass. 324, 94 N. E. 2d 259 (1950) ; People v. Larsen, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 55
(Sp. Sess. 1938) ; People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 84 N. Y. S. 2d
427 (1947). But see United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1936).
350. People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 264 N. Y. Supp. 534 (Mag.
Ct. 1933) ; cf. Dennett, Who's Obscene 70-131 (1930). Contra: People v.
Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 198 (Mag. Ct. 1948).
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values of a particular book? Or is it directly relevant to the issue
of obscenity itself?
This problem arose early in the development of the law of
obscene literature. In the Hicklin case351 The Confessional Un-
inasked352 was published and distributed to advance the objects
of the Protestant Electoral Union, a society formed to oppose
Roman Catholicism and to secure the election of protestants to
Parliament.135 The defendant conceded that the book was obscene
but argued that the defendant was not guilty of a crime because his
intention was honest and lacked the requisite criminal animus. 354
The court, however, rejected the argument and ruled that the
defendant's motives, however honest or even laudable, were no
defense to the action. 55 This decision was carried a step further
in United States v. Bennett, 6 where the court suggested that the
author's purpose is totally irrelevant.357 This is the view apparently
accepted in the Dennett35 8 and Ulysses35 D cases.
Yet in both the Deneft6 and Ulysses"6 ' cases the court spoke
of the authors' sincerity as a point in favor of the books involved
in those cases. Many other courts, holding a book not obscene, have
also emphasized the sincerity of the author.3 2 The reverse is also
true: when a court finds, or thinks it finds, an insincere author
whose intent is obscene, it readily holds the book obscene too.365
351. Queen v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360 (1868).
352. See Scott, Into Whose Hands 89-91 (1945), for a description of
the book.
353. Queen v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, 362 (1868).
354. Id. at 363-368.
355. Id. at 370-378.
356. 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14,571 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1879).
357. Id. at 1105.
358. "It is doubtless true that the personal motive of the defendant in
distributing her pamphlet could have no bearing on the question whether
she violated the law. Her own belief that a really obscene pamphlet would
pay the price for its obscenity by means of intrinsic merits would leave her
as much as ever under the ban of the statute." United States v. Dennett, 39
F. 2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930).
359. "It is true that the motive of an author to promote good morals is
not the test of whether a book is obscene ....." United States v. One Book
Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934).
360. "The defendant's discussion of the phenomena of sex is written with
sincerity of feeling and with an idealization of the marriage relation and sex
emotions." United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1930).
361. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705, 706-
707 (2d Cir. 1934).
362. See United States v. One Book Entitled "Contraception," 51 F. 2d
525, 527 (S.D. N.Y. 1931) ; United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses,"
5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. N.Y. 1933), affd, 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934);
People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 128, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427, 428 (Mag.
Ct. 1947) ; People v. Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 191, 79 N. Y. S. 2d
198, 200-201 (Mag. Ct. 1948).
363. People v. Peslrv, 230 Apt. Div. 200, 204, 243 N. Y. Supp. 193,
197 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 373, 173 N. E. 227 (1930) ; People v.
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Some courts even go so far as to suggest that a book cannot be
obscene unless it is written with a pornographic purpose.3 4
But how can a court ascertain the nature of the author's pur-
pose? In two recent cases, the author himself testified as a witness,
describing his objects and purposes in writing the book.38 5 More
frequently, courts resort to the book itself38 8 and to the testimony
of expert witnesses3 7 as evidence of the author's purpose. Yet,
however the court ascertains the author's purpose, it usually is
regarded as only one of several factors to be considered and there-
fore not conclusive on the issue of obscenity.38 8
Despite the evolution of relatively sane standards for the ap-
plication of obscene literature statutes since the Ulysses case, the
recognition of a constitutional limitation on obscenity censorship
is necessary to provide adequate protection for the values of free-
dom in literature. A soundly conceived constitutional standard has
obviously beneficial effects. If accepted, it will eliminate the un-
deserved weight often given to the decisions of trial judges and
juries who frequently are incapable of recognizing literary values,
since it will require appellate review on the merits. It will insure
more careful consideration of the factors that should govern a
decision whether a particular book can be censored. It will also tend
to develop a uniform and liberal standard for book censorship
throughout the nation in place of the present unsatisfactory system
that permits one or a few states to control the reading of the nation.
We therefore turn from the interpretation of obscene literature
statutes to a consideration of the constitutional standards that might
reasonably be anticipated when and if the issue is properly pre-
sented to the United States Supreme Court.
Berg, 241 App. Div. 543, 544, 272 N. Y. Supp. 586, 587 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd,
269 N. Y. 514, 199 N. E. 513 (1935) ; Sunshine Book Co. v. McCaffrey, 112
N. Y. S. 2d 476, 483 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
364. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 151 (1949), aff'd
sub norn. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389
(1950) ; People v. Gotham Book Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 244, 285 N. Y. Supp.
563, 567-568 (Mag. Ct. 1936) ; People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 814,
264 N. Y. Supp. 534, 536 (Mag. Ct. 1933).
365. People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427 (Mag.
Ct. 1947) ; People v. Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N. Y. S. 2d
198 (Mag. Ct. 1948).
366. E.g., Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; United
States v. One Book Entitled "Contraception," 51 F. 2d 525 (S.D. N.Y. 1931);
Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945).
367. E.g., People v. Larsen, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 55 (Sp. Sess. 1938) ; Attorney
General v. Book Named "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 93 N. E. 2d
819 (1950) ; St. Paul v. Fredkove 38 Minn. Mun. 362 (Mun. Ct 1953).
368. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945);
Attorney General v. Book Named "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 93
N. E. 2d 819 (1950); see People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 84
N. Y. S. 2d 427 (Mag. Ct 1947).
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III. THE CONSTITUTION AND OBSCENITY
The constitutional issue that concerns us here is the extent to
which the freedom of expression guarantees of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments protect literary treatment of sex against ob-
scenity charges. Another constitutional issue that might be raised
is whether the typical obscenity statute is so uncertain and vague
as to fall under the due process requirement of reasonable definite-
ness and certainty in a criminal statute,36 particularly since it
restricts the exercise of freedom of expression.3 7 0 We do not raise
this point. Despite the impossibility of determining in advance
whether a particular book will be held obscene,37' and the un-
predictable variety of tests applied to a charge of obscenity even
within the same jurisdiction,3 72 it is not likely that this attack
would be successful. Such a claim would encounter the dubious
judicial assumption that obscenity is a common law term with a
well-understood judicial meaning,1 3 and the very practical con-
sideration that without a broadly drawn "obscenity" statute it
would be difficult to control indefensible pornography having no
literary merit or justification.
Unlike motion picture censorship, prior restraint has seldom
been an issue in book censorship, since no statutes provide for
review and approval prior to publication. Prior restraint problems
are raised, however, by the growing, but not expressly authorized,
practice of furnishing to distributors lists of disapproved books
with the warning that their sale will result in prosecution.37 4 On
two occasions this practice has been enjoined by lower courts.37 5 In
view of the recent per curiam decision of the Supreme Court in-
validating prior censorship of an alleged "immoral" motion picture
369. Cf. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939) ; United States
v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921) ; see Note, Due Process Require-
ments of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1948).
370. Cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948).
371. See, e.g., People v. Friedrich, 385 Ill. 175, 52 N. E. 2d 120 (1944).
372. See Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv.
L. Rev. 40, 64-65 (1938), for a discussion of the variety of tests applied by
the New York courts.
373. See Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 518 (1948) ("words
well understood through long use in the common law-obscene, lewd, lasciv-
ious, filthy, indecent or disgusting") ; Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass.
346, 352, 86 N. E. 910, 911 (1909) ; cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250,
253, 282 (1952) ; Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 377 (1913).
374. See text to notes 99-100, 122-146 supra.
375. New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp.
823 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (some discussion of constitutional rights to freedom
of expression, but decision based on deprivation of property rights without
due process because chief of police lacks authority to censor books), Comment,
52 Mich. L. Rev. 575, 580 (1954) ; Bantam Books v. Melko, 96 A. 2d 47 (N.J.
Super. 1953) (freedom of press violated, with stress on prior restraint),
modified on appeal. See note 101 supra.
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without explanation, 876 it would be fruitful to explore current
methods of bringing pressure on book distributors in relation to
prior restraint. Space and time limitations prevent us from pursu-
ing this problem at this time, and we limit ourselves to freedom of
expression problems in obscenity censorship independent of any
prior restraint issues.
A. AN OPEN QUESTION
Constitutional protection for literature attacked as obscene is
an open question today under freedom of expression guarantees of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To establish this it might
perhaps be sufficient merely to refer back to our introductory ex-
position of the 1948 Doubleday case,3 77 where the Supreme Court
divided equally when squarely faced with the single contention that
a work of literature attacked as obscene because of its treatment
of sex episodes was entitled to constitutional protection under free-
dom of expression guarantees. Apart from Doubleday, the Court
has never considered a case in which these constitutional guaran-
tees were asserted as a defense to an obscenity charge against
literature.
The Supreme Court has mentioned obscenity in relation to
freedom of expression only in casual dicta classifying obscenity
with libel to illustrate permissible limits on freedom of expression.
It is apparent that these were off-hand remarks, made without the
benefit of briefs or careful consideration of the relationship be-
tween charges of obscenity and the First Amendment freedoms.
It is perhaps significant that these unguarded dicta stopped after
the Court faced that issue in Doubleday, except for one statement
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who did not participate in the Double-
day case. 37 8 Brief analysis of these dicta demonstrates that, even if
taken seriously, they do not preclude a carefully considered ruling
by the Court on the extent to which literary treatment of sex is
entitled to constitutional protection.
376. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 346 U. S.
587 (1954). As in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952) upon
which the Court relied, both prior restraint and indefiniteness of the standard
were in issue. See report of oral argument, 22 U. S. L. Week. 3181, 3183-3184
(1954). The separate Douglas-Black opinion, taking a strong position against
all prior restraints on any form of expression, indicates unwillingness of the
majority to take that strong a stand, at least as to motion pictures. See gen-
erally 52 Mich. L. Rev. 599 (1954).
377. See text to notes 1-40 supra.
378. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266 (1952), considered
in text to notes 393-394 infra. Also, Mr. Justice Clark, who was not on the
Court at the time of Doubleday, quoted the Near and Chaplhnsky dicta, con-
sidered in text to notes 379-385 infra, in a footnote designed to leave open
the issue of prior restraint of obscene films. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 506 n. 20 (1952).
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The first dictum was in Near v. Minnesota,3 79 where the Court
first applied the previous restraint concept but recognized certain
limitations. Permissible previous restraints, it suggested, include
publication of the sailing dates of troop transports in time of war,
and added:
"On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may
be enforced against obscene publications."
WXith this, of course, we do not quarrel. The issue is where to draw
the line between the "primary requirements of decency" and the
equally significant requirement that there be freedom to write and
read about important social issues, including sex.
The most extensive dicta on this point is in Clhaplinsky v. New
Hanmpshire,380 where the Court upheld a prosecution for the use
of fighting words likely to cause a breach of the peace. There the
Court said through Mr. Justice Murphy:
"Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the
right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an imme-
diate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality."
The casual nature of the inclusion of "lewd and obscene" along
with libelous and insulting words is obvious. It seems likely that
the Court was thinking here of "lewd and obscene" talk of a con-
versational or expletive nature,3s ' rather than literature. It pointed
379. 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931). In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 737(1878) the Court stated it had "no doubt" of the constitutionality of an act
of Congress barring obscene publications from the mails, but the sole issue
was the power of Congress under the grant of power to "establish post
offices and postroads"; no issue was raised or considered under the First
Amendment.
380. 315 U. S. 568, 571-572 (1942).
381. The court may have been thinking of such cases as: Ricks v. State,
70 Ga. App. 395, 28 S. E. 303 (1943) ("Come here baby and kiss me, I am
going to get into your pants.") ; Dillard v. State, 41 Ga. 278 (1870) (Defend-
ant asked a woman "to go to bed with him") ; People v. Casey, 67 N. Y. S.
2d 9 (City Ct. 1946) (solicitation of sexual perversion); State v. Payne,
172 Pac. 1096 (Okla. Cr. 1918) ("Will Jim Murphy make an affidavit that
he didn't go out and catch a sexual disease and give it to his wife," spoken
at an open air religious meeting).
Apparently there is "harm in the asking," though Prosser doesn't seem
to think so. Prosser, Torts, 64-65 (1941).
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out in the immediately preceding paragraph that the case involved
"the spoken, not the written, word," 3 2 and cited in support of its
dictum the following quotation from Chaffee, Freedom of Speech :383
"... the true explanation [of what he calls verbal peacetime
crimes of obscenity, profanity, and gross libel upon individuals]
is that profanity and indecent talk and pictures, which do not
form an essential part of any exposition of ideas, have very
slight social value as a step toward truth, which is clearly out-
weighed by the social interests in order, morality, the training
of the young, and the peace of mind of those who hear and see."
Professor Chafee was not there concerned with literature, where
the relationship between the passages attacked as obscene and the
author's ideas would be a major consideration, but only with "in-
decent talk and pictures," unimportant to any exposition of ideas.' s '
But even if the dicta in Chaplinsky be taken as referring to written
as well as spoken obscenity,3K; the Court's reference to the slight
social value of utterances that are "no essential part of the exposi-
tion of ideas" leaves wide open the issue of constitutional protection
for literature attacked as obscene where the objectionable passages
have a reasonable relationship to expression of the author's ideas.
It is inconceivable that Mr. Justice Murphy could have written, or
Justices Rutledge, Black and Douglas concurred in, an opinion
that might reasonably be understood as foreclosing consideration
of the constitutional freedoms in such a case.
Winters v. New York,3'" decided just seven months before the
Supreme Court argument in the Doubleday case, assumes in broad
generalities that lewd and obscene publications are subject to
prosecution. But it does not concern itself with what is obscene
and expressly suggests that there may be limits on the extent to
which it will permit obscenity statutes to interfere with constitu-
tional freedom of expression. In holding invalid for indefiniteness
a statute construed as forbidding the massing of stories of blood-
shed and lust, the Court recognized
"the importance of the exercise of a state's police power to
minimize all incentives to crime, particularly in the field of
382. See 315 U. S. 568, 571 (1942).
383. See Chafee, Freedom of Speech 150 (1941).
384. In the same book and elsewhere Professor Chafee showed his real
concern with protecting literature dealing with sex from undiscriminating
attack on grounds of obscenity. See 1 Chafee, Government and Mass Com-
munication 53-60, 200-234 (1947) ; Chafee, Free Speech in the United States
529-540 (1941).
385. Cf. Lowell v. Griffith, 303 U. S. 444, 451 (1938) where in holding
invalid a previous restraint on distribution of literature, the Court said, "The
ordinance is not limited to 'literature' that is obscene or offensive to public
morals or that advocates unlawful conduct."
386. 333 U. S. 507 (1948).
[Vol. 3S:295
THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
sanguinary or salacious publications with their stimulation of
juvenile delinquency. . . Though we can see nothing of any
possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much
entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.
. . . They are equally subject to control if they are lewd, in-
decent, obscene, or profane [Citing Chaplinsky].,987
"Acts of gross and open indecency or obscenity, injurious to
public morals, are indictable at common law, as violative of the
public policy that requires from the offender retribution for
acts that flaunt accepted standards of conduct. 1 Bishop, Crimi-
nal Law (9th ed.), § 500; Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed.),
§ 16. When a legislative body concludes that the mores of the
community call for an extension of the impermissible limits, an
enactment aimed at the evil is plainly within its power, if it
does not transgress the boundaries fixed by the Constitution for
freedom of expression [Italics supplied]."38s
The references to the criminal law texts related broadly to control
over "immoralities" and "all acts of gross and open lewdness, ' 3"9
classifying together the
"keeping of bawdy houses; the public exhibition or publication
of obscene pictures or writings; the public utterance of ob-
scene words; the indecent and public exposure of one's person
or the person of another ....
Reliance on these texts broadly classifying obscenity with indecent
exposure and the keeping of bawdy houses indicates that in Win-
ters the Court was speaking of the indefensible types of "gross and
open indecency or obscenity,"39 1 and was not suggesting that the
judicial attachment of the label "obscene" to a work of literature
automatically places it beyond constitutional protection. Indeed,
the suggestion that legislation aimed at extending the "impermis-
sible limits" cannot "transgress the boundaries fixed by the Con-
stitution for freedom of expression"3 92 seems clearly to indicate
that there are limits beyond which government cannot go in its
efforts to protect public morals.
The latest dicta of this general type to come from the Court is
the unnecessarily broad statement by Mr. justice Frankfurter
speaking for a majority of five in upholding the group libel statute
in Beauharnais v. Illinois.39 3 There in an apparently off-hand com-
ment he classifieu "obscene speech" with libel as follows:
387. Id. at 510.
388. Id. at 515.
389. Wharton, Criminal Law § 16 (12th ed. 1932).
390. 1 Bishop, Criminal Law § 500 (9th ed. 1923).
391. See 333 U. S. 307, 515 (1948).
392. Ibid.
393. See 343 U. S. 250, 266 (1952).
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"Libelous utterance not being within the area of constitution-
ally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for
State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase "clear
and present danger." Certainly no one would contend that ob-
scene speech, for example, may be punished only upon a show-
ing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in the
same class.
394
If by this he means that "obscene speech" of the conversational or
expletive nature is not entitled to constitutional protection, this
dicta is akin to that in Chaplinsky. But if he means serious speech
or writing about sex subjects, attacked as obscene, it is fantastic
to say that "no one would contend" that the speech is not to be
tested by the same test applied to other freedom of expression issues.
Indeed, it is clear that four of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's colleagues
on the Court in 1948 not only so contended but on that basis voted
to reverse the Doubleday conviction. Since Mr. Justice Frank-
furter could not fail to be acutely aware of the issue in Doubleday,
even though he did not sit on the Court in that case, the only
reasonable interpretation of this dicta is that he was here speaking
of filthy talk not directed at any serious ideas, and did not have in
mind the problem of literature and censorship on obscenity charges.
This points up the vague and misleading nature of these dicta,
which assume that "obscenity"--without defining it-either is or
is not entitled to constitutional protection. Such statements are
meaningless and misleading when we do not know which of the
many meanings of "obscene" the Court had in mind-if indeed it
gave any thought to the matter at all when the justice assigned to
write the opinion threw in the casual comment on obscenity. The
term "obscene" or one of its equivalents is often used to describe
typical under-the-counter pornography, which is, of course, not
entitled to constitutional protection.39 But the term has also been
applied by some state courts to significant literature that deals
with vital sex problems in a restrained and intelligent way ;30 this
394. But ef. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting at 343 U. S. 298, 303-304,
wherein he strongly takes the position that the "clear and present danger"
test is "the most just and workable standard yet evolved for determining the
criminality of words whose injurious or inciting tendencies are not demon-
strated by the event but are ascribed to them on the basis of probabilities."
Mr. Justice Douglas also took the position that the clear and present danger
test should condemn the group libel statute, while Mr. Justice Black took
his more absolutist position condemning any intereference with freedom of
expression. The relationship of these positions to prosecutions for pub-
lishing literature relating to sex is obvious.
395. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 150 (1949), aff'd
sub nor. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389
(1950). For a discussion of erotica, see Jackson, The Fear of Books, 121-135
(1932).
396. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945)
(Lillian Smith's Strange Fruit) ; Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318,
171 N. E. 472 (1930) (Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy).
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type of literature, we contend, is entitled to constitutional protec-
tion. Just where the line is to be drawn between these two ex-
tremes, and what is to govern that judgment, is our principal con-
cern in this article. The point we make here is that in view of the
great variety of meanings attributed to the term "obscene," casual
dicta appearing to exclude "obscenity" from constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of expression cannot reasonably be taken to mean
that the Court intended thereby to exclude the whole area of sex
literature from the First Amendment guarantees whenever some
narrow-minded state court decides to attach the label "obscene."
Not only has the Supreme Court never decided this constitu-
tional issue, except in the equally divided Doubleday decision, but
the issue has also gone relatively unnoticed in the state and lower
federal courts. These courts have been concerned primarily with
determining whether the particular book is "obscene" within the
statute. In the few appellate court cases in which the constitutional
issue was raised, it was brushed off without careful analysis,3 97
but in most cases it went completely unnoticed. Only in a few re-
ported trial court opinions was thoughtful consideration given to
the constitutional issue; in these, some degree of constitutional pro-
tection was recognized, 39s but only in one was the constitutional
issue given careful and detailed analysis.3 99
397. Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Attorney
General v. The Book Named "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 93 N. E.
2d 819 (1950) (constitutional issue "requires no discussion," citing Isenstadt
case) ; Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, supra note 396 (conviction for sale of
'Strange Fruit: "if the... 'clear and present danger' doctrine... applies ...
danger of corruption of the public mind is a sufficient danger, and... actual
publication and sale render that danger sufficiently imminent"); Common-
wealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116 N. E. 265 (1917) (conviction for dis-
seminating contraceptive information upheld; obscenity statutes "contra-
vene no provision of the Constitution" without making clear what constitu-
tional issue was raised) ; Williams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 (1923) ;
State v. Van Wye, 136 Mo. 227, 37 S. W. 938 (1896); Commonwealth v.
Donaducy, 167 Pa. Super. 611, 76 A. 2d 440 (1950) ; Cf. Sunshine Book Co.
v. McCaffrey, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (sustaining prior re-
straint on nudist magazines).
398. New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp.
823 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (adopts wholly obscene test to avoid constitutional
objection and holds unauthorized prior restraint by police official issuing
lists of proscribed books violates due process) ; State v. Lerner, 81 N. E.
2d 282 (Ohio C.P. 1948) (statute punishing sale of book containing
any obscenity, as distinct from a wholly obscene book, violates freedom of
press under state constitution) ; Bantam Books v. Melko, 96 A. 2d 47 (N.J.
Super. 1953) ("freedom of press" violated by prosecutor's order banning
Chinese Room), affirmed on appeal. See note 101 supra.
399. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949), aff'd sub
norm. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1950)(must be clear and present danger that book will cause criminal behavior;
clears Studs Lonigan trilogy, Sanctuary, Wild Palms, God's Little Acre). The
ruling bringing these books under the protection of the 14th Amendment was
affirmed by the Superior Court, without opinion, on the basis of two excerpts.
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The fact that obscenity prosecutions aimed at literature have
proceeded in state courts for many years in virtual disregard of
possible constitutional limitations cannot foreclose the Supreme
Court from examining this problem and reaching an independent
conclusion. This was done in Bridges v. California,400 where the
Supreme Court in a freedom of expression ruling disregarded and
overthrew long established state court practice to punish for con-
tempt the publication of comments thought to have a "reasonable
tendency" to interfere with the administration of justice in a pend-
ing case. In ruling that the clear and present danger test must
apply to such cases despite the long established practice of many
state courts to the contrary, the Court said:
... state power in this field was not tested for more than a
century. Not until 1925, . . . did this Court recognize in the
Fourteenth Amendment the application to the states of the
same standards of freedom of expression as, under the First
Amendment, are applicable to the federal government. And
this is the first time since 1925 that we have been called upon
to determine the constitutionality of a state's exercise of the
contempt power in this kind of situation. Now that such a case
is before us, we cannot allow the mere existence of other un-
tested state decisions to destroy the historic constitutional mean-
ing of freedom of speech and of the press."401
This is equally true of untested state court convictions for ob-
scenity. Such a dearth of authority on the constitutional question,
with no carefully considered treatment of the problem by any
appellate court, leaves the issue wide open for consideration on its
merits. To that we proceed.
B. FREEDOm OF EXPRESSION FOR SEX IN LITERATURE
Whatever may be 'its limits, constitutional protection to free-
dom of expression must be held to apply to literature dealing with
sex problems and behavior as well as to literature dealing with
other social and economic problems. It is not conceivable that the
Supreme Court will ever hold this vast and significant area of
humnan thought and conduct to be unprotected territory, in which
speech and writing are subject to unrestricted governmental sup-
pression. Sex has always occupied too important and dominant a
Ibid. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to review, but added this
caveat:
"Allocutor refused, without, however, approving the test of 'clear and
present danger' as applied to alleged obscene literature adopted by Judge
Bok and apparently approved by the Superior Court." See 157 Publishers'
Weekly 1823 (1950).
400. 314 U. S. 252 (1914).
401. Id. at 267-268.
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place in literature and in human interest and concern to be im-
pliedly excluded from the broadly stated First Amendment free-
doms.
While the Supreme Court has never had occasion to deal ex-
plicitly with this issue, it has made abundantly clear in other con-
nections that constitutional freedom of expression applies to all
subject matter of human thought, interest, and concern. In Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 0 2 dealing with freedom to communicate view-
points on labor disputes, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for an all
but unanimous Court, said:
"The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss pub-
licly and truthfully all matters of public concern without pre-
vious restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies
of the colonial period and efforts to secure freedom from op-
pressive administration developed a broadened conception of
these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for infor-
mation and education with respect to the significant issues of
the times .... Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its his-
to6iic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the mem-
bers of society to cope with the exigencies of their period
[Italics supplied] ."403
The same viewpoint was expressed five years later in Thomas v.
Collins40 4 in another labor case:
"The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same
security as freedom of conscience. . . .And the rights of free
speech and free press are not confined to any field of human
interest [Italics supplied]. ' '4°5
And in Pennekamp v. Florida,40  protecting freedom to discuss
judicial action, the Court emphasized:
"Free discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal prin-
ciple of Americanism-a principle which all are zealous to pre-
serve [Italics supplied].' '4°T
Literature dealing with various aspects and problems of sex
and sex behavior relates to a significant "field of human interest"
and "public concern." Such literature deals with some of the most
402. 310 U. S. 88 (1940). While this eight to one decision has been
gradually whittled away insofar as it protects picketing as free speech, no
doubts have been raised as to the soundness and importance of constitutional
protection for expression of ideas in the area of labor disputes, and other
areas of public concern.
403. Id. at 101-102.
404. 323 U. S. 516 (1945).
405. Id. at 531.
406. 328 U. S. 331 (1946).
407. Id. at 346.
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basic "problems of society." Certainly this is an area in which there
is "public need for information and education" to permit intelligent
grappling with these problems.
In the decisions quoted above, the particular issues related to
expressions in the field of labor and the administration of justice,
but it is clear that the Court had no thought of limiting freedom of
expression to these and kindred subjects. Indeed, a few years
later an unsuccessful attempt was made to limit freedom of ex-
pression to such subjects when counsel for the state suggested in
Winters v. New York that freedom of the press only applies to
interference with religion and with "the free expression of ideas
on political or economic matters.140 8 In its opinion holding too
vague and indefinite a statute forbidding the massing of stories of
bloodshed and lust, the Supreme Court rejected this suggestion,
saying:
"We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitu-
tional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition
of ideas. The line between the informing and the entertaining
is too elusive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone
is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What
is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though
we see nothing of value in these magazines, they are as much
entitled to the protection of free speech as is the best of litera-
ture. Cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U. S. 146, 153, 158. They
are equally subject to control if they are lewd, indecent, ob-
scene or profane." 4 9
Here is an express ruling that magazines dealing with crime and
lust are not automatically excluded from constitutional protection,
though their publication can be controlled "if they are lewd, in-
decent, obscene or profane"-whatever that may mean. Of course
408. See Brief for Appellees, pp. 7-8, Winters v. New York, 333 U. S.
507 (1948).
409. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948). The citation of
the Esquire decision in this connection appears to suggest that the Court con-
siders sex subjects in magazines to be entitled to constitutional protection,
even when there is "nothing of value" in them, so long as they are not "ob-
scene." There the Court, in finding that the Postmaster General was without
statutory authority to revoke the Esquire second-class mail permit for "in-
decent, vulgar, and risque" writing and pictures, said:
"There doubtless would be a contrariety of views concerning Cervantes'
Don Quixote, Shakespeare's Vems and Adonis, or Zola's Nana. But a
requirement that literature or art conform to some norm prescribed by
an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our system. The basic values
implicit in the requirements of the Fourth condition [of the postal act-
"devoted to literature, the sciences, arts"] can be served only by uncen-
sored distribution of literature. From the multitude of competing offerings
the public will pick and choose. What seems to one to be trash may have
for others fleeting or even enduring values." Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,
327 U. S. 146, 157-158 (1946).
The same "basic values" are implicit in the First Amendment, and would
seem to lead to the same conclusions.
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there are limits on the literary treatment of sex, just as there are
limits on the expression of ideas on other subjects, and our major
concern in the following pages is how to determine that limit with-
out harmful repression of freedom of expression on a subject of
great public interest, concern, and importance. But the point we
make here, without discussing the limitations, is that literature
dealing with sex problems and sex behavior is entitled to consti-
tutional freedom of expression.
That literature on sex problems, practices, and behavior deals
with a subject of great public interest and concern is amply demon-
strated by the widespread public interest in the two recent Kinsey
studies dealing with the sexual behavior of the human male and
female.410 Not only did these studies become best sellers,'411 but
they became the subject for extensive comment and discussion in
both popular and professional writings. Even before these studies
were published, Walter Lippman pointed out man's "immense
preoccupation with sex" and the "immense and urgent discussion
of sex throughout the modern world. 4 12 It is common knowledge
that in recent years there has been wide distribution and sale in
this country of books and other publications dealing with many
aspects of sex, sex problems, and sex behavior from a great many
points of view-psychology, sociology, anthropology, education,
birth control, marital relations, sex instruction, and sex techniques.
Here is an area of life that immediately concerns all of man-
kind. It creates problems that vitally affect most individuals. It is
an area in which man has often groped in the dark, because of
periodic taboos on intelligent discussion. The ready response in
recent years to the wider distribution of literature dealing with this
area demonstrates great interest in and serious concern with prob-
lems that so closely affect the lives of all, and the widespread de-
sire for more information, light, and understanding. There are
many differing and conflicting viewpoints and opinions concern-
ing the place that sex should play in the life of individuals, and
what is acceptable human conduct. This is exactly the type of
subject matter on which freedom of expression is essential-be-
cause of this great human interest and the great variety of view-
410. Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, and Gebhard, Sexual Behavior in the
Human Female (1953) ; Kinsey, Pomeroy, and Martin, Sexual Behavior in
the Human Male (1948).
411. Kinsey's first book on the male was on the New York Times' best
seller list for nearly ten months. See N. Y. Times, Sunday Book Review
Section, Jan. 25-Nov. 21, 1948, p. 8. The second book on the female was on
the New York Times best seller list for over two months. See N. Y. Times,
Sunday Book Review Section, Sept. 27-Dec. 6, 1953, p. 8.
412. See Lippman, A Preface to Morals 285, 300 (1929).
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points. Unrestricted censorship over the expression of ideas in
this area would defeat the very purpose of the guarantees of free
expression-that men shall be free to express themselves on, and to
consider and choose between, conflicting viewpoints in matters of
vital concern to themselves.
Not only must constitutional freedom of expression apply to
literature dealing with sex problems and sex behavior, but it
must apply regardless of the form the literature takes-whether it
be fiction, poetry or non-fiction. It is axiomatic that fiction and
poetry are important vehicles for the conveyance of ideas. Fiction
not only reaches readers that resist non-fiction, but it is often the
best method of expressing some kinds of ideas, or for explaining
and portraying human behavior. But this point needs no belabor-
ing, for the Supreme Court has clearly recognized that the freedom
of expression guaranteed by the Constitution covers fiction and
entertainment, as well as more serious works.
This was made clear in two Supreme Court decisions in the
past five years. As indicated in the foregoing quotation, Winters v.
New York noted that the "line between informing and entertain-
ing is too elusive for the protection of that basic right" to a free
press. There the Court recognized that fiction is a familiar form
of propaganda, and that what is "one man's amusement teaches
another's doctrine."4 3  More recently the Court also ruled that a
fictional motion picture is entitled to freedom of expression protec-
tion for basically the same reason:
"It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant
medium for the communication of ideas. They may affect pub-
lic attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from
direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes artistic expression. The
importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion
is not lessened by the fact they are designed to entertain as well
as to inform [quoting from Winters v. New York] ."4,14
It is equally true that artistic expression through fiction and poetry
can be one of the most subtle and effective methods of conveying
ideas. To be adequate and effective, freedom of expression must
extend to these effective methods of communicating ideas, par-
ticularly where, as here, the recipient has complete freedom of
choice to read or to leave alone. 41
413. See Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948), considered
in text at notes 386-392 supra.
414. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 501 (1952).
415. See 1 Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 208 (1947),
quoting the publisher of Strange Fruit: "A book.., is something which any
individual can take or leave alone... Consequently it has always been the
most adult form of expression which we have. Consequently also it has always
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C. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR FREEDom OF
EXPRESSION: BALANCING THE INTERESTS
The conclusion that literature dealing with sex is entitled to
constitutional protection does not mean that it is entirely free from
governmental interference. Freedom of expression guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments is not absolute, for despite
its great importance in a democratic society, it must on occasion be
subordinated to other interests of high value. In the past three
decades the Supreme Court has repeatedly had to determine the
extent to which freedom of expression must give way to other
interests. Gradually the Court has evolved an approach to these
problems that often makes use of a deceptively simple phrase-
"clear and present danger"-as the framework for important policy
judgments. For the purpose of this article, it is necessary to em-
phasize the factors that enter into those judgments.4 6
While the phrase "clear and present danger" had its origin in
an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes for a unanimous court in 1919,4 .7
it did not become a tool used by a majority of the Court for resolv-
ing freedom of expression issues until 1940.418 Meanwhile it was
kept alive by dissenting and concurring opinions of Justices Holmes
and Brandeis.4 10 Beginning with Thornhill v. Alabama in 1940,420
it frequently though not invariably came to be used by the majority
of the Court in deciding freedom of expression issues.42 1 It is
significant that with one exception since 1940 the Supreme Court
has always used the "clear and present danger" test in determining
the validity of governmental regulation interfering with the content
of an utterance, as distinct from the manner or means of its ex-
been the means which the community uses for testing and development of
new and pioneering ideas in the arts, in the sciences and in the philosophies.
To tamper with freedom of expression in book form, therefore, is the most
dangerous exercise of interference with freedom of thought which can be
imagined." Cf. Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949) (limitation on use of
sound truck, but no limit on content of expression).
416. To trace the evolution of "clear and present danger" would be a
complete article in itself. This has been well done in recent years, permitting
us, for the purposes of this article, to build largely on the scholarship of
others. See Antieau, "Clear and Present Danger"-Its Meaning and Sig-
nificance, 25 Notre Dame Law. 603 (1950) ; Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and
Present Danger," 27 Notre Dame Law. 325 (1952); Gorfinkel & Mack,
Dennis v. United States and the Clear and Present Danger Rule, 39 Calif. L.
Rev. 475 (1951) ; Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Shenck to
Dennis, 52 Col. L. Rev. 313 (1952) ; Richardson, Freedom of Expression
and the Function of the Courts, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1951) ; Note, Clear and
Present Danger Re-examined, 51 Col. L. Rev. 98 (1951).
417. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
418. Mendelson, supra note 416, at 317 ff.
419. Id. at 314-317.
420. 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
421. See Mendelson, supra note 416, at 317-330.
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pression.4 22 That exception occurred in the majority opinion in the
Beauharnais group libel case, where Mr. Justice Frankfurter pushed
the test aside saying it was "unnecessary ... to consider the issues
behind the phrase 'clear and present danger'" because libelous
utterances are not "within the area of constitutionally protected
speech.1423 If the Supreme Court agrees that literature dealing with
sex is entitled to the freedom of expression protection provided by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, there is every reason to
believe that it will appraise such literature in the light of what Mr.
Justice Frankfurter called "the issues behind the phrase 'clear and
present danger'."
The first clear statement of the issues behind the phrase was
made in 1927 in a separate concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in which Mr. Justice Holmes joined. In approving a
conviction under a criminal syndicalism act in Whitney v. Califor-
nia,41- Mr. Justice Brandeis stressed the values and necessities of
freedom of expression in a democratic society and emphasized three
factors essential to state interference with this fundamental free-
dom :425
1. There must be a "clear" danger that the speech will produce
a serious substantive evil that the state has power to prevent. It is
not enough simply to "fear" serious injury, but there must be
"reasonable grounds" to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced. It is obvious in this opinion that in the think-
ing of Brandeis and Holmes the single word "clear" connotes a
close causal relationship between the prohibited speech and the
evil sought to be prevented.
2. There must be a "present" or "imminent" danger. Again,
"reasonable grounds" are necessary for believing the danger to be
imminent, and that it may result before there is opportunity to
avert it by full discussion and the processes of education.
3. The substantive evil to be prevented by suppressing speech
must be a "serious" one. Prohibition on freedom of expression is
not permissible "unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious."
It can never be appropriate to avert "a relatively trivial harm to
422. See Note, Clear and Present Danger Re-examined, 51 Col. L. Rev.
98, 99-100 (1951). But cf. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75
(1947), which sustained the Hatch Act depriving federal civil service em-
ployees of the right to take an active part in political campaigns. While no
mention was made of the "clear and present danger" test, the opinions are
openly an attempt to "balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom against
... the supposed evil of political partizanship of classified employees of gov-
ernment." Id. at 96.
423. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266 (1952).
424. 274 U. S. 357, 372-380 (1927).
425. See id. at 374, 376, 377.
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society." While the meaning of the term "relatively" is not spelled
out here, its most likely meaning is that the seriousness of the harm
must be weighed in relation to the importance and value of the
freedom of expression being interfered with, and the extent of that
interference. Consistent with this interpretation is Mr. Justice
Brandeis' later statement in the same opinion that one of the issues
in a freedom of expression case is "whether the evil apprehended
was one so substantial as to justify the stringent restrictions inter-
posed by the legislature. ' 420 Indeed, in an earlier dissenting opinion
joined in by Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis emphasized
the "clear and present danger" test as "a rule of reason," a "ques-
tion of degree."4 27
These three factors became and remained the backbone of the
"clear and present danger" test as applied by the Supreme Court
beginning in 1940,428 though two substantial modifications were
made. (1) The Court came to recognize openly the policy-making,
interest-balancing nature of the judicial function in these cases,4 28
and (2) the Dennis case in 1951430 minimized or subordinated the
"present" or "imminent" factor, merging it into the "clear" or
"probable danger" factor.4 31 We do not consider this latter modi-
fication particularly significant on our problem of literature dealing
with sex, for if in fact such literature is sufficiently likely to stimu-
late immoral conduct or other evil consequences to satisfy the re-
quirement of "clear" or "probable" danger, this danger would
usually be sufficiently imminent even under the stricter Brandeis
view. 12
But the Dennis case is significant for our problem in two re-
spects. First, it indicates that all eight justices who participated,
seven of whom still sit on the Court,433 accept the clear and present
danger phrase as the starting point for determining the validity of
governmental interference with freedom of expression, although
they give it varying interpretations and degrees of rigidity.4 34
426. Id. at 379.
427. Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, 482-483 (1920).
428. These factors have been analyzed and emphasized in a number of
recent studies. See particularly those by Richardson, Antieua, and Gorfinkel
and Mack, supra note 416.
429. See cases cited infra note 443.
430. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951) (upholding con-
viction of Communist Party leaders under Smith Act).
431. For a treatment of this issue see Gorfinkel and Mack, Supra note
416, at 492-496; Richardson, supra note 416, at 8-9.
432. One possible exception is considered in the text to notes 479-486
infra.
433. Mr. Justice Clark did not sit. Chief Justice Vinson has since died
and been replaced by Chief Justice Warren.
434. For an analysis of the differing positions of the various justices
see Gorfinkel and Mack, supra note 416, at 484-487.
19541
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Second, it indicates that six of the justices, five of whom remain,
consider the "clear and present danger" test not as a rigid formula
but as a policy-maling rule of reason 8 5 under which the Court
weighs the gravity of the evil, and the degree of its probability,
against the dangers of infringing freedom of expression. It also
indicates that two additional justices would apply the clear and
present danger test with greater rigidity in protecting freedom
of expression.
43 6
At the present time there remain three significant factors that
must be considered in appraising governmental interference with
freedom of expression, disregarding what may be left of the
"present" or "imminent" factor. The first is the "clear" or "prob-
able" danger factor. This necessity for a probable causal relation-
ship between the forbidden expression and the evil sought to be
prevented has been a significant factor since 1940 in determining
the validity of interferences with freedom of expression.43 7 Dennis
made no change in this;4 8 indeed, in accepting Judge Learned
Hand's reformulation of the "clear and present danger" test the
plurality opinion expressly indicated that the probability or improb-
ability of the danger was one of the relevant factors. It must be borne
in mind, as so well expressed in Richardson's masterful summation
of this factor, that what is required is not simply the probability
that the evil will occur, but a probability that the forbidden utter-
ance will be a substantial factor in bringing about the evil.4 31
The second factor is the relative seriousness of the evil sought
435. The plurality opinion, representing the views of Chief Justice Vin-
son, and Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton, found the meaning of the phrase
"clear and present danger" "squarely presented" and accepted the Learned
Hand interpretation of the phrase as follows:
"Chief Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below, interpreted
the phrase as follows: 'In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity
of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' 183 F. 2d at 212. We adopt
this statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as
succinct and inclusive as any other we might devise at this time. It takes
into consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their
significance. More we cannot expect from words." Dennis v. United States,
341 U. S. 494, 508, 510 (1951).
Separately concurring, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's long opinion indicates
impatience with attempts to use the phrase "clear and present danger" as a
formula, or as a "substitute for the weighing of values," and repeatedly
stresses that in freedom of expression cases the problem before the Court
is a "careful weighing of conflicting interests." Id. at 519 ff. Mr. Justice
Jackson would not apply .the phrase to cases of communist propaganda like
the Dennis case, but would "save it, unmodified, as a 'rule of reason' in the
kind of case for which it was devised." Id. at 568.
436. See id. at 479, 481 (dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and
Black).
437. See analysis and cases cited by Richardson, supra note 416, at 7-8.
438. See Gorfinkel and Mack, supra note 416, at 491.
439. See Richardson, supra note 416, at 9-16.
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to be prevented by the interference with freedom of expression.
Repeatedly since 1940 the Court has stressed the necessity for a
grave or serious evil to justify such an interference. 4 0 Neither of
these factors is an absolute. Each must be considered in relation to
the other. The more serious the threatened evil, the lower the re-
quired degree of probability. This seems clearly indicated in the
Dennis opinion accepting Judge Hand's reformulation of the clear
and present danger test. Presumably the converse is also true: the
less serious the threatened evil, the higher the required degree of
probability.-41
But these two factors must not only be weighed in relation to
each other, but in the relation to the third significant factor, im-
plicitly though not expressly spelled out in the Brandeis formulation
of "clear and present danger"-the value of freedom of expression
in the context of this utterance, and the effect the challenged sup-
pression may have on freedom of expression on this and similar
occasions. Brandeis made clear that in determining whether a
danger was sufficiently "clear" or "imminent" or "serious," it is
necessary to consider the importance of freedom of expression in
a democratic society ;442 this was not lost on the Court when it be-
gan using the "clear and present danger" test in 1940. Repeatedly
it weighed the factors of "clear" or "probable" danger and the
"seriousness" of the evil against this third significant factor-the
value of freedom of expression on this subject and in this context.443
Whether the Court invokes "clear and present danger" or not,
in all freedom of expression cases it inevitably must grapple with
fundamental policy questions as it seeks to balance two significant
interests-the public interest in preventing the supposed evil and
the public interest in preserving freedom of expression. In each
such case the Court must decide whether the seriousness of the
evil, and the probability that the utterance under attack may cause
or substantially contribute to that evil, are sufficiently great to
440. See cases cited in Antieau, mipra note 416, at 604 n. 4, 5; Note, 51
Col. L. Rev. 98,99 n. 10 (1951).
441. See Richardson, supra note 416, at 17-18.
442. See Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 374-375 (1927).
443. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 508-510 (1951);
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 397, 399-400 (1950) ; Penne-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 346-347 (1946) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S.
516, 530-532 (1945) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 268-271 (1941) ;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310-311 (1940) ; Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U. S. 88, 104-105 (1940). In others the Court has engaged in this
same process of weighing the supposed evil against the importance of freedom
of expression without using "clear and present danger" talk. See, e.g., Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 643, 644 (1951) ; United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 96 (1947) ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158,
165 (1944).
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justify the interference with freedom of expression in this particu-
lar case and the resulting suppression of freedom of expression in
similar situations. The "clear and present danger" phrase helps to
point up the factors that enter into that determination, but in the
last analysis each such determination has to be a policy judgment
in which all of these factors are brought into balance. 444
Therefore, in considering the constitutionality of applying ob-
scenity statutes to literature, it is necessary to balance the serious-
ness of the evil or evils sought to be prevented, and the probability
that the book or article in question will be a substantial factor in
bringing about the evil or evils, against the value of the particular
book or article, the value generally of literary treatment of sex
matters, and the effect the application of the statute to this particu-
lar book or article may have upon the freedom of others to write
and to read literature touching upon sex and related social problems.
We turn, therefore, to a consideration of these two competing
interests: (a) The significant values of freedom to write and to
read literature without restriction as to subject matter, particularly
with respect to sex, and the social losses that censorship entails.
(b) The seriousness of the evils that are sometimes thought to
justify the suppression of literature attacked as obscene, and the
probability that these evils will in fact result from the reading of
such literature.
D. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD TO OBSCENITY CENSORSHIP
1. Values of a Free Literature: Consequences of
Obscenity Censorship
The values of a free literature are of course the same as those
of any other form of expression. Indeed, the need to protect free-
dom of literature in book form is even greater than the need to
protect it in other forms. For a book, as publisher Curtice Hitch-
cock once wrote, ". . . has always been the means which the com-
munity uses for the testing and development of new and pioneering
ideas in the arts, in the sciences, and in the philosophies. To tamper
with freedom of expression in book form, therefore, is the most
444. Qualified commentators have repeatedly noted that whatever form-
ula is used, the Court's function in freedom of expression cases is to balance
competing interests in reaching a policy judgment. See, e.g., 1 Chafee, Gov-
ernment and Mass Communications 36 (1947) ; Chafee, Free Speech in the
United States 31-35 (1941) ; Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court
27-28 (1949) ; Antieau, supra note 416, at 639-645; Corwin, Bowing Out Clear
and Present Danger, 27 Notre Dame Law. 325, 359 (1952) ; Donnelly, Goz-
ernient and Freedom of the Press, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 31, 53 (1950) ; Emerson &
Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government Employees, 58 Yale L. J. 1, 86 (1948) ;
Wechsler, Synposium on Civil Liberties, 9 Am. L. School Rev. 881, 889(1941).
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dangerous exercise of interference with freedom of thought which
can be imagined. '445 This of course is self-evident with respect to
expository and argumentative literature. 44 But it is not so ap-
parent in fiction and poetry-at least to the censorious; for the
private censorship groups,44 7 the police and prosecuting officers, 44
and sometimes judges too 44 ' do not seem to have much love for
imaginative literature or appreciation and understanding of its
nature and function.
Fiction and poetry, like all other forms of art and expres-
sion are vehicles for the conveyance of ideas. They differ from
other forms of art and expression in the use of their own peculiar
means of communication. 45 0 Sometimes this is obvious, as in A. P.
Herbert's well-known novel Holy Deadlock, which was written
to ridicule the English divorce law and to generate support for its
amendment. But the use of fiction and poetry for the communica-
tion of ideas is not always so apparent. For it is not necessarily the
function of fiction and poetry to teach or instruct or to argue, in
the usual sense in which these words are used.4 1' This does not
mean that the reader learns nothing from fiction and poetry; he
does learn, but he learns "in the fashion that is art's unique own.
'45 2
But what is "the fashion that is art's unique own"? Harold C.
Gardiner, S. J., the perceptive and intelligent literary critic of
America magazine, tells us that he learns from fiction by its truth
of fact and its truth of ideal, that he finds "truth through the door
of beauty. 4 5 3 Using as an illustration Marquand's So Little Time,
a novel of dull, bored, unthinking people described as "a group
portrait of people in a huddle wondering what for," he says:
"[W] here is there the dimmest glimmering of beauty there?
445. Letter quoted in 1 Chafee, Government and Mass Communications
208 (1947). Cf. Seagle, Cato, or the Future of Censorship 16-17 (1930).
446. E.g., Parmalee v. United States, 113 F. 2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940)
(Parmalee's Nudimn in Modern Life) ; United States v. One Obscene Book
Entitled "Married Love," 48 F. 2d 821 (S.D. N.Y. 1931) (Dr. Marie C.
Stopes) ; Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Popenoe's
Preparing for Marriage).
447. See text to notes 147-158 supra.
448. See text to notes 160-164 supra.
449. E.g., Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840
(1945) (Smith's Strange Fruit) ; People v. Pesky, 230 App. Div. 200, 243
N. Y. Supp. 193 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 373, 173 N. E. 227 (1930)
(Schnitzler's Hands Around).
450. "The sonnet, 'The world is too much with us, late and soon,' may
be translated into expository prose as an idea, a thesis. It tells us what many
moralists have said less memorably, that the pressure of things and events
and affairs corrupts that capacity for pagan joy in the fresh world about us
that is our birthright." Edman, Arts and the Man 61 (1949).
451. Gardiner, Tenets for Readers and Reviewers 18-21 (1944).
452. Id. at 19.
453. Id. at 19-20.
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It isn't there, but it emerges from the book; it is in the over-
tones, it is in the wistful gropings of the rootless characters,
it is in the whole poignant contrast that the author never points
explicitly but which lurks beneath every page-the contrast
between what these people actually are and what, as human
beings, they could have been. There is beauty; the beauty of
the potentiality of the human soul, unrealized, frustrated, dissi-
pated on the husks, but still fundamentally and eternally
there."
454
Irwin Edman also tells us how the reader learns from fiction
and poetry. The chief functions of art, he says, are the intensification,
clarification, and interpretation of experience.4 55 Experience is
intensified by arresting the reader's sensations, focusing his atten-
tion upon his own emotions so that he can know them for what they
are.456 Experience is clarified by setting emotions and random im-
pressions in a pattern so as to make their meaning clear to the
reader.457 And experience is interpreted, simply because any work
of art necessarily carries in it the artist's view of life and his criti-
cism of that phase of experience he" has selected for treatment.45 6
To the reader:
454. Ibid.
455. Edman, op. cit. mpra note 450, at 30.
456. "In the clear and artful discipline of a novel or a drama our emo-
tions become reinstated into a kind of pure intensity. It might appear on
the surface that the actualities of life, the impingements of those so very
real crises of birth and death and love, are more intense than any form of art
provides. That is true. But we do not live always amid crises, and the ordi-
nary run of our experiences gives us only emotions that are dull and thin. A
tragedy like Hamlet, a novel like Anna Karenina, clarify and deepen for us
emotional incidents of familiar human situations. For many people, it is
literature rather than life that teaches them what their native emotions are.
And ideas themselves, which in the abstractions of formal reasoning may be
thin and cold and external, in the passionate presentation of poetry and drama
may become intimate and alive."Id. at 26-27.
457. "Everyone has experienced the blindness of human pride or the
fatal possessiveness of love. But it requires a Sophocles to show him the tragic
meaning of the first in such a play as Oedipus, a Shakespeare to exhibit him
the latter in Othello. Even the most unreflective have at some time or other
harbored scattered and painful thoughts on the vanity of life or the essential
beauty and goodness of Nature. A few have formulated these scattered in-
sights into a system. But a poet like Lucretius can turn that vague intuition
into a major and systematic insight: Dante can exhibit the latter in a mag-
nificent panorama of life and destiny. The kaleidoscope of our sensations falls
into an eternal pattern; a mood half articulate and half recognized in its con-
fused recurrence becomes, as it were, clarified forever in a poem or a novel
or a drama." Id. at 27-28.
458. "All the arts in one way or another, to some greater or lesser ex-
tent, interpret life .... They may 'interpret' nothing more than sensation. Or
they may interpret, as Hamlet does, or War and Peace, or Ode on the Inti-
mations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood, the confused
intuitions of millions of men, bringing to a focus an obscure burden of human
emotion. A poem like The Divine Comedy or Goethe's Faust may be a com-
mentary upon the whole human scene, its nature, its movement, and its destiny.
When Matthew Arnold defined poetry as a criticism of life, he might well
have extended his definition to the whole of the fine arts. For criticism is a
judgment upon, an interpretation of, a given section of life." Id. at 29-30.
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"The great and simple appeal of fiction is that it enables us
to share imaginatively in the fortunes of these created beings
without paying the price in time or defeat for their triumphs
and frustrations. One moves with them in lands where one has
never been, experiences loves one has never known. And this
entrance into lives wider and more various than our own in turn
enables us more nicely to appreciate and more intensely to live
the lives we do know. '459
And this imaginative sharing in the fictitious lives of others helps
to give the reader an understanding of unfamiliar problems and
modes of life and to foster development of the personal quality the
psychologists call "empathy"-the ability to put one's self imagi-
natively into the other fellow's shoes.
Love and desire and jealousy are among the basic human emo-
tions that give rise to the conflict and tension essential to fiction and
poetry. And since sex lies at the root of these and other similar
emotions, it is a significant and necessary ingredient of most imagi-
native literature, and requires broad freedom for the manner in
which it may be treated; for only with the freedom to experiment
in the manner of treating sex in imaginative literature are authors
and poets able to produce their best works. Sex is also significant
in its own right; for it is one of the most important elements of all
human experience. As such, it demands freedom for rational dis-
cussion, scientific investigation, and education. Yet these are the
very social values of sex that censorship of obscenity jeopardizes,
especially when the censorship is indiscriminate.
And censorship of obscenity has almost always been both irra-
tional and indiscriminate. 4 0 Perhaps the best explanation for this
fact lies in the personal characteristics of the censor. He is rarely an
educated person who understands and appreciates the nature and
function of imaginative literature.4 1 He is often an emotionally
'disturbed and intemperate person with a paranoid personality.46 2
His attention is focused on smut, and since he looks for it, he finds
459. Id. at 77.
460. In addition to the numerous illustrations discussed at notes 147-166
supra and text thereto, and otherwise scattered throughout this Article, see
for an extreme example the list of some 2,000 titles of books banned from
Ireland. Eason & Son, Ltd., Books Prohibited in Eire (1948). See also Craig,
The Banned Books of England 95-98 (1937) ; Scott, Into Whose Hands 84-
86 (1945).
461. See note 16S s ipra. The sole exception that has come to our atten-
tion is Huntington Cairns. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications
254 (1947).
462. Watson, Some Effects of Censorship Upon Society, In Social Mean-
ing of Legal Concepts No. 5, Protection of Public Morals Through Censor-
ship 79-80 (1953).
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it everywhere. 463 Indeed, his continued existence may depend on
his ability to turn it up.4 4 In either case, he is so much interested
in smut that he cannot, even if he had the ability, see the good
at all.4
65
The effects of obscenity censorship upon authors and publishers
are of course difficult to ascertain. Yet the lack of definiteness in any
standard of obscenity, the absence of even a uniform indefinite
standard applicable throughout the nation, and the constant threat
of prosecution instigated by some local smut-hound cannot help
but have a repressive effect upon authors and publishers. H. L.
Mencken's description of his problems as an editor is illuminating:
"[A] s a practical editor, I find that the Comstocks, near and
far, are oftener in my mind's eye than my actual patrons. The
thing I always have to decide about a manuscript offered for
publication, before ever I give any thought to its artistic merit
and suitability, is the question whether its publication will be
permitted-not even whether it is intrinsically good or evil,
moral or immoral, but whether some roving Methodist preach-
er, self-commissioned to keep watch on letters, will read in-
decency into it. Not a week passes that I do not decline some
sound and honest piece of work for no other reason. I have a
long list of such things by American authors, well-devised, well-
imagined, well-executed, respectable as human documents and
works of art-but never to be printed in mine or any other
American magazine. It includes four or five short stories of the
very first rank, and the best one-act play yet done, to my
knowledge, by an American. All of these pieces would go into
type at once on the Continent; no sane man would think of
objecting to them; they are no more obscene, to a normal adult,
than his own bare legs. But they simply cannot be printed in
the United States, with the law what it is and the courts what
they are."4 6
Though Mencken wrote this description in 1917 and the law of
obscene literature has changed very much since then, the problems
of a publisher today, faced with the current wave of censorship
across the country, are probably not very much different. 46 7 And
463. Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock 273 (1927); Craig, The
Banned Books of England 89 (1937) ; Jackson, The Fear of Books 75, 83-86(1932). "A determined prude detects bawdry everywhere, because he carries
it about with him." Id. at 84.
464. Scott, Into Whose Hands 202-203 (1945); Kallen, The Ethical
Aspects of Censorship in Social Meaning of Legal Concepts No. 5, Protection
of Public Morals Through Censorship 69 (1953); Mencken, Puritanism
as a Literary Force, in A Book of Prefaces 243-252 (1917). But ef. Broun
and Leech, Anthony Comstock 265-266 (1927).
465. Erskine, Decency in Literature, in The Literary Discipline 43(1923).
466. Mencken, op. cit. supra note 464, at 277.
467. For a discussion of the effects of obscenity censorship on English
publishers, see Scott, Into Whose Hands 182-187 (1945).
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the publisher's fears are likely to be transmitted in even greater
degree to the author. For the author is ordinarily less able to bear
the financial risk involved in a book that might be suppressed as
obscene, 6 s and his contract with the publisher may even contain a
clause that "The author hereby guarantees . . . that the work . . .
contains nothing of a scandalous, an immoral or a libelous nature. ' 461
The inevitable tendency is to make the serious author timid, to
cramp his mind so that the books he is not afraid to write will fall
far below the level of his abilities.4 7 0 And society, as a consequence
of the anxiety to suppress smut at all costs, may lose the values of
important literary, scientific, and educational contributions. In their
place it may have a distorted literature, unfaithful to life,4 71 and
perhaps even a blacking out of rational public discussion of social
problems of immense public importance.
4 7 2
2. "Evils" Claimed to Justify Obscenity Censorship:
Balancing the Interests
These significant values that arise out of freedom to write and
to read literature without restrictions as to theme or materials,
and the substantial losses to society that inevitably result from most
censorship aimed at "obscenity," must be balanced against the
evils thought to justify the suppression of literature attacked as
"obscene." Under the current constitutional approach to freedom
of expression issues, this policy judgment requires a consideration
of the relative seriousness of the supposed evils and the degree of
probability that these evils will, in fact, result from the distribution
of the literature under attack.
4 73
As indicated above,-7 4 the exact evils aimed at by obscenity
legislation, and by courts in applying this legislation to literature,
are seldom clearly stated. Professor Chafee has observed that ob-
scenity is a "complex idea" that includes several "real or supposed
468. Mencken, op. cit. supra note 464, at 269-272.
469. Dreiser v. John Lane Co., 183 App. Div. 773, 774, 171 N. Y. Supp.
605 (1st Dep't 1918). See also Mencken, op. cit. supra note 464, at 270 n. 1.
470. Scott, Into Whose Hands 179-182 (1945); Forster, Culture and
Freedom, in Two Cheers for Democracy 32-33 (1951) ; cf. Van Druten, Sex
and Censorship in the Theatre, in International Congress for Sexual Reform
317-322 (3d Cong. 1929).
471. And also a distortion in the way readers afterwards perceive the
book, assuming they can find a copy which, of course, is usually the case.
Watson, Some Effects of Censorship Upon Society, in Social Meaning of
Legal Concepts No. 5, Protection of Public Morals Through Censorship 77-
78 (1953).
472. Rebecca West, Introduction to Causton and Young, Keeping It
Dark 8-11 (n.d.) ; cf. Watson, op. cit. supra note 471, at 74-75.
473. See text to notes 437-444 supra.
474. See text to notes 232-317 supra.
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social injuries.' 4 75 In the main these injuries relate to various
effects upon individual readers. The offensive or shocking effect
upon the reader is occasionally suggested as among the evils aimed
at,476 but the effects usually mentioned are danger of stimulating
impure sexual thoughts, or sexual conduct contrary to the laws or
accepted moral standards of the community.4 7 7 In addition to these
supposed effects upon individuals, another evil sometimes men-
tioned is the danger that literature challenging or questioning the
accepted moral standards of the community might actually bring
about a change in the commonly accepted standards. 478 The rela-
tive weight that should be attached to each of these evils when
thrown into the balance against the loss to society from this kind of
censorship requires critical consideration.
a. Changing Community Moral Standards
Only slight consideration need be given to the contention that
literature challenging or questioning the currently accepted moral
standards of the community should be suppressed because of the
danger that it may in time influence those moral standards through
changing laws or customs, as distinct from influencing individuals
to deviate from the currently accepted standards. If this purpose
were not so apparent in the materials advocating censorship, 470 in
the type of books occasionally censored,8 0 and in some of the
judicial decisions applying censorship laws,481 it would hardly merit
discussion. Not only is this purpose inconsistent with the funda-
mental reasons for freedom of expression, but the causal relation-
ship between such literature and a change in the general moral
standards is far too tenuous to satisfy the constitutional standard
of "clear" or "probable" danger.
The view that literature may be proscribed because of the risk
that it may influence a change in the accepted moral standards of
475. See 1 Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 211 (1947).
476. See text to notes 273-284 supra.
477. See text to notes 232-258 supra.
478. See 1 Chafee, op. cit. supra note 475, at 197, 211, and authorities
cited in note 481 infra.
479. See note 62 supra.
480. See notes 264, 268 supra and text thereto. Fiction is sometimes used
to attack current standards and is thus made the object of censorship. Shadows
Move Among Them, by Edgar Mittelholzer, and The Harem, by Louis Royer
are examples.
481. E.g., United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14, 571
(C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1879) (Cupid's Yokes, or The Binding Forces of Coni'ugal
Love) ; Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945)
(Lillian Smith's Strange Fruit) ; Commonwealth v. DeLacy, 271 Mass. 327,
171 N. E. 455 (1930) (D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover) ; People
v. Dial Press, 182 Misc. 416, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 480 (Mag. Ct. 1944) (D. H. Law-
rence's The First Lady Chatterley); People v. Friede, 133 Misc. 611, 233
N. Y. Supp. 565 (Mag. Ct 1929) (Radclyff Hall's The Well of Loneliness).
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the community flies squarely into the face of the very purpose for
guaranteeing freedom of expression. Back of this fundamental free-
dom lies the basic conviction that our democratic society must be
free to perfect its own standards of conduct and belief-political,
economic, social, religious, moral-through the heat of unrepressed
controversy and debate.1 2 The remedy against those who attack
currently accepted standards is spirited and intelligent defense of
those standards, not censorship. This is the remedy guaranteed
and required by the Constitution. Only through unlimited examina-
tion and re-examination, attack and defense, can come the ultimate
perfection of these standards, 48 3 and the understanding and grasp
of the reasons that alone will insure their preservation, if sound.
48 4
That the issue in controversy is a currently accepted moral standard,
even a standard considered basic to our society, can make no dif-
ference. As Mr. Justice Jackson so well said:
"... freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order.
'48 5
Even if there were substantial danger that one book, or several
books, would actually bring about a change in the currently ac-
482. This point is too well recognized by the Supreme Court to be
documented in detail; therefore the following are quoted as illustrative. Mr.
Justice Brandeis concurring in Whitney v. California, 272 U. S. 357, 375
(1927) :
"Those who won our independence ... believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the dis-
covery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; . . .
that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.";
Mr. Justice Murphy speaking for the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U. S. 88, 95 (1940) :
"The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as they
think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through
the process of education and discussion is essential to free government.
Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread
political and economic truth. Noxious doctrines in those fields may be
refuted and their evil averted by the courageous exercise of the right of
free discussion.";
Chief Justice Vinson in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 503 (1951)
"We pointed out in Douds, supra, that the basis for the First Amendment
is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer
propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental
policies. It is for this reason that this Court has recognized the inherent
value of free discourse."
483. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 40-46 (McCallum ed., 1947) ; 1
Chafee, op. cit. supra note 475, at 39.
484. See Mill, op. cit. .supra note 483, at 30-40; Merriam, Book Review,
27 Am. J. Soc. 97, 98 (1921).
485. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943).
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cepted moral standards, this still would not be a sufficient evil to
justify repression of the book for the reasons stated above. If that
were a justification, then freedom of expression would be guaran-
teed only when it could make no difference. But it is not amiss to
point out also that the standards of society are changed neither
quickly nor as the result of a single force. Changes in moral stand-
ards are necessarily slow and gradual, the result of many inter-
related forces. Perhaps a book may be a minor factor in a change
of the generally accepted standards, but this will only occur if
many other factors also concur in bringing this about. The "prob-
able effect' of any book attacking current moral standards is that
it may cause a brief stir and discussion among a relatively small
portion of the population, and then be placed on the shelves without
causing any perceptible change in the accepted standards. Insofar as
"present" or "imminent" danger remains a factor in freedom of
expression decisions after Dennis,48 6 this is wholly lacking here.
When the faint risk that a book may, at some future and probably
distant time, be a minor factor in a gradual change of the accepted
moral standards is weighed against the incalculable harm that
would result from suppressing literature that challenges or ques-
tions these standards, we can only conclude that this risk can
never justify censorship.
b. Offensiveness
Professor Chafee has suggested that one of the injuries sought
to be prevented by obscenity laws is "offensiveness, which links
indecency to profanity and public drunkenness."'48 7 Amplifying
upon this, he states at another point:
"... the law wants to prevent the sense of citizens from be-
ing offended by sights and sounds which would be seriously ob-
jectionable to a considerable majority and greatly interfere with
their happiness. From this standpoint, a nasty word in a street-
car is treated like a lighted cigar-the law is interested in the
immediate effect on the sensibilities of others." 48
Professor Chafee appears here to have been thinking of publicly
486. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951), considered in text to
notes 430-441 supra. That the Supreme Court minimized the importance
of a "present" or "imminent" danger in Dennis, where the evil to be
prevented was revolution that might be attempted as soon as the time was
ripe, does not mean that it will consider this factor unimportant where
the danger is gradual persuasion of public opinion with respect to a change
in moral standards. This is the very kind of case in which there is ample
time, without danger, "to expose through discussion the falsehoods and falla-
cies, to avert the evil by the processes of education." See Mr. Justice Brandeis,
concurring, in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927).
487. 1 Chafee, op. cit. supra note 475, at 211.
488. Id. at 196-197.
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spoken obscene" or profane words of a shocking nature, which we
have already noted are sometimes prosecuted under obscenity
laws. 489 But at another point he suggests that a "valiant effort"
could be made to justify some convictions for written obscenity on
the ground that a state may "protect readers from... serious shock
to their sensibilities ;,4,9o here, however, he was speaking specifical-
ly of "grossly indecent" letters, not literature.,9 Still, some con-
victions for "obscene" publications appear to have been influenced
by the desire to protect against offensiveness, judging from the
emphasis in some opinions on vulgarity and on the need to pro-
tect the public from offensive and shocking materials. 492
This becomes again a matter of weighing values. Here the im-
portance to society of complete freedom for authors to write with
blunt realism on any subject, when that seems the best way to make
their point, and to portray their characters in whatever way seems
most appropriate for their purposes, must be balanced against the
relatively minor harm that results from disturbing or shocking the
sensitive soul.
This harm-if it is a harm-is relatively minor for two reasons.
In the first place, few who read literature that might offend the sensi-
tive will in fact be offended, for the sensitive seldom read such litera-
ture-unless they are looking for the shock.4 93 Those who dislike or
are offended by such literature need not, and ordinarily do not, read
it. If by accident they start to read a book that turns out to be of-
fensive, there is no obligation to continue reading. In this respect,
literature containing words, scenes, or ideas likely to offend some
readers is quite unlike publicly spoken obscenity from which there
may often be no escape. For the offensive materials are confined
within the covers of a book, and need not be brought to life unless
it is the reader's desire to do so.
In the second place, for the relatively few readers who will be
offended by what they read, the shock to their sense of decency
and propriety is really a very trivial harm, standing by itself. Those
who quite accidentally read a book containing unexpected scenes
489. See note 381 supra.
490. 1 Chafee, op. cit. supra note 475, at 56. He proceeds to spell out
such an argument in terms that might be applied to obscene literature.
491. United States v. Limehouse, 285 U. S. 424 (1932).
492. See Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Com-
monwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (1945) ; Common-
wealth v. Donaducy, 33 Erie Co. Leg. J. 330, 332 (1950) ("disgusting ma-
terial... of equal vice with.., obscene.., not apt to incite desires of any
kind. It arouses only a feeling of nausea. ...") .
493. Samuel Johnson is supposed to have replied to a woman who com-
plained about certain words in his dictionary: "Madam, you must have been
looking for them."
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or words of a nature shocking to them may at the worst become
momentarily embarrassed, and perhaps outraged or distressed that
such a book should be available to the innocent reader. Any such
emotional reaction is of relatively short duration, and causes no
serious or lasting harm. In .contrast, the local Comstock, who prowls
the book stores and magazine stands searching for "shocking pas-
sages" to point at in horror, alarm, and glee, finds exactly what he
is looking for and would be disappointed if he did not. Certainly he
cannot claim that offense to his sensitivity is a harm that justifies
censorship. On the contrary, he protests that he, at least, is im-
mune from harm.4 94 Of course, most readers experience no offense
at all, for they know the general character of the book and they
read it because they want to.495 Whether such literature may be
harmful to them from the standpoint of morals is quite a distinct
problem, which we consider below, but to sustain censorship in
order to protect the usual reader from being shocked or offended
by what he voluntarily chooses to read would be fantastic.
This occasionally asserted justification for censorship thus ap-
pears to be a relatively trivial harm-a temporary sense of shock,
irritation, and outrage at the worst; and it is experienced by rela-
tively few of a book's readers. This infrequent and trivial offense
to the sense of decency and propriety of relatively few readers can-
not possibly outweigh the values of unrestricted freedom in litera-
ture, unless the -author is writing only "dirt for dirt's sake. " 496
Such considerations have influenced some courts to interpret ob-
scenity statutes not to forbid vulgarity that is objectionable only
because of its offensiveness.4 97 Interpretation apart, a ruling that
mere offensiveness cannot constitutionally justify censorship of
literature would seem compelled by any reasonable judgment based
upon balancing the interests pursuant to the constitutional test for
freedom of expression. 498
494. "For whom does a censor speak? Obviously he does not limit his
ban to such things as may endanger his own moral prominence. Comstock
worked for many years in a sewer, as he himself described it, but he came
up every now and then and went to prayer meetings, where he was accepted
as devout and uncontaminated." Brown and Leech, Anthony Comstock 268
1927). See also Schroeder, Obscene Literature and Constitutional Law 102
1911) ; Ernst, The Point at Issue, 47 Am. Lib. Ass'n Bul. 457 (Nov. 1953).
495. As Professor Chafee so well states, the objection of those who
-would ban books for obscenity "is not that these books offend readers but
that they delight them." Chafee, op. cit. supra note 475, at 57.
496. See People v. Gotham Book Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 243, 246, 285
N. Y. Supp. 563, 567, 570 (Mag. Ct. 1936).
497. See cases cited note 274 supra.
498. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) where a unani-
mous Court placed freedom of expression above the risk of breach of the
peace that might well result from playing on a public street a highly offensive
record attacking the Roman Catholic Church in vicious terms. See Transcript
of Record, p. 41, ibid.
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c. Stimulating Sex: Thoughts
The basic evil aimed at by obscenity censorship is protection
of the moral standards of individuals, stated usually in very broad
and inexact terms, even by those who would reduce the excesses
of censorship. While the classic obscenity test in Hicklin, which
would ban literature believed to have a "tendency. . . to deprave
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influ-
ences" 499 has been largely discredited, even the most liberal opinions
still talk in broad terms of whether "the book as a whole has a
libidinous effect", whether its "dominant effect" is "to promote
lust",-"" or whether "the likelihood that the work will so arouse
the salacity of the reader"50' 1 outweighs its merits. Without at-
tempting to be precise, these and countless other statements relat-
ing to the "effect" of literature in determining the issue of ob-
scenity appear to be concerned both with the effect upon the mind
of the reader and the effect upon his conduct. There is no attempt
to separate these two, as indeed would be impossible in appraising
the effect of a book; nor is there any clear indication in typical
statutes or court decisions whether the ultimate evil sought to be
prevented is conduct inconsistent with the existing moral stand-
ards, or whether the "evil" of lustful sex thoughts, independent of
any risk of translating those thoughts into action, is also a purpose
of obscenity censorship.50 2
Is "corrupting" the reader's mind with sex thoughts, indepen-
dent of any risk that these may be translated into action inconsistent
with the current moral standards, in itself a sufficient evil to justify
censorship of literature? Without devoting much time to this
question, because whatever the answer we are immediately driven
to consider the stimulation of sex thoughts into sex conduct, it
should suffice to suggest briefly four reasons for real doubt that,
standing alone, the stimulation of sex thoughts is a sufficient evil
to justify censorship.
First, the creation of normal sexual desires is, in itself, neither
499. See text to note 207 supra.
500. See United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705,
707-708 (2d Cir. 1934).
501. United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1936).
502. In contrast to the legal materials, the church has been insistent
that evil thoughts on sex matters should be kept under control. In the Anglo-
Saxon period, the "expression of sex was no more an evil than the contempla-
tion of sex," for "sin lay in the desire" and on one occasion a 40-day bread
and water fast was required of a layman whose thought dwelt on fornication.
See May, Social Control of Sex Expression 82 (1931). That the church
today is still concerned with the mental effects of books dealing with sex is
indicated by Noll, Manual of the NODL 18 (n.d.), where the author speaks
of the 'vicious" effects of literature that falls short of pornography: "It
darkens the mind. It enfeebles the will. It corrupts the heart."
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immoral nor contrary to the accepted sex standards. The stimula-
tion of thoughts and ideas about sex, even creating the desire for
sexual intercourse, may often be in the public interest. For ex-
ample, education in sexual practices that will make for more satisfy-
ing marital relations, 5° 3 or an exposition of the delights that can
come from the perfect mating of a man and wife in a physical and
spiritual union,504 may well make for more stable family relation-
ships, and encourage a young man to marry rather than to experi-
ment in unmarried love. Even books that make love attractive when
it happens to be illicit may have a beneficial effect on some by at-
tracting young people to marry rather than to seek sex pleasures
outside of wedlock.
The second reason is that independent of the danger of inducing
or encouraging sex conduct inconsistent with accepted moral stand-
ards, the harm that can result from the stimulation of sex thoughts
is relatively trivial in the case of the normal person. 5 Sex thoughts
are perfectly natural ;506 without them men and women would be ab-
normal. The failure of pro-censorship literature or court opinions to
analyze the harm that can come from stimulation of sex thoughts,
independent of stimulating action, may indicate that this is really
not an important factor. But what are the possible harms? Some
of the religious advocates of censorship say that sex literature
"darkens the mind" and "corrupts the heart,"50 7 but they do not
503. ". . . for . . .marriage, in its essence, is a status of antagonistic
co-operation.
"In such a status, necessarily, centripetal and centrifugal forces are con-
tinuously at work, and the measure of its success obviously depends on the
extent to which the centripetal forces are predominant.
"The book before me here has as its whole thesis the strengthening of the
centripetal forces in marriage, and instead of being inhospitably received, it
should, I think, be welcomed within our borders." United States v. One
Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," 48 F. 2d 821, 824 (S.D. N.Y. 1931).
504. See, e.g., Dennett, The Sex Side of Life (1918), quoted in Dennett,
Who's Obscene? 144-145, 149-150 (1930), and partially quoted in United
States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564, 566-567 (2d Cir. 1930), where a conviction
for mailing a pamphlet on sex instruction for youth was reversed on the
ground that this "idealization of the marriage relation and sex emotions ...
tends to rationalize and dignify such emotions rather than to arouse lust."
Id. at 569.
505. See Roth v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 788, 792 (2d Cir. 1949) (concur-
ring opinion) : "I think no sane man thinks socially dangerous the arousing
of normal sexual desires. Consequently, if reading books has merely that
consequence, Congress, it would seem, can constitutionally no more suppress
such books than it can prevent the mailing of many other objects, such as
perfumes, for example, which notoriously produce that result."
506. See State v. Lerner, 81 N. E. 2d 282 (Ohio C.P. 1948): "Pure,
normal sex ideas are all right. Nature is aflame with sex ideas-the hoot of
the owl, the coo of the dove, the blossoms of the flowers, plants and trees, the
spawning of the fish. Sex is the why and wherefore of life and living."
507. See Noll, Manual of the NODL 18 (n.d.). Anthony Comstock
wrote: "Lust defiles the body, debauches the imagination, corrupts the mind,
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attempt to indicate just what this harm is, apart from its effect on
conduct. Basic to religious thinking is the emphasis that lustful
thoughts are as great a sin as lustful acts ;50o this talk of corrupting
the mind probably is derived from the religious duty to think noble
thoughts. Certainly it is entirely appropriate for the church to dis-
courage reading that turns the mind from spiritual to carnal
thoughts, but under our constitutional system the government can
scarcely claim authority to impose controls on literature for the
purpose of directing men's minds away from the physical interests
of life toward more spiritual and worthy thoughts. Another possible
evil is that excessive preoccupation with sex thoughts may perhaps
divert the mind from more important subjects,501 such as the study
of law, but to ban literature in order to turn the mind into more
productive or useful channels would be unthinkable. Again, litera-
ture dealing with sex may further stimulate the abnormal thinking
of those already mentally unbalanced on sex, but we cannot pos-
sibly justify censorship over the reading of all to protect the
mentally unbalanced,5 1' who can be set off on abnormal tangents
in innumerable ways."' Disregarding at this point the effect on
outward conduct, the insignificant and generally indefensible char-
acter of these "evils" that may result from stimulating sex thoughts
emphasizes the overwhelmingly greater weight of the values to
society of freedom in literature.
Assuming that the non-action "evils" that may result from
stimulation of thoughts and desires on sex are worthy of some
weight in the constitutional balancing of interests, there is a third
reason why the danger to worthwhile thinking cannot justify cen-
sorship; it is that the causal relationship between literature dealing
with sex and the composite sex thoughts and desires of an indivi-
dual is likely to be extremely tenuous. So many non-literary stimuli
to sex thoughts and desires are constantly thrown at mankind, and
are ordinarily so much more powerful in arousing sex thoughts
deadens the will, destroys the memory, sears the conscience, hardens the
heart, and damns the soul." See Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock 80(1927).
508. fatthew 5.27-28: "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old
time, Thou shalt not commit adultery: But I say unto you, That whosoever
looketh on a woman to lust after her bath commited adultery with her already
in his heart."
509. Cf. Edman, Arts and the Man 39-40, 45 (1949).
510. See text to notes 551, infra, 301-303 supra.
511. See, e.g., Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis 69-79, 82, 88-124,
126-127, 144-151, 165 (12th ed. 1950) ; London and Caprio, Sexual Deviations
462, 483 (1950).
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and desires,512 that in most cases literature touching on the subject
is an exceedingly minor factor. 513 Thus, even if these "evils" from
sex thoughts and desires are entitled to some weight, the relative
unimportance of literature in stimulating such thoughts only serves
to point up the overwhelmingly greater weight of the value of free-
dom to write and to read in this area.
Finally, if the purpose of obscenity censorship is really to con-
trol the kind of thoughts people have in this important area of
human life, this invades dangerous territory constitutionally. The
state can properly be concerned with controlling action that harms
society, but ordinarily it must stop short of what men think and
believe. In the area of sex morals, the Supreme Court recognized
this long ago in connection with polygamous marriage,51 4 and in
more recent days it has been emphasized in connection with politi-
cal problems.51 5 It seems unlikely there should or could be any
difference with respect to ideas or thoughts on sex problems gen-
erally. We conclude, therefore, that the possibility of stimulating
sex thoughts and desires, independent of the danger of stimulat-
ing objective conduct inconsistent with current standards, seems
altogether inadequate to justify the losses to society that result
from interference with literary freedom in this area.
d. Stimulating Sex Conduct
The primary evil aimed at by obscenity censorship is the dan-
ger that through stimulating sexual desire obscene literature will
512. See, e.g., Scott, Into Whose Hands 5 (1945) : "The sexually stim-
ulative effect of erotic literature is enormously exaggerated. Literature oc-
cupies a very inferior position in the list of aphrodisiacs. There are many
far more potent influences on sexual libido. Dancing exerts a powerful aphro-
disiacal effect; so does alcohol; so does women's dress; so does perfume. Yet
no one suggests the prohibition or suppression of any of these aphrodisiacs
on the ground of its 'corrupting influences' or its power of inciting sexual
passion. Indeed, the most powerful sexual stimulate of all, intimate contact
of the sexes, it is impossible, in any extended and complete sense, to guard
against"
513. Cf. Bradley, Essay on the Treatment of Sexual Detail in Litera-
ture in Selected Essays 618, 620-624 (1935), where the author points out that
in successful literature, as well as other successful art, the sexual ideas are
embodied in an impersonal setting, so that even in the romance novel an
understanding reader attaches them to an object or world of objects beyond
his own individual life: "The ideas and emotions that are aroused live not
merely in ourselves. They are beyond us as the souls of those figures, whose
acts and sufferings, whose sorrows, sins, and delights are for the moment
more real to us than anything of our own. What we feel into those creatures
we feel out of ourselves." But Bradley recognizes that some authors may
fail to keep the detail subordinate, so that it is no longer bound to the service
of the artistic purpose, and that the reader may fail to read understandingly,
with sufficient detachment of personal feeling.
514. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164, 166 (1897).
515. See, e.g., Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 396, 406-
412 (1950), and the separate opinions of Justices Frankfurter at 422 and
Jackson at 439-444; Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 502 (1951).
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lead to sexual conduct that is illegal or otherwise inconsistent
with current moral standards. Preventing deviation from the com-
munity standard in sexual matters is sufficiently important to so-
ciety that the danger of such deviation, if established, would doubt-
less be given great weight by the Court. If it were established that
reading a certain book would, in fact, induce normal persons5 8 to
engage in sexual conduct that seriously deviates from the accepted
community standards, there can be little doubt of the constitutional
power to ban the circulation of the book among the general public.
But our major difficulty arises because it is impossible to know that
the book will have that effect; instead, the effect of any book upon
the action of normal individuals is in the realm of prophecy. There-
fore, as regards this primary evil asserted in support of obscenity
censorship, the constitutional issue is not whether the evil, if estab-
lished, is serious enough. The issue is whether the possibility that
a particular book, or type of book, will adversely affect the moral
conduct of the normal reader is sufficiently great to constitute the
"clear danger" needed to outweigh the social values of the free dis-
tribution of the book and the harm to society that would result if
this type of book were subject to censorship.
In appraising the actual effect of literature upon the sex con-
duct of the reader, there is a great deal of talk and very little
factual data upon which to base a fair judgment. The advocates of
obscenity censorship simply assume, with no attempt at proof, that
reading about sex is a primary cause of sexual deviation. 17 Those
who oppose censorship point out that its advocates have "never
proved their case," 518 that censorship "scorns facts" and "substi-
tutes guesses for findings."5 10 On both sides there is much heat and
little light on this critical question. Both grasp at straws for lack
of any dependable information on the effect of reading upon the sex
conduct of the reader.
For example, advocates of strict obscenity censorship rely heavi-
ly upon the conclusions of prison wardens and law enforcement
officers that "salacious material" is an important factor in the in-
516. See text to notes 301-308 supra, and 551 infra for discussion con-
cerning effect on abnormal persons and youth.
517. See, e.g., Noll, Manual of the NODL 21 ff (n.c) ; Note, 34 Mar-
quette L. Rev. 301 (1951).
518. See Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock 266 (1927).
519. See Ernst and Lindey, The Censor Marches On 222-224 (1940). Cf.
Scott, Into Whose Hands 205 (1945) : "In the long history of the prosecu-
tion of books on the ground of obscenity, punctuated with many celebrated
cases, no one has ever been able to point out a specific person who has ad-
mitted being, or who can be proved to have been, injured by the publication
in question." To the same effect see Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock
266 (1927) ; cf. Schroeder, Obscene Literature and Constitutional Law 103(1911).
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crease in sex crimes, -5 2 0 although there is nothing to indicate that
these conclusions are based upon anything other than bare conjec-
ture from the fact that sex criminals also read sexy magazines.
Apart from the fact that these law enforcement officers appear to be
talking mainly of the "dirt for dirt's sake" type of material, there
is nothing even to suggest that their conclusions were based upon
any careful study designed to separate the various factors that
might contribute to sex delinquency. So far as appears, these con-
clusions are guesses based on the fact that those with anti-social
sexual desires do read sexy material, without any attempt to deter-
mine which is the cause and which the effect.521 On the other hand,
neither do those who oppose this type of censorship rely on any
scientific study of the possible causal relationship between sex litera-
ture and sex conduct. Instead, they point to studies indicating
that books stand very low among the various sources of sex knowl-
edge.522 From this finding, it is reasonable to conclude that litera-
ture dealing with sex is not an important factor in most sex con-
duct; but this does not necessarily mean that among those who
read, such literature is a negative factor. 2  Or they quote un-
named psychiatrists to the effect that "pornographic literature does
520. See Noll, Manual of the NODL 31, 123 (n.d.); Cooper, This
Trash Must Go, 103 Forum 61 (1940).
521. Cf. Armitage, Banned in England 33 (1932): "... is it not nearer
the truth to say that obscene reading can never engender sexual desire, but
sexual desire, especially if frustrated, may well beget an inclination for ob-
scene reading?"; Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock 272 (1927): "But
then you have the old problem of the chicken and the egg and no one would
be competent to tell whether the boy came to erotic thoughts by reason of
pornographic matter or whether he sought out the book and the pictures
because he was erotic. Comstock did not seem to realize the possibilities of
spontaneous combustion among the adolescents." See also Science News
Letter, Jan. 3, 1953, p. 9.
522. Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L.
Rev. 40, 73-74 (1938), points to two studies, not as conclusive, but as casting
doubt on the assumption that "immoral" books corrupt the reader. The first
is a study by the New York City Bureau of Social Hygiene, in which 1200
out of 10,000 college and normal school women graduates to whom letters
were sent reported on the source of their sex information. Only 72 out of
the 1200 mentioned books as the source, and though specific books were
named, not one of them was of the "dirty" type. Out of 409 responses to the
question inquiring what they found most sexually stimulating, 95 said books;
and 208 said "Man." The second study indicates that in a cross section of
youth, where scientific controls were used to get a good sample of youth from
16 to 24, the percentage securing their sex information from books was sub-
stantially less than among the college graduates. Out of 13,528 youth inter-
viewed only 4% named books as the source of their sex information. The
particular types of books were not identified. Bell, Youth Tell Their Story
41-42 (1938).
523. As indicated in note 522 supra, one study indicates that 95 out of 409
women found books the most sexually stimulating factor, but, of course, this
does not demonstrate that stimulation from books leads to improper sexual
conduct.
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not lead to sex crimes" with no reference to any substantiating
studies.
6 24
The unfortunate fact is that today relatively little information
is available on the effect of sex literature on human conduct. A
small amount of tangential information points toward the minor
significance of literature as the source of sex knowledge, or of
sexual stimulation, but this is fragmentary and falls far short of
relating the reading of sex literature to sexual conduct or miscon-
duct. For example, the Kinsey studies found that a slight majority
of men and women reported some "erotic responses" from a variety
of literature, some romantic, some more specifically sexual, but
only 16% of the women and 21% of the men reported that such
response was "definite" or "frequent. ' 2 5 Obviously this is too
vague to be dependable in forecasting what kind of literature is
likely to lead to sexual desire or arousement, and it gives no light
whatever on the causal relationship between such arousement and
actual sex conduct inconsistent with the community standard. Al-
though the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon
the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant
factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard,
no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test
this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex
literature upon sex conduct. Surely, methods of social investigation
have now progressed to the point where this can and should be
done.'"
But until dependable studies of this kind are made, literature
will continue to be censored upon the hypothesis that so-called
"obscene" literature is a significant factor in influencing substan-
tial deviation from the community standard of values. There are a
number of reasons for real and substantial doubts as to the sound-
ness of that hypothesis. (1) Scientific studies of juvenile delin-
quency demonstrate that those who get into trouble, and are the great-
524. See Science News Letter, Jan. 3, 1953, p. 9.
525. See Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, and Gebhard, Sexual Behavior in
the Human Female 669-670 (1953). In addition to those with "definite" or
"frequent" response, the report shows "some response" by 44% of the female
and 38% of the male, and "never" a response by 40% of the female and 41%
of the male. The sample included 5699 females and 3952 males.
526. See Ernst, What Should be the Relation of Morals to Law, 1 Pub.
Law J. 303 (1952) ; cf. Judge Frank, concurring "with bewilderment," in
Roth v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 788, 792 (2d Cir. 1949). Recently the U. S.
Senate authorized a subcommittee of the judiciary Committee to "conduct a
full and complete study of juvenile delinquency in the United States" with
special attention to its "extent and character" and "its causes and contributing
factors." Sen. Rep. No. 89, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ; 99 Cong. Rec. 6016(1953). With only $44,000 provided, there is little hope that this investigation
will provide any real light on the effect of books on juvenile delinquency.
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est concern of the advocates of censorship, are far less inclined to
read than those who do not become delinquent. The delinquents are
generally the adventurous type, who have little use for reading and
other non-active entertainment . 2 7 Thus, even assuming that read-
ing sometimes has an adverse effect upon moral conduct, the effect
is not likely to be substantial, for those who are susceptible seldom
read. (2) Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, who are among the coun-
try's leading authorities on the treatment and causes of juvenile
delinquency, have recently published the results of a ten year study
of its causes. They exhaustively studied approximately 90 fac-
tors and influences that might lead to or explain juvenile delin-
quency, -5 2 s but the Gluecks gave no consideration to the type of
reading material, if any, read by the delinquents. This is, of course,
consistent with their finding that delinquents read very little. When
those who know so much about the problem of delinquency among
youth-the very group about whom the advocates of censorship
are most concerned-conclude that what delinquents read has so
little effect upon their conduct that it is not worth investigating in
an exhaustive study of causes, there is good reason for serious doubt
concerning the basic hypothesis on which obscenity censorship is
defended. (3) The many other influences in society that stimulate
sexual desire are so much more frequent in their influence, and
so much more potent in their effect, that the influence of reading is
likely, at most, to be relatively insignificant in the composite of
forces that lead an individual into conduct deviating from the com-
munity sex standards.5 2 1 The Kinsey studies show the minor de-
gree to which literature serves as a potent sexual stimulant 5 5 ' And
the studies demonstrating that sex knowledge seldom results from
reading indicates the relative unimportance of literature in sex
thoughts as compared with other factors in society.5 31
In considering the constitutional validity of obscenity censor-
ship, how much weight should be given these genuine doubts and
the absence of any dependable information concerning the effect of
literature upon the actual sex conduct of readers? It is arguable
that "obscene" literature embodies no "clear" or "probable" danger
527. See Glueck, Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency 160-161 (1950).
528. For a quick summary of the broad scope of this study, listing all
factors investigated, see the table of contents, id. at xiv-xv.
529. The relative insignificance of reading as an aphrodisiac has been
noted by many commentators. See, e.g., Ernst and Lindey, The Censor
Marches On 255 (1940) ; Jackson, The Fear of Books 89-119 (1932) ; Mil-
ton, Areopagitica 16-17 (1644) ; Scott, Into Whose Hands 205 (1945) ; Alpert,
Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 74 (1938).
530. See note 525 supra and text thereto.
531. See note 522 supra.
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to the public interest when we really know so little about its effect
upon sex conduct. It could be urged that the degree of likelihood
that such literature will result in improper conduct does not even
meet the "reasonable tendency" test rejected by the Supreme Court
as not sufficiently "clear and present" to justify interference with
freedom to comment adversely and unfairly on pending judicial
cases.3 2 Yet the degree of likelihood that harm will result from
an utterance under attack is only one factor in the policy judgment
that requires the balancing of several conflicting interests in all
constitutional decisions relating to freedom of expression. At this
point it suffices to note that the absence of dependable information
concerning the effect of "obscene" literature on human conduct is
a significant factor that ought not to be overlooked in making such
decisions.
E. A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR OBSCENITY CENSORSHIP
The foregoing analysis requires the conclusion that much ob-
scenity censorship authorized by the terms of current statutes is
unconstitutional. The danger of influencing a change in the current
moral standards of the community, or of shocking or offending
readers, or of stimulating sex thoughts or desires apart from ob-
jective conduct, can never justify the losses to society that result
from interference with literary freedom. Until social research de-
velops more adequate knowledge concerning the effects of reading
on sex conduct, probably some leeway must be left for permissible
banning of books reasonably thought likely to lead to antisocial sex
conduct, when they are found to have insufficient offsetting value to
society. But even with this leeway, many of the books now claimed
to fall under the ban of current obscenity statutes are entitled to
constitutional protection. Certainly the constitutional right to free-
dom of expression cannot be impaired simply because a legislature
or court hangs the label "obscene" on a book. For example in our
opinion the Massachusetts decisions upholding convictions for sell-
ing Strange Fruit and An American Tragedy violated the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of expression. Similarly, many of the
books on the prosecutors' and NODL lists can not constitutionally
be banned.
We do not suggest that all obscenity censorship is unconstitu-
tional. It is arguable, of course, that the social values of censorship
are always outweighed by its serious deterrent to free expression,
particularly in view of the uncertainty that any evil within reach
532. Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U. S. 331 (1946) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941).
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of the government actually results from reading sex literature.
Yet such a position would be hard to maintain in the face of pub-
lished material that seems designed to stimulate sexual appetites,
contributes nothing to the expression of ideas, and is without liter-
ary merit. Whether such pornography should be forbidden, and
hence driven under cover, or should be permitted to circulate freely
and perhaps thereby die a natural death, is a policy decision for the
legislature. In any event it is not entitled to constitutional protection.
1. The Values of a Constitutional Test for Obscenity Decisions
Our real problem arises because it is difficult to draw the line
between material that can reasonably be thought harmful in its
effects on society, without sufficient offsetting social value, and that
which has social values sufficiently great to outweigh any reason-
ably predictable harm. If any obscenity censorship is to be at-
tempted, and this decision has already been made by legislation,
then some agency must be entrusted with power to discriminate
between that which appropriately falls under the ban and that
which does not. Up to now this decision has been made largely by
police officers, or other equally unqualified censors.5 8 3 When a case
has been carried to court, the controlling decision has too often
been made by a single trial judge, with or without a jury, with no
careful, independent review of the issue by an appellate court. 3 4
It is our contention that the final agency to determine what
literature may be censored must be an appellate court operating
under uniform constitutional standards and subject to ultimate re-
view by the United States Supreme Court. Apart from strong
reasons for constitutional protection arising out of the importance
of freedom of expression in this area,535 recognition of a constitu-
tional issue in obscenity censorship would have substantial addi-
tional advantages in providing a more dependable and sane method
of discriminating between that which may be banned as obscene
and that which must be permitted to circulate.
First, constitutional review of an obscenity ban will eliminate
the undeserved weight given to the decision of a trial jury or judge,
which is too frequently the decision of a single judge. Appellate
courts quite commonly treat the determination of obscenity in the
trial court as an issue of fact, subject to reversal only if the decision
could not reasonably be reached on the "evidence," which is simply
533. See text to notes 99-172 supra.
534. See text to note 536 infra.
535. See text to notes 402-415, 445-472 mepra.
[Vol. 38:295
THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
the book under attack. 36 This permits dodging what sometimes is
a tough question. In this area, where warped and narrow viewpoints
are common, such an important issue as banning the circulation of
a work of literature should never be decided without a fresh and
independent look by an appellate court. If a constitutional issue
is recognized here, the independent judgment of several minds will
be assured, and among them will likely be some acquainted with
literature and having an appreciation of literary values.
Second, constitutional review will insure more careful considera-
tion of all the factors that should enter into a policy determination
as to whether the country should be deprived of the opportunity
to read a particular book. Most courts give weight to most of the
factors that ought to be considered, though purporting only to
apply the statutory terms.5 37 Others appear not to concern them-
selves at all with these broader policy issues that are inevitably in-
volved in obscenity censorship. 38 If a constitutional review is
required, a more intelligent and carefully weighed determination
of these cases will be insured, for the constitutional test will neces-
sarily force appraisal of the appropriate factors, and in the back-
ground will always be the possibility of review and reversal by the
United States Supreme Court.
Third, a right to constitutional review of obscenity censorship
will make book censorship throughout the United States subject
to a uniform and liberal standard. Most of the book publishing in
this country is centered in New York. But whether the publisher
is in New York, or in some other state, prosecution of the pub-
lisher in the state of publication gives that one state the power
to limit the books that will be available throughout the entire
United States. Furthermore, apart from nation-wide control of
reading material by the state of publication, censorship in an im-
portant area of distribution sometimes causes out-of-state publish-
536. See, e.g., People v. Pesky, 254 N. Y. 373, 173 N. E. 227 (1930)
[where the court on this basis affirmed the conviction for possession for sale of
a copy of Arthur Schnitzler's Hands Around, the novel from which the motion
picture La Ronde was made. Censorship of the motion picture was reversed
per curiam in Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 346
U. S. 587 (1954) ] ; Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d
840 (1945) ; People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P. 2d 853 (1947).
537. See, e.g., Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945);
United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) ;
United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930) ; People v. Creative
Age Press, 192 ifsc. 188, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 198 (Mag. Ct. 1948) ; People v.
Vanguard Press, 192 Mfisc. 127, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 427 (Mag. Ct. 1947) ; People
v. Gotham Book fart, 158 Misc. 240, 285 N. Y. Supp. 563 (Mag. Ct. 1936).
538. See, e.g., Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) ;
People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P. 2d 853 (1947) ; People v.
Dial Press, 182 Misc. 416,48 N. Y. S. 2d 480 (Mag. Ct 1944).
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ers to revise or reject manuscripts before publication, thereby in-
terfering on a national scale with freedom to read. In this manner
pre-publication censorship in Detroit has affected the reading of the
entire United States.53 9 The right of citizens of the United States
to choose what they shall read should not be at the mercy of the
courts of any one or a few states. Literature is international in
scope, and should never be controlled by narrow, local standards.
At the very least it should be protected by a uniform standard
enunciated by the Supreme Court under the liberal principles of
the Bill of Rights, and subject to occasional control by that Court. 4
2. The Constitutional Standard: Major Values and
Significant Considerations
Just what should the constitutional standard be in obscenity
cases? No simple formula will do.54 1 Literature attacked as obscene
should be tested by the issues behind the phrase "clear and present
danger,"54 2 but this provides no formula; it is only a broad guide
539. See text to notes 145-146 supra.
540. It need not be feared that this would result in the Supreme Court
becoming, as Mr. Justice Jackson put it, "the High Court of Obscenity" 17
U. S. L. Week 3119 (1948) with a flood of obscenity cases to review. The
Supreme Court can fulfill its appropriate function by making clear the
standards to govern these constitutional decisions without attempting to
review many cases. Its jurisdiction is essentially discretionary, whether on
certiorari or appeal, and once the Court has made clear the factors that must
be weighed in determining the constitutional issue, there will likely be few
occasions when it will need to substitute its judgment for that of a state or
federal appellate court. Actually, the volume of cases to reach the appellate
courts is likely to be quite small. Despite all the agitation, there have been
relatively few obscenity prosecutions in recent years. With the establishment
of a more intelligent basis for determining obscenity, there may be still
fewer in the future, though it is conceivable that once a constitutional right
is recognized there will be less bowing to the will of the police censors and
for a short period resistance to police lists may result in more, rather than
fewer prosecutions.
541. There has been very little consideration of this problem, apart from
sweeping statements that the clear and present danger test should be applied.
See, e.g., Antieau, The Ride of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of its Ap-
plicability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 811, 833 (1950). Professor Chafee has suggested
that the test might be "clear and probable" danger of a "substantial evil."
See 1 Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 59 (1947). The most
complete analysis, reaching the most extreme conclusion, is in Commonwealth
v. Gordon 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949) aff'd sub. nor. Commonwealth v.
Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1950). There Judge Bok con-
cludes that conviction for literary obscenity should be permitted "only where
there is reasonable and demonstrable cause to believe that a crime or mis-
demeanor has been or is about to be committed as the perceptible result of
the publication in question: the opinion ... that a tendency thereto exists or
that such a result is self-evident is insufficient and irrelevant. The causal con-
nection between the book and the criminal behavior must appear beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 156.
542. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266 (1952).
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to the factors that should enter into the policy judgment required
in all freedom of expression decisions. We have already indicated
in broad terms that this policy judgment requires the alleged evils
to society from "obscene" literature to be balanced against the value
of the particular book and the value to society of freedom to read
and to write literature of this type.5 4
3
In the light of the foregoing analysis of the commonly asserted
evils, one phase of the constitutional standard is "clear" or "prob-
able" danger that the particular work under attack will lead to
sex conduct deviating from the legal or otherwise currently es-
tablished moral standards. But standing alone this states in a
deceptively simple fashion what must still remain a complex policy
judgment into which other factors must enter. Apart from the diffi-
culty of predicting the effect of a particular book on conduct, it dis-
regards the other side of the balance-the value or lack of value
of the book under attack, and the effect its banning may have on
freedom of expression in literature. Some books are so totally lack-
ing in merit, and so pornographic in content, that their weight in
the scale of values is so low as to be outbalanced by relatively slight
danger of causing improper sex conduct; and the banning of such
books poses no serious threat to freedom of expression in literature.
On the other hand, some books have such great literary merit, or
such great value in stimulating serious thought, that even though
they may reasonably be thought likely to affect adversely the sex
conduct of some readers, their weight in the scale of values, added
to the importance of freedom of literary expression, outweighs the
possibile evil that might result from their publication.
The constitutional standard in obscenity censorship cannot be
reduced to any formula. As in the case of all policy judgments in-
volving significant conflicting interests, a sound decision here re-
quires the careful balancing of all relevant factors bearing on (a)
the losses to society that may result from censoring the book, and
(b) the harms to society that may result from not censoring it.
Major values to be weighed in arriving at this policy judgment are
three: (1) The values to society of freedom of expression through
literature, and the importance to this freedom of avoiding govern-
mental action that tends to discourage freedom to read and write
in important areas of human interest, including sex. (2) The
value to society of the particular book or work of literature under
attack. (3) The value to society of avoiding the harmful effect on
sex conduct that might reasonably result from reading the book in
543. See text to note 473 supra.
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question, but weighed heavily against this value must be the recog-
nition that we have very little dependable information or knowledge
with respect to the effects of reading on human conduct in this area.
In weighing these major values in particular cases the following
considerations may often be determinative.
We believe the constitutional standard requires that a book be
judged as a whole, rather than by isolated words or passages.
Statutes that authorize a finding of obscenity based only on a part of
the book are to that extent unconstitutional, as are judgments of
obscenity similarly based. It is not possible for a court to give the
requisite consideration to the value of a book, or to the effect of sup-
pressing the book upon freedom of expression in literature, with-
out considering the entire book and the relationship of the disputed
passages to its theme. To permit a book to be condemned as obscene
solely because of isolated words or passages ripped from the total
structure of the work would result in depriving society of the value
of the particular book, and the value of freedom of expression
through literature, without judidial consideration of the value of
what is being destroyed.
Both the writer and publisher need assurance that their books
will be judged as a whole; for only in this way can the values of
freedom of expression through literature be protected. We have
seen that the censor is rarely a well-balanced and literate person;
he usually is compulsively interested only in finding what he seeks
and in its merciless and indiscriminate suppression once he finds
it.544 To put a writer's months or even years of creative work and
a publisher's capital investment in a new publication at the mercy
of such a person. without an obligation on the courts to evaluate
the book as a whole is to invite timidity and restraint in both
author and publisher-a sure way to destroy the value to society
of freedom of expression in literature.54 5
Society also needs the same protection to preserve the values
of the particular book under attack. If the now-discredited standard
that called for condemnation of a book solely because of its isolated
passages were ever literally and rigorously applied, much of the
world's great literature would have to be suppressed as obscene 5"
544. See Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock 272-273 (1927) ; Jackson,
The Fear of Books 84-85 (1932) ; Mencken, A Book of Prefaces 243-252 (5th
ed. 1924) ; Scott, Into Whose Hands 202-203 (1945).
545. See Craig, Above All Liberties 97-98 (1942); Forster, Abinger
Harvest 65-66 (1936) ; Mencken, op. cit. supra note 544, at 269-279; Scott,
op. cit. supra note 544, at 179-187; cf. Forster, Two Cheers for Democracy
31-35 (1951).
546. See Rex v. The Headmaster of Eton in Herbert, More Misleading
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or at least bowdlerized as Shakespeare and others were in Victorian
England.5 47 Even if exceptions to censorship be made for recognized
classics, equally great literature of tomorrow may well be suppressed
today if a book may be condemned on the basis of isolated passages.
We know what such an irrational viewpoint accomplished in Massa-
chusetts where suppression of Theodore Dreiser's An American
Tragedy4 " on this ground made Massachusetts the laughing stock
of the nation. It also demonstrated, even to the people of that state,
that society cannot tolerate such an absurd standard.54"
But in weighing the value of a particular book, the requirement
that the book be judged as a whole is not alone enough to give ade-
quate protection to society's interest in literature, or to insure ade-
quate consideration and understanding by the courts of the value of
the book in question. Something more is required to give sufficient
emphasis to the aesthetic, scientific, educational and other social
values of the book, and to enable the courts to appraise these values
intelligently. If, for instance, the particular book is a work of fiction
or poetry, it is important that it be viewed with a sympathetic ap-
preciation and understanding of the nature and function of imagina-
tive literature. Here, the appraisal of literary critics is indispen-
sible; ° for without it, judges are forced to assume the role of
literary critics themselves - a role that few courts, if any, are
competent to play. Much the same observation applies to non-
imaginative literature as well. In considering the values of such
works as Mary Ware Dennett's The Sex Side of Life or Dr. Marie
C. Stopes' Married Love, the testimony of experts appraising the
value of the particular book in satisfying a social need is equally
indispensible. Consideration of literary criticism and other expert
appraisal is probably not a constitutional requirement, but it is
essential for adequate fulfillment of the judicial function in constitu-
tional adjudication of obscenity charges against literature.
We believe the constitutional standard requires that in making
determinations as to the probable effect of a book on sex conduct,
courts must take account of the unsatisfactory state of a human
Cases in the Common Law (1930) ; Jackson, op. cit. supra note 544, at 118;
Vizetelly, Extracts Principally from the English Classics showing that the
Legal Suppression of M. Zola's Novels would logically involve the Bowdler-
izing of some of the greatest Works in English Literature (1888).
547. See Jackson, op. cit. supra note 544, at 55.
548. See Commonvealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N. E. 472 (1930).
549. See 1 Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 228-234
(1947) ; Grant and Angoff, Recent Developments in Censorship, 10 B. U. L.
Rev. 488 (1930) ; 59 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1946).
550. See text to notes 341-349 supra.
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knowledge concerning the effect of literature relating to sex. With
our present inadequate knowledge on this subject, a court would
probably not now be justified in taking the position that a legislature
is entirely wrong in basing obscenity legislation on the premise,
usually unstated, that reading some kinds of literature probably
affects the sex conduct of some readers. Obscenity censorship of
literature cannot be rejected in toto on the ground that the effect
of obscenity on sex conduct is too uncertain. But in view of the
importance to society of adequate protection for freedom of expres-
sion in literature, courts are obliged to give careful consideration to
whether there is any real and substantial danger that a particular
book will bring about anti-social sex conduct. Certainly, in view of
the good reasons for doubting that literature relating to sex has
any such effect, courts should never make the assumption-so com-
mon in past adjudications-that any literature labeled "obscene"
has an adverse effect on sex conduct. Such an assumption violates
a court's constitutional obligation to protect freedom of expression.
But tentative acceptance of the premise that some literature
dealing with sex can have an effect upon sex conduct cannot justify
approval of the stultifying Regina v. Hicklin rule that makes the
test for obscenity censorship the tendency of the book to deprave or
corrupt any whose minds are open to immoral influence. This rule
would reduce the reading fare of the public to a level suitable only
for some hypothetical person endowed with all the sexual sugges-
tibility than can be imagined in someone else.55' In our opinion the
Hicklin rule cannot stand in the face of a constitutional requirement
that courts weigh the social cost of censorship against its social gains.
The overwhelming cost to society of restricting adult reading and
expression to books and articles wholly acceptable for adolescents
and abnormal adults could not possibly be offset by the value of
protecting the relatively few young or abnormal readers from the
contingent and unpredictable effect some books might possibly have
upon them. Such a restriction on adult reading would, in our opin-
ion, be unconstitutional.
Yet what may be called the audience to which a particular book
is offered may well be a legitimate consideration in appraising the
book's threat to the social value of avoiding immoral sexual conduct.
Determination of the particular channel of distribution and the na-
ture of the sales promotion techniques largely controls the audience
to which the book is offered. The channel of distribution and the
nature of the advertising may also affect the attitude with which the
551. See text to notes 301-308 supra.
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normal reader within the selected audience reads the book. If both
are designed to appeal to those looking for pornography, it is a fair
assumption that the normal reader in that class reads the book for
its salacious passages. In such cases, courts may and should take
this factor into account in appraising the risk that immoral sexual
conduct may result from reading the book.5 2 Similarly, if a book is
aimed at a youth audience, a court in passing upon the constitutional
question can properly consider its probable effect on the sex conduct
of that intended audience. In doing so, however, courts should also
bear in mind the lack of dependable information on this point and
also the possibility that the values of the particular book may offset
whatever harmful effects it might have in the hands of even such a
reader.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current threat to freedom of expression in literature is the
mass suppression of books through secret lists distributed by pri-
vate or public authorities to book dealers or distributors threaten-
ing prosecution unless the books are removed from circulation. Judi-
cial recognition of constitutional protection for books attacked as
obscene might well bring about the defeat of this dangerous threat
to freedom. It should encourage some dealers and publishers to
resist the threat of the secret lists and thus force public prosecutions
aimed at individual books. It should also encourage publishers to
seek injunctions against the use of such lists by public authorities,
for the lists always contain some books whose suppression would not
be justified under the constitutional standard outlined above, wholly
apart from the possibility of attacking such lists as a prior re-
straint.5 Regardless of the manner in which the issue is raised,
recognition of the constitutional standard would require that each
book be considered on its individual merits, and thus discourage
their mass suppression. Equally important, it would insure an inde-
pendent review of the obscenity issue by an appellate court obliged
to evaluate the book as a whole and to give careful consideration
to all factors relevant in balancing the significant values affected
by obscenity censorship.
552. See text to notes 309-316 .mpra.
553. See text to notes 374-376 supra.

